THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF WORLD WAR II

WORLD ORDER IN THE 20TH CENTURY, AND RECONCILIATION AND CO-EXISTENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Report of the Symposium Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP)
Osaka University of Economics and Law
This document offers a report and selected papers of an International Symposium commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the end of World War II held December 3-4, 2005 under the auspices of the Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP), Osaka University of Law and Economics at the Tokyo International Exchange Centre. The event was co-hosted by Peking University, the University of Hawaii, with support from the United Nations University, the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Association of Peace Studies, and Asahi Shimbun. The symposium featured academic researchers and intellectuals from over ten countries in three continents and was widely attended. Focusing on the basic theme of “World Order in the 21st Century, and Reconciliation and Co-existence in the Asia Pacific”, the panelists examined three central issues: war and responsibility: the experiences of Europe, Japan and Asia; international collaboration and unilateralism under the post-war world order with specific reference to the Japan-US alliance and the East Asian community; and the failures and lessons of World War II.

The context of the symposium is provided by the mixed legacy of World War II, especially the changing global architecture of world politics both during and after the Cold War era. It is my solemn hope that the papers will generate further discussion and dialogue to rethink new avenues of international cooperation and promote reconciliation, particularly in the Asia Pacific, a major aim of CAPP. I am very pleased to present to you the report and selection of papers.

Kinhide MUSHAKOJI
Director
Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership
Osaka University of Economics and Law
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INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
COMMEMORATING THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE END OF WORLD WAR II:
WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY, AND
RECONCILIATION AND COEXISTENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Programme

December 3 (Saturday)

Chairperson

KIM Taemyeong, Professor, Centre for Asia-Pacific Partnership, Osaka University of Economics and Law

9:00-9:30 Opening Session:

Opening Addresses:

LI Yu (Professor, Peking University)
Hugh H.W. KANG (Professor Emeritus, University of Hawaii)
Wakio FUJIMOTO (President, Osaka University of Economics and Law)
Kinhide MUSHAKOJI (Director, Centre for Asia-Pacific Partnership, Osaka University of Economics and Law)

Special Guest:

Edward SHULTZ (Professor, University of Hawaii, President of the International Society for Korean Studies and former Director of the Center for Korean Studies at the University of Hawaii at Manoa)

9:30-12:30 Session 1:

WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE EXPERIENCES OF EUROPE, JAPAN AND ASIA
Session Coordinator: Takahiro KONDO (Associate Professor, Nagoya University)

Yuji ISHIDA (Professor, University of Tokyo), “Overcoming the Past: Japan and Germany”
Gerhard SCHILDT (Professor, Technical University at Braunschweig, Germany), “Responsibility for the War and Overcoming the Past: The Experiences of Europe, Japan and Asia”
Hochul SONN (Professor, Seogang University, South Korea), “The 60th Anniversary of the End of WWII and Settling the Past in Asia: The Korean Experience”

12:30:1400 Lunch

14:00-17:30 Session 2

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION AND UNILATERALISM UNDER THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER: THE JAPAN-US ALLIANCE AND THE EAST ASIAN COMMUNITY

Session Coordinator: Wakio FUJIMOTO (President, Osaka University of Economics and Law)

Haruki WADA (Emeritus Professor, University of Tokyo), “The East Asian Community and a Common House of Northeast Asia”
Jungmin SEO (Assistant Professor, University of Hawaii at Manoa), “Multiple Layers of ‘East Asia’ as an Area”
FAN Shiming (Associate Professor, Peking University), “Japan’s International Cooperation and Its Implications for China”
Helen HILL (Senior Lecturer, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia), “World Order in the 21st Century, and Reconciliation and Coexistence in the Asia-Pacific”

18:00-19:30 Reception

December 4 (Sunday): Symposium and Forum

Chairperson: KIM Taemyeong (Professor, Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership, Osaka University of Economics and Law)

9:30-12:30 Session 3

THE FAILURES AND LESSONS OF SIXTY YEARS AGO

Session Coordinator: Nobuo SHIMOTOMAI (Professor, Hosei University)

Stephen SCHLESINGER (Professor, New School University), “The Failures and Lessons of Sixty Years Ago: A Reevaluation of WWII”
Pierre GROSSER (Professor, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris), “Narrow Memories and Broad History: How to Think About the Second World War
Anatoly KOSHKIN (Professor, Orient University, Russia) “Postwar Reconstruction in East Asia from a Russian Perspective”
LIANG Yunxiang (Associate Professor, Peking University), “World War II and Sino-Japanese Relations: Reflective Views At the 60th Anniversary of the End of the War”
SRIMANJARI (Reader, University of Delhi), “The Failures and Lessons of Sixty Years Ago: An Indian Perspective”

12:30-14:00 Lunch

14:00-17:30 Session 4: Round-up Discussion and Forum
Session Coordinator: Kinhide MUSHAKOJI (Director, Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership, Osaka University of Economics and Law)

Rapporteur: Mustapha Kamal PASHA (Visiting Professor, Meiji Gakuin University)
LIST OF PANELISTS AND DISCUSSANTS

LI Yu, Vice Dean, Asia Pacific Research Institute, School of International Studies, Peking University

Wakio FUJIMOTO, President, Osaka University of Economics & Law

Hugh H.W. KANG, Professor Emeritus, Department of History, University of Hawaii

Yuji ISHIDA, Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo

Gerhard SCHILDT, Professor, Technical University at Braunschweig, Germany

Hochul SONN, Director/Professor, Institute of Social Sciences and Department of Political Science, Seogang University, South Korea

Takahiro KONDO, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Education and Human Development, Nagoya University

Haruki WADA, Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo

Jungmin SEO, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa

FAN Shiming, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University

Helen HILL, Senior Lecturer, Sociology of Development, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia

Stephen SCHLESINGER, Professor, New School University

Pierre GROSSER, Professor, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, Scientific Director, Diplomatic Institute of the French Foreign Ministry

Anatoly KOSHKIN, Professor, Center for Strategic Research, Orient University, Russia
LIANG Yunxiang, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University

SRIMANJARI, Reader, Department of History, Miranda House, University of Delhi

Nobuo SHIMOTOMAI, Professor, Faculty of Law, Hosei University

Kinhide MUSHAKOJI, Director, Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP), Osaka University of Economics and Law

KIM Taemyeong, Professor, Osaka University of Economics and Law

Mustapha Kamal PASHA, Visiting Professor, Faculty of International Studies, Meiji Gakuin University

Edward SCHULTZ, Professor, University of Hawaii at Manoa
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
COMMEMORATING THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF
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A REPORT

Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP)
Osaka University of Economics and Law
Tokyo, Japan
December 3-4, 2005
Introduction

An International Symposium was held at the Tokyo International Exchange Centre on December 3-4, 2005, under the auspices of the Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP), Osaka University of Economics and Law to commemorate the end of the Second World War. The event was co-hosted by Peking University and the University of Hawaii at Manoa with support from the United Nations University, the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Association of Peace Studies, and Asahi Shimbun. Widely attended, the symposium featured academic researchers and scholars from over 10 countries, addressing an extensive range of issues surrounding questions of war responsibility, divergent historical experiences of the Second World War, and the trajectory of post Cold War international relations, including the Japan-US Alliance, and unilateralism. The basic theme of the symposium, “World Order in the 21st Century and Reconciliation and Coexistence in the Asia Pacific” provided a focal point for a lively exchange of interpretations and analyses from a multidisciplinary perspective. This Report summarizes the main proceedings of the symposium.

The principal rationale for this symposium is provided by the spirit of commemorating the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. In part, however, recent dramatic changes in the character of world order have also propelled the need to reassess the gains and failures of the global constellation emerging out of the ruins in Europe and Asia. Following the end of the Second World War, several colonies achieved independence ushering in a post-colonial age. A new form of world order recognizing international law was born that was to be nurtured by the United Nations system. It aimed at establishing peace, development and human rights under the Bretton Woods institutions. The “Cold War” between the capitalist and socialist camps began quickly eroded optimism as the world was both faced the real threat of nuclear annihilation. A more recent and remarkable development, however, has been the unification of Europe that has rapidly expanded since the end of the Cold War. The Second World War provided the foundation for these somewhat contradictory developments in the subsequent decades.

Sixty years since the end of WWII, the global political and economic environment is radically different. The East-West bipolar system led by the United States and the Soviet Union—the nuclear power states—has been replaced by the mono-polar system headed by the United States as the only superpower seeking global hegemony. The world economy has rapidly globalized. In the era of a neoliberal globalization and hegemonic political and military regimes influenced strongly by neo-conservatism, the values and legitimacy of the systems believed to have been established at the end of WWII have been shaken by skepticism and the effectiveness of those values are now at stake.

This symposium was organized on the intuition that the manner in which WWII ended contained some, if not all, of the causes for the current problems. This fact requires thorough examination from both historical and theoretical perspectives. The timeliness of analyzing the Second World War from new points of view and to expand the scope of research by tackling issues that have as yet not been addressed cannot be exaggerated.

To explore these issues from cross-national perspectives, scholars and researchers from
several countries were invited, particularly those who specialize in the history of WWII in academic institutions around the world. Conceived as a forum for international and multidisciplinary discussion and critical dialogue, the symposium afforded a rare opportunity to explore new approaches to the analysis of WWII and provided novel insights into the question of reconciliation.

To summarize, the symposium covered several key issues, including the legacy of World War II, especially decolonization and the emergence of a world order based on international law under the United Nations system, but also the Cold War with the threat of nuclear warfare; the end of the Cold War marked by the unification of Europe, but also the emergence of a mono-polar system under the hegemony of the United States and neoliberal globalization; and lingering question of war responsibility and obstacles towards reconciliation and peaceful co-existence in the Asia Pacific. An examination of the link between the current world order and the manner in which WWII ended underscores the continuing effects of the past on the present and future possibilities. Opening Addresses

The symposium began with opening addresses by principal representatives of the co-hosting institutions: Professor LI Yu (Peking University), Professor Emeritus Hugh H.W. KANG (University of Hawaii at Manoa), Wakio FUJIMOTO (President, Osaka University of Economics and Law), and Professor Kinhide MUSHAKOJI (Director, CAPP). Professor Edward SHULTZ (University of Hawaii at Manoa), Special Guest to the symposium, also presented some brief welcoming remarks.

Professor LI Yu stressed the anti-fascist nature of the Second World War “between people who love peace and justice and the enemies of human civilization.” According to Professor LI, “the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against the Japanese invasion became an important part of the World Ant-Fascist War. We should draw lessons from history and be forward-looking in order to jointly push forward the healthy development of Sino-Japanese relations”. Acknowledging great changes in human society and the global environment since the end of WWII, especially the collapse of the colonial system, the growing importance of the developing world, and the end of the Cold War, LI saw both bright possibilities and various challenges in the future.

Hugh H.W. KANG saw two main objectives of the symposium, “an assessment of World War settlements and their effects on the post-World War II international order” as well as “to explore how the lessons learned from the experiences of the Cold War era be used in building a new world order of the 21st century to bring about active reconciliation and peaceful coexistence among the nations of the Asia-Pacific region”. This important symposium, in KANG’s view would illuminate the basis for “constructing a novel world order for the future that promises peace and prosperity for the peoples of the region”. However, “success or failure in the new era will ultimately depend on the choices the citizens of the nations in the region make. In other words, it will be up to us as individuals in these societies to translate the answers into actions that will determine the final outcome”. Given the controversial nature of some of the issues, KANG pleaded for engagement “in the debate with open minds and cool heads when dealing with the most inflammable topics on our
agenda”. Only a willingness “to open our minds even to views contrary to our own” could pave the way towards mutual understanding “and build a bridge for lasting reconciliation and coexistence among us”. Citing the example of Hawaii, KANG noted the prevalence of peaceful coexistence among all the ethnic groups, despite “a deep-rooted mentality that often sets up insiders, kamaaina, against outsiders, malahini haole”. Hawaii’s example was quite applicable to Japan, Korea, and China.

The President of Osaka University of Economics and Law, Wakio FUJIMOTO thanked the international participants and the supporting organizations, notably the United Nations University, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, the Asahi Shimbun, and the Japan Association of Peace Studies, who had cooperated in the holding of this symposium. He also detailed the organization of the two-symposium structure of the different session, emphasizing the need to “draw lessons from history and be forward-looking in order to jointly push forward the healthy development of Sino-Japanese relations.”

The end of WWII, he noted, saw the triumph of democracy over fascism, followed by decolonization and the emergence of a new world order emerged, led by the United Nations and based on its fundamental principle of peace and human rights. Despite “this early optimism”, the Cold War produced “a dangerous standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union”. During this period, there several attempts to face “war responsibility” and to “overcome the past” in Europe. “The integration of Europe is one outcome of those attempts. On the other hand, unfortunately, the situation was different in East Asia.” FUJIMOTO underscored the drastic change in the past twenty years in the world political and economic climate. “The collapse of the Soviet Union and demise of the “East” has brought the global hegemonic system under a single superpower, the United States, and the world economy has been increasingly exposed to the rapid flows of globalization”. US unilateralism against the principle of international cooperation was an important agenda which we currently face. Alongside these issues, FUJIMOTO saw an urgent need for “new interpretations and understandings about World War II and its legacy”. An overview from multiple standpoints to provide new perspectives for world order in the 21st century would also offer hope for reconciliation and coexistence in Asia-Pacific.

Kinhide MUSHAKOJI, Director of CAPP, and the principal force behind the philosophy and design of the two-day event, also expressed his profound thanks to the North East Asia Research Center at Peking University, the Center for Korean Studies at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and all panelists and participants who had made this symposium possible. He provided three principal reasons for the symposium. First, although the 60th anniversary of the end of WWII had been discussed in many forums, especially in Europe, there was a general tendency in the Asian part of the world to detach the war in the Pacific from World War II. MUSHAKOJI acknowledged Anatoly Koshkin’s (Orient University, Russia) important suggestion to view the two regions as an indivisible whole. In the experience of the former Soviet Union, Asia and Europe could not be divided. This symposium reflected the unity of the historical experience of WWII.
The second reason for the symposium was linked to recent political developments, especially in Japan. While many good things that emerged out of the victory, MUSHAKOJI noted, they were now put into question in this ‘war on terror’, including the Peace Constitution, which was under threat of abrogation. It was important, he stressed, to revisit those issues in the light of the historical experience of WWII.

Concerning the question of reconciliation, the third main reason for the symposium, MUSHAKOJI believed that reconciliation could only be based on a correct understanding of history. He admired European colleagues for their interpretations of the historical past in the spirit of mutual cooperation. Because of some erroneous concepts among some members of the ruling elites, reconciliation, MUSHAKOJI cautioned, was being made difficult. A clear-minded analysis of WWII was crucial. Finally, he expressed his sincere hope that the symposium would be useful not only for the academic community, but also towards fostering reconciliation.

Edward SHULTZ, also stressed that the importance of a postwar assessment, which was both “laudable and essential”. Close to Pearl Harbor, and as a scholar of Korean affairs, he was acutely aware of the tragic consequences of war. In Japan, China and much of Asia, tales of horror were legion. “Everybody”, SHULTZ believed, “wants reconciliation”. However, there was a mixed record of past efforts as nationalism had been fanned in individual countries and the mass media had bred sensationalism. On the other hand, there were also hopeful signs when leaders could come together and take helpful measures to promote reconciliation. In his view, reconciliation was both “possible and imperative”.

First Session: War and Responsibility: The Experiences of Europe, Japan and Asia

The first session was chaired by Takahiro KONDO (Nagoya University), who offered three principal observations as a staging ground for examining the question of “war responsibility”. He noted that there was a general tendency to see Germany as the successful case in order to draw inferences for Japan. On this view, Germany had managed to have friendly reconciliation with her neighbors. Even victors could learn from the German experience. Second, in the Japanese context, there was the lingering issue of historical textbooks, but also the controversy regarding the Yasukuni Shrine. Professor Kondo was critical of Japan’s reluctance to review textbooks. Finally, he believed that there was a need to promote universal values with an emphasis on civic education. Germany served as a good example in this regard.

The three historically textured presentations tackled a range of issues surrounding the question of war responsibility in Japan, Germany and Korea, including varied national responses to WWII and an examination of domestic, regional and contexts; the main obstacles reconciliation, including political, cultural and psychological factors; and the roles of governments and civil societies.

Yuji ISHIDA focused on the major factors which differentiated Japan and Germany in their relation to the legacy of WWII, offering an account of the first two decades after the end of WWII.
He explored the meaning of the term ‘overcoming the past’ as a continuous process with reference to four key aspects of post-WWII German history: (a) compensation for the victims of Nazi crimes; (b) the Nuremberg Trial; (c) regulation of neo-Nazi movements; and (d) history education stressing the Nazi period including anti-Holocaust education. On balance, Germany has been successful in reconciliation unlike Japan which has been stubbornly tied to the past as shown in the textbook and Yasukuni issues, as noted by Takahiro Kondo.

Gerhard Schildt clearly saw both Germany and Japan as the principal instigators of WWII, but situated his remarks within discrete historical variances, especially Japan’s late arrival as an imperialist power and negative Western response to Japanese’s aspirations. He delineated four different paths taken by the axis powers and their allies (Italy; Germany and Japan); countries occupied by the Soviet Union (namely Eastern Germany, Hungary and Romania); and Finland and Austria with an emphasis on the Cold War context. Schildt saw the dismantling of imperialist powers and their transformation into democracies as the principal legacy of WWII. Finally, he saw an affinity between political freedom and reconciliation, which in his view explained the successful experience in Germany, not in Japan. This claim on the political preconditions for reconciliation produced some lively exchange in the symposium.

The third presentation by Hochul Sonn focused on the Korean experience during and after WWII, with an emphasis on the mutual constitution of right-wing Japan, Korea and China that were feeding off each other. He also saw Japan’s reluctance towards reconciliation in the historical framework of US anti-communist policy exacerbated by Japan’s complicity in that policy. Obstacles to reconciliation were, according to Sonn, were a part of the weakness of civil society and peace activism in Japan. He was critical of what he termed “Korea’s less than generous attitude” towards settlement due to US military occupation and the sustained role of collaborators, some in very high positions, in post-War Korean politics. Presently, the advent of neoliberal globalization was threatening world peace because it was creating “Armed globalization” symbolized by the War on Iraq and Pre-emption. Sonn’s sobering account underlined the political difficulties towards reconciliation in East Asia.

The three presentations in the first session were followed by a spirited discussion on a large menu of related issues, including the complex relationship between the past and the present and the potential for deploying the past for political ends. Contrary to popular perception, the centrality of China in the Korean equation, not North Korea, was emphasized. There was also the recognition that there was no ‘science of reconciliation’ despite rich historical precedent. The panelists also raised a number of questions concerning the relation between war responsibility and reconciliation. How does this relationship actually work in the case of Japan? How did the Communist victory in China shape Japanese attitudes towards reconciliation, the question addressed in Sonn’s presentation. There was also the issue of assessing the impact of the US occupation of Japan on reconciliation in East Asia, especially with the onset of the Cold War. Given the contrasting historical trajectories of Europe and Asia, how did the Cold War actually shape the course of events in the two
continents? Finally, there was also the question of why the Bandung spirit of peaceful coexistence was abandoned. Specifically, what was Japan’s attitude towards Bandung and other multilateral arrangements outside of the Japan-US alliance? These salient questions raised during the discussion period offer a vibrant research agenda for future academic exploration, but also impact the political discourse on the challenges of reconciliation in the Asia Pacific region.

**Session II: International Collaboration and Unilateralism under the Postwar Order: The Japan-US Alliance and the East Asian Community**

The second session of the symposium was devoted to the postwar architecture of international relations, characterized by two principal designs, especially with regard to the East Asian community. *Wakio FUJIMOTO*, the session coordinator, set the stage for the session by highlighting three central points. First, he noted the difficulty of reconciliation in East Asia, especially against the background of any attempts on the part of Japan to propose an East Asian community. Reminiscent of the idea of the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere, the proposal was received with considerable suspicion amongst Japan’s neighbors. Second, *FUJIMOTO* raised the key issue of membership. How should we understand the new order in the Pacific Area? The scope of the community was central to any viable proposal, specifically with regard to whether the United States ought to be included or excluded from the East Asian community. Lastly, Fujimoto, directed attention to the impact of US unilateralism on East Asian community, particularly with reference to the potential hazards of joining the US-led war.

The four papers presented in this session all stressed the difficulty of creating an East Asian community due to historical, political, and philosophical differences among East Asian polities. Without a common point of reference, it was not possible to forge a viable community. Offering a wealth of historical example, *Haruki WADA* (University of Tokyo) identified different schemes of creating an East Asian community. He framed his presentation by showing different meanings and conceptions of an East Asian community. But, he also noted some of the serious impediments to its creation, notably Sino-Japanese relations and the question of US membership. *WADA* used the metaphor of a two-floor house, a North East Asian community, including the US plus a Southeast Asian community without the US. He believed that the two visions could be eventually connected.

In his presentation, *Junmin SEO* (University of Hawaii at Manoa) challenged the concept of a pre-fixed region, cautioned against haste in creating an East Asian community in favor of gradualism, and stressed the importance of memory and knowledge production. In the first instance, *SEO* suggested four different ways of conceiving a region: as a ‘security complex’ in which the security of several states was indivisible. He explored the implications of this concept drawn from his reading of international relations theory, including China’s role either as ‘balancer’ or a multilateral partner. A second model was strictly economic in nature, for instance, APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Community) and AMF (Asian Monetary Fund). *SEO* believed that financial regionalism had made a major impact in the Asia Pacific with 16 currency swap arrangements.
Regionalism in this regard was linked to developmentalism. A third vision of a region derived from the notion of shared memories and history. However, often domestic legitimacy had come from nationalism. The core issue is who remembers, not what is remembered. Finally, SEO saw East Asia as an area of knowledge production, especially in attempts to denationalize history as some recent feminist historians had done in reexamining the past. The creation of subnational networks was important in this regard.

**FAN Shiming** (Peking University) offered a Chinese view of Japan’s international cooperation, which has been “a strategic, not tactical, choice for Japan”. According to FAN, international cooperation has been both an expression of Japan’s international identity and a vehicle of foreign policy. These aspects should be seen in the context of Japan’s historical legacy in Asia and its civilian, not military power. Japan has opted for bilateral relations, notably with the United States, not multilateral relations. There has been a tension between idealistic international cooperation centered on the United Nations and realism centered on Japan-US alliance. On balance, Japan has tilted in favor of the United States. Stressing the presence of contradictory impulses in Japan’s identity, whether Japan was Asian or Western, FAN proposed that these impulses had created real problems for Japan as well as cooperation in East Asia. Japan has not been able to resolve this problem. He offered the counter-intuitive claim that Japan’s international cooperation, especially the Japan-US alliance, has been to China’s benefit since it limits Japan’s ambition for regional dominance and also provided an example to China.

**Helen HILL** (Victoria University, Melbourne) focused on the much neglected small island countries in the Pacific. She placed her discussion in the context of World War II history. Challenging the common perception of the Oceanic region as “empty space”, HILL demonstrated the significance of this region during World War II, especially with regard to the effects of war. In the postwar period, there were different conceptions of security in this region with greater emphasis on the welfare concept (what one may call human security) with a focus on environmental concerns than military security. HILL also stressed the role of civil society, especially the involvement of women in the peace movement.

As with the first session, the discussion in Session II covered a wide variety of issues, including the perennial tension between Japan and China, which was seen as the main obstacle to an East Asian community, but also the role of the United States. The discussion also examined the model of the “Six-Party” talks as a viable form to think of an East Asian community, recognizing the absence of a tradition of concert in North East Asia. Japan’s responsibility in resolving the conflicts with China, Russia and Korea and potential implications of changing the Japanese Constitution reappeared as principal trends for investigation. The limits of popular culture as a vehicle for creating an East Asian community and the political uses of culture such as the nationalization of Confucius in China were also highlighted. Finally, the rise of China, especially as a military power, came under scrutiny.
Session III: The Failures and Lessons of Sixty Years Ago

This session examined the legacy of WWII, especially with reference to the mixed, mostly detrimental socio-economic effects of WWII in various regions; country-specific perspectives on the War; post-War Sino-Japanese relations; different visions of world order, and emergence of US unilateralism as a replacement of multilateralism. Nobuo SHIMOTOMAI (Hosei University), session coordinator, introduced the panel by recognizing diversity of historical interpretations and perspectives as represented in the present symposium. SRIMANJARI (University of Delhi) analyzed the negative effects of WWII on India, including India’s massive contribution to the war effort; devastation of its infrastructure in the face of advancing Japanese; and severe economic and social effects, especially famine. She also examined the impact of the war on decolonization. In her view, the War accelerated the pace of decolonization, but also affected domestic politics. Similar points were also echoed by Professor HILL in the discussion.

Anatoly KOSHKIN (Orient University, Russia) stressed the point that the history of WWII has been used as a powerful political, ideological weapon in the domestic politics of each country. The key issue in Russo-Japanese relations remains the actual reasons for Stalin’s entry into the war, to capture Japanese territory or fulfill Russia’s alliance obligations. Based on recent archival work, he noted, three key things have emerged: Stalin wanted to confirm the presence of the USSR in the process of postwar reconstruction of East Asia, prevent US territorial gain near the Soviet border and contain US plans for Asian Pacific dominance, and ensure favorable conditions for consolidating alliance between China and the USSR. KOSHKIN suggested that the structure of the Cold War in East Asia was still too strong to dismantle. He viewed US militarism as a serious obstacle to peace in East Asia.

LIANG Yunxiang (Peking University) offered his reflections on Sino-Japanese relations by focusing on the Sino-Japanese War which began before the War in Europe. He examined the principal causes of the War and conflicts between China and Japan as well as the results of WWII and Post-War Sino-Japanese relations. Finally, he identified key lessons from the War and New Sino-Japan Relations.

Pierre GROSSER (Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris) placed his presentation within a broader historical narrative, offering a non-linear, non-chronological reading of our times. He proposed that there were three ways of thinking about WWII. First, “nothing has changed and nothing can change”. The essential idea here was that the rules of the game remain the same, with same mental maps, language, discourses, strategies of inclusion and exclusion. In this perspective, there are always the same questions: What is the distribution of power, the question of unipolarity or multipolarity and fields of conflict. The second way to think of WWII was to see “a world in progress”. With hindsight, WWII appears as a deviation from the right path of history. On this view, after WWII, that path was restored. “WWII was a great washing machine which cleaned part of the world”, GROSSER noted. In this perspective, the post WWII period was the birth of a pacific, democratic and prosperous space. The third way of thinking about the world saw the emergence of a
new kind of modernity from the 1880s with mass politics, mass parties, and mass production. Within this larger framework of investigation, GROSSER identified three possible scenarios for East Asia: the primacy of geopolitics with territorial problems and national mobilization; the creation of a pacific community with common norms and common security with Japan as a link between the Asian community and the transatlantic community or a global community with accountable governance; and bottom-up interdependence with people to people contact, tolerance and criticism of the remnants of the past. However, he proposed, “only the future could tell us what the past was”.

Three principal questions emerged as the main foci during the discussion period: the social-economic effects of WWII and the link between WWII and the decolonization process; the controversy over the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute; and possibilities and limits of civil society as a force of progress given its contradictory nature.

Session 4: Round-up Discussion and Forum

Session Coordinator: Kinhide MUSHAKOJI (Director, Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership, Osaka University of Economics and Law)

The fourth and final session was chaired by Kinhide MUSHAKOJI, the Director of the Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP). A detailed report of the previous three sessions was presented by Mustapha Kamal PASHA (Meiji Gakuin University), the Rapporteur for the symposium. He stressed the importance of the international meeting and identified its location within the context of recent reflections on the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II and its meaning, particularly in reference to East Asia. Revisiting the principal foci of the symposium, three questions were relevant: (1) how decolonization was accompanied by the emergence of a world order based on international law under the United Nations system but the Cold War in a sense subverted the promise of decolonization; (2) how there were mixed results of the end of the Cold War, witnessed on the one hand by the unification of Europe, and the emergence of a unipolar world under the hegemony of the United States and the advent of neoliberal globalization, on the other; and (3) an examination of the link between the current world order and the manner in which WWII ended, specifically as Kinhide MUSHAKOJI noted, the usual tendency to separate the discussion of the Pacific War from the war in Europe. The symposium was also relevant because there was a potential that the gains of the anti-fascist war in Asia could be lost because of impending changes of the Constitution in Japan as well as within the larger framework of the ‘War on Terror’. The general theme of the symposium engaged the issues of war and responsibility (contrasting cases of Europe, Japan and Asia); the pitfalls and limits of international collaboration with the emergence of unilateralism (impacting the formation or forging of an East Asian community; and failures and lessons of what we have learnt.

The Rapporteur also raised some questions for reflection and discussion in his Report. On the first session, he questioned a tendency in the presentations and discussion to focus more on
reconciliation but not as much on the relation between war responsibility and reconciliation. How does this relationship actually work? Then there was the lingering question of the impact of the Communist victory in China and how it had shaped attitudes toward reconciliation in the region. There was also the issue of the impact of the US occupation in Japan in consolidating barriers against reconciliation in the region. Perhaps, the Occupation might explain the difference between Germany and Japan.

On the second session, the Rapporteur stressed the need to examine the importance of internal debate within the countries of East Asia to avoid the tendency to present a uniform image of each country. Civil societies are not monolithic. What would be the impact of democratization in China, for example, if that were to happen? Another set of issues for further examination was the impact of globalization on national consciousness. Is national identity being strengthened or weakened? In this regard, the growing polarization within the East Asian countries could easily fan nationalism. On the other hand, nationalism could be easily mobilized by the State to silence internal dissent. The potential dangers of conflict over the Taiwan Strait could not be exaggerated, a topic not fully explored in the symposium. Finally, the actual impact of US unilateralism, especially the Iraq War, on East Asia, could have reaching implications.

On the third session, PASHA challenged the proclivity to structure the discussion in terms the national imaginary. This prevented an exploration of the diversity within East Asian countries. Second, there was the usual practice of treating European history in modular terms with Asian history as a derivative discourse. Finally, there was need to move beyond strict chronological periodizations to thinking of the meaning of history.

These comments were followed by a vigorous debate over various issues raised in the previous sessions, focusing primarily on the question of reconciliation between Japan and China, but also on different facets of World War II history. SONN raised the question of the linkage between democracy and reconciliation, a point stressed by SCHILDT. There was a need for clarification of this point since reconciliation was a complex issue. SONN emphasized the need to make a distinction between an apology and reconciliation. In the context of an apology, the character of the government was quite salient, whether it was a democracy or a dictatorship. Reconciliation, on the other hand, also involved the grassroots level. In FAN’s view, freedom was a double-edged sword. As noted, freedom of speech, elections or thought could also trigger nationalism. MUSHAKOJI observed that despite broad popular support for reconciliation, the Japanese public was unable to convince the government to apologize properly. While there was a will for reconciliation, Prime Minister Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits were posing problems but were excused because Japan was a ‘free’ country. SONN saw Japan’s civil society divided into two camps: those who were willing to apologize and reconcile, and others, including powerful rightwing politicians, who did not wish to. It was necessary to examine the balance of power within civil society to make sense of reconciliation. ISHIDA drew from the example of post World War II Germany which had made several official gestures to formally apologize during visits of German chancellors and presidents.
to war memorials. **WADA** took an historical perspective on the issue of reconciliation between Japan and its neighbors. He reminded the audience that the Peace Treaty between Japan and Taiwan in 1951 involved neither an apology from Japan nor an admission of responsibility. Similarly, the Peace Treaty between Korea and Japan in 1965 did not address the issue of an apology or war reparations or apology. According to **WADA**, it was only in 1972 with the normalization of relations that issue of war damage issue was raised as well as soul-searching between China and Japan, but no apology was made. Officially, the issue has been raised quite recently. It appears that the minimum assumption of an apology for reconciliation is a recent development. Even during Zhang Zemin’s visit to Japan, the need for reflecting on the past was mentioned, but not apology. The assumption that the apology is necessary for reconciliation has not been made by the Japanese government.

The discussion returned to the idea explored earlier whether reconciliation was an art or a science. **HILL** gave the examples from post-Apartheid South Africa and East Timor. These cases demonstrated that reconciliation was a series of practices, both an art and a science; social practices which involve both state and civil society. These practices had been further researched and developed by various organizations like the Center for Transitional Justice. **HILL** stressed that there were key stages in this process, including information-gathering for purposes of ‘truth-seeking’. There was agreement between the parties what the actual nature of what has been done and what the apology was all about. Similarly, in the case of East Timor, people’s reconciliation involved large numbers and low-level perpetrators went through the process in which truth-seeking confessions were followed by forgiveness by victims. However, for major crimes the situation was not the same. Many perpetrators in the present government could not sufficiently dissociate themselves from the crimes in East Timor and despite calls from human rights groups to hold only individuals in previous governments responsible has not been heeded. To the extent that government is protecting them, only shows that Indonesia is not a democratic country. In this regard, there is a connection between democracy and the ability to have reconciliation. **HILL** noted that the principles involved could be adapted in other contexts. **FAN** made the provocative point that it was not simply a question of an apology, but more importantly, history. History pertains to the recollection of the past. In this context, the Nanjing massacre was a relevant example. Apology cannot override the question of denial of that massacre, nor can visits to the Yasukuni shrine. The question of redefining history was the key. The session coordinator, **Kinhide MUSHAKOJI** agreed that without an acknowledgement of truth, apologies were meaningless. As an historian, **KOSHKIN** also saw apology and remorse as complex issues. **SCHILDT** believed that it was both a question of heart and mind. Comparing the situation with the period preceding World War I, the question of pride was not insignificant in relations between nations, also demonstrated by the example of the Pacific small islands.

The open discussion also touched the periods before World War II, including the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905. In response to the observation from a member of the audience that Japan may have been an ‘agent of Britain’ in the two great wars, **KOSHKIN** placed Russo-Japanese relations in the context of both Russian and British expansion. Recent scholarship, he noted also
shows that the United States may also have been involved due to expanding economic interests. Before WWII, Japan had concluded a neutrality pact with Stalin while contemplating attacking Russia. Japanese expansion into the North was an invaluable opportunity. The Axis Pact provided a window of opportunity for Japan to try to have the Russian empire collapse.

The concluding portion of the fourth session concentrated on the complex Sino-American and Japanese-American relations. MUSHAKOJI challenged conventional realist thinking as exemplified by Kenneth Waltz in 1990s, which saw the possibility of U.S. intervention in interstate relations given its status as a hegemonic country, with the ability to intervene in interstate situations. The principal aim in these prognostications was to legitimate US hegemony. From this perspective, the US wants to divide China and Japan. Given the context of China’s rise and Japan’s decline, this was a serious stage in the presumed conflict between China and Japan. At some point, the Japanese side would go nuclear. At another point, US power would be necessary to stop a war between China and Japan. The US was trying to divide East Asia and oppose reconciliation between China and Japan. This scenario posed problems for Japan whether to side with the US in attempts to isolate China or to help forge an East Asian community through reconciliation. The option of good, not power, relations between China and Japan were not envisioned in realist accounts. MUSHAKOJI saw the need for Common Security in place of the so-called security dilemma between China and Japan. While relations between the two countries could be encapsulated in the phrase, ‘cold in politics, hot in economics’ the Bush Doctrine also saw Sino-American relations in those terms, friendly with Chinese markets, but inimical to the Chinese government.

According to FUJIMOTO the establishment of an East Asian community was a desirable aim, complex trilateral relations between China, Japan and the US had to be considered. While the US was not an East Asian country in historical terms, the US enjoyed major influence in the region and on Sino-Japanese relations. The establishment of an East Asian community is in the interest of both China and Japan, but it is not in the US interest. Equally so, it is not in the US interest to see conflict between China and Japan. FUJIMOTO saw no single national interest but a variety of economic, political, and security interests. However, security was more important than either politics or economics. The cooperative relations in East Asia centered on ASEAN, which had strong relations with both China and Japan. The situation in the region was abnormal and quite mystifying. GROSSER analyzed Sino-Japanese relations in light of recently released documents on the normalization of Sino-American relations which reflected Chinese concerns not only about the Soviet Union, but also Japan. From an historical perspective, GROSSER also saw the US as a declining power, increasingly adopting the role of an ‘external balancer’.

SEO questioned the pre-1997 state-centered language to explain economic activity in East Asia. The new middle class in China, for example, was more worried about the global stock market. In the age of globalization, a new homogenized identity of stock-holders was becoming more salient than national identities. In East Asia, there were new economic flows and denationalization of capital. War and memory had to be seen in the context of deconstruction of the national, SEO
insisted. Similarly, security was now a global issue, as reflected in the role of Self Defense Forces (SDF) in Japan and visits to the Yasukuni shrine did not necessarily characterize Japanese politics. GROSSER disputed the link between economic interdependence and peace, citing the period before World War I. SONN also saw the need to explain Sino-Japanese economic relations at different levels of analysis. He saw considerable polarization within Japanese society. Growing economic ties with China do not necessarily benefit Japanese workers. Integration has differential effects on social classes and sectors.

The notion of inseparability between politics and economics was also questioned by FAN. Although there was already a popular culture in the region, this was not enough to change mutual perceptions as recent opinion polls suggested. He saw the need for ‘effective exchange’ between China and Japan. The two countries have been economically interdependent, but the community is not institutionalized. FAN opposed the idea of artificially promoting a framework for an economic community. Instead, it could only be viable as a natural outcome of relations. While economic interdependence does not necessarily bring peace, it can raise the cost of political conflict. WADA concurred with the insufficiency of economic interdependence to forge a community, but he also saw it as a necessary ingredient. There was also a need to redefine the nature of the US-Japan Alliance without which there could be no East Asian community.

The discussion confirmed the living legacy of World War II, especially in East Asia. The sustained focus on Sino-Japanese relations in the symposium highlighted their centrality in rethinking the future of the region. Given the spirit of openness and dialogue throughout the symposium, however, also demonstrated both the challenges and possibilities of Asia-Pacific partnership that informs the work of CAPP.
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
COMMEMORATING THE 60th ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF WORLD WAR II:
WORLD ORDER IN THE 21st CENTURY, AND RECONCILIATION AND COEXISTENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

SELECTED PAPERS

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OVERCOMING THE PAST:
THE POSTWAR JAPAN AND GERMANY

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1. What is “Overcoming the Past”?  

The term “overcoming the past” is an English translation of a German word “Vergangenheitsbewältigung”. Its Japanese translation: “Kako no Kokufuku” has been popularized in Japan since the establishment of the German federal fund for victims of the Nazi forced labor in 2000. This term is accompanied with another concept “Sengo Sekinin”, after war responsibility, which got to be used in early 1990s in the course of post war compensation lawsuits with Korean and Chinese plaintiffs against the Japanese government.

“Overcoming the past” is originally used to refer to the commitment in post war Germany to deal with the Nazi legacies, an all-encompassing term referring to the variety of measures put in place to deal with the consequences of the atrocities of Nazi Germany such as the Holocaust. There are four main branches involved: (1) compensation for the victims of Nazi injustice; (2) legal proceedings brought concerning crimes committed under the Nazi regime; (3) regulation of neo-Nazi movements; and (4) history education prioritizing the Nazi period including anti-Holocaust education.

In Germany, “overcoming the past” was not a once-off post war strategy, but a continuous process. We can not view this process as following some sort of pre-ordained road map. Rather, it is the result of the accumulation over time of actions responding to a wide variety of social, political and moral demands and criticism from foreign countries. For example, “the statute of limitations debate” was reignited on as many as four separate occasions between 1960 and 1979, involving the battle between forces pushing for an end to these moves of overcoming the past, and forces calling for their continuation. Who, indeed, just after the end of the war, would have foreseen the eventual abolition of the statute of limitations in this case?

In spite of the current German and Polish debates on the compensation for expellees from the East at the end and right after the end of the Second World War, and in spite of several trials for compensation filed in vain by Greek war victims whose relatives were murdered by the SS in the course of “anti-guerrilla” war, Germany has proved to be successful in bringing about reconciliation with the countries it once invaded and with the peoples it once caused great suffering. Without a doubt, the process of overcoming the past has contributed to improving Germany’s international standing. Japan, on the other hand, is still in trouble with its historical legacies. The recent history text book issue and Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine have impressed upon the observer the seriousness of the unresolved “history issues” weighing heavily upon relations
between Japan and its East Asian neighbors, and how this issue has become a major weakness in Japan’s foreign policy. East Asian countries have for a long time focused on this “history issue”. Until this problem is solved, Japan will never truly be a trusted country in the international scene. Germany put into practice a policy of “overcoming the past” to recover the trust they had lost, along with their own dignity and self confidence. However, in recent years, opinions such as that repenting for the past is unnecessary for Japan, or that comparisons between Japan and Germany are meaningless have been expressed, most prominently by politicians of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. However, do these opinions accurately reflect the facts? Were Japan and Germany involved in totally different wars?

Certainly, Japan had no “ethnic eradication plans” of the ilk of Nazi Germany’s massacre of the Jews, and to liken the Massacre of Nanking to the Holocaust, that is, the destruction of European Jews is inappropriate. However, the Nazi Germany’s atrocities for which post-war Germany was pressed for apologies and compensation were not confined to the massacre of the Jews. They were also made to take responsibility for the Nazis’ actions in suppressing political, social and ethnic minority groups and embarking upon a war of invasion, in the process of which they abused residents and captives in their territory and coerced many civilians into forced labor. Can it really be claimed that the “clean-up operation” of the Japanese Army in the northern China during the Japanese-Chinese War in which countless villages were burned to the ground and masses of innocent villagers were systematically killed (called the “three-all policy” by the Chinese) was totally different to the “extermination war” waged by the German Army on the Eastern Front? How different was the treatment of the forced laborers taken to Germany, who for the most part were citizens of occupied Poland or Slavic Russians, from the treatment of the Chinese and Korean laborers who were brought to Japan during the war? In both cases, Germany and Japan, were not the beneficiaries of this forced labor system the government and people as well as private firms? Finally, was there really that much of a difference between the Nazi doctors killing “asocials” in the name of scientific experiment in concentration camps, and the scientists of Unit 731 of the Japanese Army conducting live experiments on residents and captives in Manchuria for the development of biological weaponry?

It goes without saying that it was not the case that as soon as the war ended, people in Germany immediately grasped the full magnitude of the Nazi atrocities and realized their responsibility for them. As indicated by the fact that it took over half a century for the compensation policy for victims of forced labor to begin, in order for past atrocities to be recognized as such, a full maturation of the concept of law in modern society, and the development of the concept of human rights, are necessary. In that respect, the progress of the “overcoming the past” policies accurately mirrors the progress of post-war German democracy, which itself overcame Nazi rule.

It is not wise to attempt to explain the efforts to “overcome the past” in post-war Germany in terms of any German “national character” or “religious faith”. This is for the same reasons that the argument put forth for the lack of progress in Japan’s “overcoming the past” being because it is
“a culture which lets the past be” lacks credibility. Following the path traced by Germany’s efforts to “overcome the past”, we discover a number of forces acting to support or to hinder these efforts. While on the one hand there were people who repented sincerely for past acts and tried to derive lessons for the future from them, there were others who decried these efforts as “masochistic”, and asserted the need to “get over it”. The latter category was by no means restricted to neo-Nazis or right-wing extremists. The history of German efforts to “overcome the past” is the history of the struggle between these two forces, even up until the present day.

2. Factors Distinguishing Japan and Germany

2.1 Domestic Dimensions

The first difference between Japan and Germany is the difference in official perception of the value systems of the former regime. At the root of the political policies approving compensation payments for victims of the Holocaust or forced labor, there has been an official recognition of the absolute injustice of the doctrine of Nazism which triggered these atrocities. Post-war Germany, both in the East where anti-Fascism was adopted as a national motto, and in the West which saw itself as the legal inheritor of the old German Empire, determined a rejection of Nazism as the official starting point for the rebuilding process, a position appreciated by the allied powers of World War Two. In Japan, on the other hand, while militarism was viewed negatively and the extreme ideology worshipping the Emperor as God was officially denied, the break from the prewar value systems was vague and incomplete. It has much to do with the Emperor’s remaining as Emperor without being accused by any one of his responsibility as the supreme ruler of the former regime.

What about the common perception of ordinary people? In Germany, in spite of the official norm, there still existed persistently views sympathetic to Nazism and recognition of the former regime as not totally wrong. It goes, it had some good points. It took over three decades before most of the Germans regarded the Nazism as absolute injustice according to a public opinion poll.

When it comes to a question of the personnel continuity, I would like to question the prevalent stereotypes about the discontinuity in Germany and the continuity in Japan. Neither in Germany nor in Japan, the purge of the former Nazis and the militarists from the public office could lead to a fundamental reform of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice under the Prime Minister Konrad Adenauer featured many stalwarts of the former Nazi elites. Georg Kiesinger, the third Prime Minister of the FRG, was a former member of the Nazi party. In this regard, we can not see any great difference between Germany and Japan. However, the Grundgesetz., the new West German constitution was very successful in oppressing neo-Nazism as well as communism.

In Japan, in the aftermath of the war, there was a strong criticism of the former regime in the public opinion. Especially militarism was totally discredited, whereas the Government and the
bureaucracy clung to the old value system. The Government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, featuring many members of parliament who were high ranking officials in the former Japanese Empire, acquiesced to the new constitution and accepted the fundamental human rights and the sexual equality and the symbolic new Tenno-system “forced upon them by GHQ”, they persisted in their calls for the revival of spiritual cultural morals, along the lines of the so-called “Yasukuni thought”.

In particular, the decision to honor the Emperor with a guard of honor on the occasion of the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces is worthy of note. With the increasing satisfaction of the populace with the present during the period of high level economic growth in the 1960s, moves to re-establish prewar value systems such as the establishment of National Foundation Day (a celebration of the legend of the ascension of the first Emperor of Japan), the revival of honoring war dead and the return of Japanese mythology to elementary school textbooks were accelerated by the government. 1960s witnessed Japan emerging as a democracy with some prewar values.

2.2 International Dimensions

Next, I would like to consider international factors leading to the diverse development of the overcoming the past in Japan and Germany. Common to the both countries, here I mean Japan and the Federal Republic, is that the Cold War changed the aim of the allied occupation policies from the punishment of the defeated to its quick reconstruction, resulting in the escalated rehabilitation of the former power elites.

Within the Western camp the Federal Republic of Germany had to manage to build and rebuild friendly relationships with France and Israel. Behind West Germany’s decision to go ahead with policies of compensation lay, more than the moral imperative, a desire to recover international trust and build a firm political footing on the western side through these moves. The Luxembourg Agreement, which settled compensation for Israel, was also seen as West Germany’s ticket into the western side’s group of common values. The regional integration which manifested itself in the foundation of ECSC was also premised on the Franco-German reconciliation. Also harsh criticism from the Eastern camp targeted the allegedly personnel continuity from the Nazi regime to the Federal Republic. Without these external factors, the process of “overcoming the past” would not have developed so swiftly. In this sense, Germany’s “overcoming the past” can also be seen as a sort of international collaboration.

Japan also became a member of the western camp. But, it means Japan became a loyal follower of the United States. The post-war Japanese diplomacy is characterized as a subordinate variable of the Japan-US relationship. The U.S. has exerted no influence or pressure upon the Japanese government to initiate compensation policies or to solve such historical problems. It makes a great difference from the American policy toward West Germany. Except demands of former British and Dutch war prisoners on compensation for forced labor, no serious voice from
within the western camp was raised against the Japanese government after the war. Figuratively speaking, Japan has never had such experiences as the Federal Republic had with France or Israel. Additionally, Japan has until recently never been in the position to take initiative for regional integration.

In East Asian countries Japan once invaded or occupied independence movements sprung up and they continued revolutions and civil wars. Most of these countries possessed a developing dictatorship controlling a military government, which so needed Japan’s economic aid that it suppressed anti-Japanese criticism from its people who had suffered in the war with Japan. China, Japan caused the greatest damage to, gave up officially the claim for compensation both under Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong.

The split between East and West Germany, far from impeding moves to deal with the past, actually accelerated them. The existence of two Germanys side by side also worked positively for moves towards “overcoming the past”. That is, both sides stressed their distance from Nazism, and fought with each other to gain the moral high ground in this respect.

As to the internalization of the Cold War into the domestic politics, Japan and Germany vary. Japan, indeed, was not divided into East and West, but its domestic politics were definitely affected by the East-West confrontation. The compensation issue, which seemed to work positively toward the interests of China or North Korea, could not easily attract attention across the party lines. On the contrary, within the Federal Republic, the political and ideological spectrum of which was rather narrower than that of Japan, the compensation issue could go relatively easier without being dependent on the ideological conflict.

2.3 Historical Dimensions - Resistance

The third factor is the existence of resistance elements and defectors from the former regime. Led by the Jews, people with a variety of ideological principles defected to other countries, and after the war some of them returned. Famous examples include the philosophers Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, the legal expert Frits Bauer and the politician Willy Brandt. Occasionally they were treated with suspicion, but from their position as members of a formerly oppressed group, they contributed greatly to the re-establishment of post-war democracy. In Japan such cases were practically non-existent.

2.4 Historical Dimensions - Experiences of War

The fourth issue is that of differences between experiences of war. As a common factor, there naturally arises the experience of being a victim of war. While Germany experienced no Hiroshima or Nagasaki, it endured indiscriminate bombing of its cities and the expulsion of its people from the eastern territories, so that the scale of its war damage was, like Japan’s, extremely
serious. However, Nazi-Germany learned from the harsh experiences in the defeat of the World War I, and adopted measures for its citizens to maintain a certain standard of living. What made this possible was the painstaking gathering of resources from their occupied territories and the use of forced foreign labor.

Meanwhile, Japan pressed ahead with their war despite the fact that it meant the total sacrifice of the lifestyle of its people, also incurring major losses in its military forces due to rash leadership. Recent research has brought to light the fact that almost half of the Japanese soldiers declared killed in action, in fact died of hunger. These “fallen heroes” had in fact starved to death. This irrational, “spiritual” battle plan, which completely ignored the issue of supplies, led to a strong popular anti-militarist sentiment in post-war Japan, and at the same time created a consciousness amongst Japanese of their role as victims of the war.

In Germany, the war was fought by the regular army (Wehrmacht) and the Nazi SS, and even after defeat the social status of the soldiers of the Wehrmacht remained high. In fact, they were also heavily involved in the massacre of the Jews, but this fact came to light until later. The fable that the German Army was clean and unimpeachable even if the SS were guilty lasted for a long time.

2.5 Which Past to Overcome?

The next point concerns the debate over what past actions needed to be atoned for. In Germany’s case, this has been self-evident. That is, the past which needed to be atoned for was the “Nazi era”, the period from 1933 to 1945 during which Hitler’s government held power, and specifically the atrocities and crimes committed under the Nazi regime. In Japan’s case, the question of what past acts should be atoned for was much more difficult to answer. The issue of when Japan’s state actions became illegal is a thorny one; indeed, the opinion that none of Japan’s pre-war state actions were illegal holds significant sway. If one calls into question all of the actions of the colonial era, then one must go back as far as 1910, or even 1895, but this would effectively deny the entirety of Japan’s pre-war modern history. I know that Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, the federal minister for economic cooperation and development in summer 2004 offered in Namibia a clear apology for massacre of Herero bribes committed by the German Imperial army in 1904. But, it does not mean that the period of the German Kaiser Reich belongs to the past for the present Germans to overcome.

Conclusion

Germany’s way of “overcoming the past” is generally evaluated highly. There are many Western social scientists who consider Germany’s efforts at “overcoming the past” to be a model example of democratic reconstruction for a nation state which has collapsed following a period of state-level illegalities. However, there remain a number of reservations concerning the Germans’
efforts. For example, how is it that far right-wing groups and neo-Nazis remain active in Germany, when it has succeeded so well in “overcoming the past”? Why, also, do anti-historical claims such as that “Auschwitz never happened” are enjoying a certain level of support, albeit at an underground level? Further, why is it that Germans and Jews tend to be divided in their opinions on “overcoming the past”, as evidenced by the Martin Walser versus Ignatz Bubis debate which shook public opinion in Germany? It seems it may still be necessary to deal with the problem of “anti-Semitism after Auschwitz” which lurks in the shadows behind German moves to “overcome the past”.

“Overcoming the past” is a multi-faceted process. Japan has put very few concrete measures in place at the level of governmental policy, but much of note has been accomplished in terms of socio-cultural activity. In the 1960s the Ienaga School Text Book Suit began, the 1970s saw the massacre of Nanking brought to light by Honda Katsumichi, and the 1980s saw the crimes of Unit 731 (the conduction of live biological experiments on prisoners for the purposes of the development of biological weapons) revealed by Morimura Seiichi. The “school text book issue” of 1982 triggered debate on the direction of history education in schools, and acted as a major catalyst for civilian movements to expose state responsibility for the war. The 1990s saw the full-scale development of post-war compensation trials, which have merged with many other measures for “overcoming the past”.

These developments have all managed to shed light upon the dark corners of history, and show them to the people. The common desire behind all of these moves has been to reject the pre-war value system which the LDP government tried to popularize, and to make efforts to deal with the troublesome past of the nation, which the government itself has steadfastly refused to do. This movement resembles closely the movement in West Germany of the same time, in which the Green Party, under the banner of “anti-war, peace and the environment” made strides into the Assembly (1983), and, as the main opposition party, took issue with the conservative history policy of Helmut Kohl’s government, thereby exerting a profound influence on the subsequent historical consciousness of Germany. The Green Party formed a coalition with the Social Democratic Party in 1998 to become the government under the leadership of Gerhardt Schroeder. Compensation payments for forced labor, which until then had been said to be impossible, were carried out under the Schroeder regime.

There have been two historically significant changes of power in the old West Germany and one so far in the united Germany. The handovers in 1969 when Willy Brandt became chancellor, and in 1998 when Schroeder became chancellor, acted as powerful tailwinds assisting the process of “overcoming the past”. It is, however, worth remembering here that the change of power in 1993 was likewise a tremendous opportunity for Japan. In the case of both Hosokawa and Murayama, the emergence of non-LDP prime ministers, even on a temporary basis, brought about great changes.

In post-war Japan, there were practically no politicians of the like of the Germans Brandt or Schumacher who fought against the old regime and saw the very raison d’etre of the new state in a denial of the old systems. There were many politicians, however, who believed that the policies of
the LDP were immoral and not in the best interests of the nation.

At the present time, the post-war compensation trials, including the suits brought by Chinese victims of war, have become one of the main battlegrounds in the process of Japan’s “overcoming the past”. These suits serve as a vital and effective counter-attack to the large-scale propaganda waged by the right wing politicians and intellectuals. Issues such as “comfort women”, forced labor, the massacre of Nanking, damage from abandoned gas bombs, orphans left in China, and nuclear bomb victims are all under discussion. All of these speak of the horror of war, and the hidden corners of history. In the trials, not only is the responsibility of the former regime being called to account, but also the inaction of the post-war government which knew about the victims but took no steps to offer them aid. Even in Germany, where the government took the reins from the beginning in terms of “overcoming the past”, and which was blessed with an environment far more conducive to solving these problems than Japan, it took over half a century to completely settle the issue of compensation for forced labor. In order to force the government into action and bring about a full resolution of the post-war compensation issue in Japan, where the LDP, with its pre-war value system, has continued to hold power, and where the Cold War acted as an obstacle to “overcoming the past”, it is essential that manpower and ideas from any and every field are gathered together. This path will be every bit as steep and challenging as that traveled by Germany, but it is one which must not be avoided for the establishment of civilian solidarity and the continuation of peace in East Asia in the twenty-first century.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR AND OVERCOMING THE PAST: THE EXPERIENCES OF EUROPE, JAPAN AND ASIA

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There is no doubt that Japan and Germany were responsible for World War II. Their motives shared similarities, but there were differences as well.

Japan’s responsibility

In 1853, Japan’s isolation came to an end. Japan became acquainted with the western powers, all of which were imperialistic. Japan adopted western achievements in nearly every aspect of society, including education, law, military, economics, and more. This response to the western challenge was very successful. It proved to be the answer to enable a non-western country to act with equal significance in world affairs and world economy.

Japan adopted imperialistic policies of the western countries as well. It began to compete with them to occupy colonies and territories of influence. Japan clashed with Russia, and the successful outcome of war encouraged Japan to expand its ambitions. Korea, Manchuria, Siberia and then China were the main objects of Japanese expansion.

The rise of this great imperialistic empire followed patterns of western imperialistic expansion. As was typical, there were hostilities with the older powers that didn’t want the rise of Japan as a new power. Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, England, France all had to fight to establish or defend their place in the world. The newcomer had to fight against the old power.

However, in the 20th century, the public opinion of the western world began to change. States slowly became democratic. Governments were more dependent on the opinion of the people than in the past. People in these countries wanted self-determination, democracy, and peace. Under this motto, the Anglo-Saxon countries had fought against Germany in World War I. In their mindset, they were not permitted to suppress the population in the colonies if the people fought for self-determination. Gandhi’s fight for freedom of India was popular in England. There were negotiations in order to establish a constitution in India and a more independent state. Other parts of the English empire became dominions, almost independent states. The League of Nations gave German colonies to the victors not to own and exploit, but rather to administer and develop them with the plan eventually to return governance to the native population.

Therefore, the rise of the Japanese empire challenged not only the rivalry of the old powers, but the very modern public opinion that the time of imperialistic empires had passed. The conviction
arose that the task was not to maintain or enlarge such empires, but to dissolve them and to consider suppression of native populations a crime. This attitude was especially strong in the United States due to its democratic style of governance and its own past as a colony.

Therefore, since the 1930s, Japan either had to abandon its imperialistic aims or have an inevitable clash with the United States and other western countries. Japan chose war.

**Germany’s responsibility**

In World War I, Germany fought primarily against three of the five great European powers, and as of 1917 also against the United States. In 1917, it seemed that Germany had defeated Russia, with the resulting Peace of Brest-Litovsk. Until the summer of 1918, Germany thought it possible to defeat the final two great enemies, France and Great Britain. Germany underestimated the United States as an exotic power, but no serious enemy.

When the Command of the German army petitioned for armistice in October, 1918, it was a shock for the German nation. At this time, the leading circles within Germany hesitated to act, but workers successfully revolted in order to finish the war and establish a democracy. Later, Germans in various circles believed the revolution was not the result of military defeat, but the cause of it. Many thought German troops were undefeated by external enemies, but were betrayed by an inner enemy. The National Socialists believed that Jews were that inner enemy that seduced the workers by Marxian ideology, workers’ political parties, and trade unions. National Socialists claimed that the Jews’ success was due to famine in Germany during the war. Germany was not able to nourish itself sufficiently during the British naval fleet’s blockade of Germany.

These thoughts, as wrong as they were, led to Hitler’s conclusion that he had to annihilate the Jews, to destroy the workers’ movement and to conquer land in Eastern Europe to ensure sufficient nourishment of Germany in the event of war. He wanted to secure “Lebensraum,” the living space that Germany’s population needed.

When Hitler came to power, he didn’t speak frankly about these aims, but he always tried to achieve them. All of his measures -- armament of the “Wehrmacht,” the occupation of the Rhine region (both in violation of the Versailles Treaty), the annexation of Austria, the occupation of the Sudeten region by the Munich Treaty, the occupation of Czechoslovakia -- were made less for the negation of the Versailles Treaty but more in preparation for the fight to establish a new German Reich, agriculturally independent with its center of gravity in Eastern Europe.

Western countries had no earnest objection to the removal of the Versailles Treaty. They knew that the Treaty had not provided German and Austrian self-determination. Great Britain and France therefore concluded the Munich Treaty. But the occupation of Czechoslovakia demonstrated the imperialistic aims of Hitler.

As with Japan, Germany had to abandon its imperialistic policies or wage war. It chose to continue its imperialistic course. The attack on Poland, an independent European country, the
violation of the equilibrium of powers in Europe, and the Nazis’ internal policy of human rights violations all made war unavoidable.

Both wars -- the war in East Asia and the war in Europe -- grew together to a single war through the attack on Pearl Harbor. The prospect of gains led Italy to join the Axis Powers, as did Hungary, Romania and Finland.

Four victim groups

There are four groups of victim countries of World War II. The first is represented by Italy. It managed to change sides during the war. Italy, the oldest fascist state and former ally of Germany, was occupied by German troops. Allied forces did not bomb Italy. At the end of the war, Italy was more a victor than a victim. With the exception of its colonies, it did not have significant territorial losses. The monarchy was removed and a democracy was established as a continuation of its pre-fascist state. In subsequent years, Italy became a founding member of NATO and the European Union.

The second victim group includes countries occupied by the Soviet Union, including eastern Germany (later, the German Democratic Republic GDR), Hungary, and Romania. They became part of the Soviet empire. Within the Soviet empire, they were treated as victims of Hitler, for instance, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Croatia—which became a part of Yugoslavia—can be added to this group. In these countries, puppet governments of the Soviet Union were established. Slowly, the planned economy of socialism was adopted. Communists taught the population to be workers and farmers, class enemies of the fascists. Therefore, nearly no one was guilty of the crimes of the fascist forces. This kind of education was rather successful. Until now, the diverging consciousness between eastern and western Germany persists.

Two countries escaped the fate of Soviet troop occupation and the change to socialistic states. These countries were Finland and Austria.

Finland made peace with the Soviet Union rather early and declared war on Germany. Through this action, Finland preserved its inner freedom and established a solid democracy, although in the realm of foreign policy it was not free but was instead obliged to maintain neutrality.

Austria was satisfied to become part of Nazi Germany in 1938. Austria’s branch of the Nazi party, its officers and troops, had equal rights with those of the old Reich. Nevertheless, after 1945, Austria declared it was the first victim of German aggression. The Allies granted Austria its wish to be independent. Austria therefore avoided getting divided or becoming a communist state. Similar to Finland, Austria was not allowed to make independent foreign policy and was obligated to be neutral. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Austria joined the European Union but neither Austria nor Finland are members of NATO.
The Situation in Germany and Japan after War’s End

The wartime destruction and losses of both countries were tremendous. Germany’s casualties included approximately 3.5 million military and 3.0 million civilians (600,000 through bombing and 2.4 million during flight and expulsion out of the eastern provinces). At war’s end, 9 million soldiers were prisoners of war. Years later, the fate of approximately 300,000 possibly still living in Poland and the Soviet Union was uncertain. Every town with more than 100,000 inhabitants was destroyed, as well as many smaller ones. There was a severe lack of all basic needs: housing, food, clothes, or fuel. Twenty-four percent of the territory was incorporated into Poland or the Soviet Union. Millions of German women were raped.

Destruction in Japan was similar. Nearly 2 million Japanese lost their lives, 700,000 of these civilians. Approximately thirty percent of the population had no homes. Japan was required to give up all territories it had occupied since the Meiji Restoration. As a result, 6.5 million Japanese had to return to a destroyed native country. Famine in post-war Japan was very possibly worse than in Germany.

Without doubt, both Germany and Japan had to abandon past imperialistic policies. Those considered most responsible for those policies were accused, condemned, and executed.

More important for the future was the economic recovery of both countries. Destroyed factories and production plants were rebuilt. Often, after restoration, the facilities were more modern than those of the victors. Capability existed to run the modernized factories since workers were well acquainted with privations and were ready to work hard for low wages. With lower prices, products off the conquered countries sold easily. Slowly, economic growth increased wealth. With this as background, political measures were acceptable to the populace. Both nations rejected past policies not only due to horrible defeat, but also because of impressive economic success. Nevertheless, the psychological situation in Japan and Germany was very different.

Psychological and Political Differences Between Germany and Japan

Japanese imperialism had a longer tradition than the German one against Eastern Europe. More importantly, Japan’s tradition was supported by the reverence of the emperor. Added to this was a lengthy military tradition in Japan. Military values were highly esteemed. Compared to Germany, these together made it more difficult for Japan to reject the policies of the past.

In Germany there was no religious tradition to revere the state, the nation, or the head of state. The National Socialist movement tried to establish such an attitude, but was in power for just six years before the war began. Time was too short to deeply root the values of the new government. Additionally, the esteem accorded military values was less in Germany than in Japan. During the 18th century, and long into the 19th century, esteem of military achievements in Germany was restricted to nobility, especially Prussian nobility. The victors liked to say that Prussian militarism should be
destroyed. Great portions of Germany agreed, since they were never part of Prussia.

Western Germany lived under the threat of the Soviet Union. During the war, Germany had the impression that the Soviet Union was its strongest enemy. The advance of the Red Army seemed inevitable. The fear of communism and distrust of the Soviet Union was strengthened by numerous factors: the blockade of West Berlin in 1948/1949 when American airplanes supplied the city; the communist attack in Korea in 1950; the communist statement, West Berlin was located at the territory of the GDR; the huge military forces that the Soviet Union had stationed in central Europe; and, the mass exodus of 2.7 million people fleeing poor living standards in the GDR prior to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. In this last connection, the most impressive event was John F. Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin in 1963 when he spoke the famous words “Ich bin ein Berliner,” or “I am a citizen of Berlin,” to an overwhelming welcome from the inhabitants. Because of the threat of the Soviet Union, Germany fled into the arms of the western world. Germany wanted to position itself as closely as possible to the United States. Under such circumstances reconciliation with former enemies in the west seemed absolutely necessary.

The western powers were for several reasons ready to accept German efforts at reconciliation. Firstly, the United States needed a strong ally in the Cold War, particularly a land power. West Germany fit this purpose well. The allies’ good will towards Germany could be seen when the Bundeswehr -- the West German military force -- was established. The officers at the head of the Bundeswehr belonged to or were close to the group who had tried to kill Hitler in 1944. But in the lower ranks, the Bundeswehr and its new allies were not very interested in the personal past of the officers and soldiers. Many condemned war criminals were discharged prematurely. A new chapter in relations between Germany and the western powers was meant to begin without thorough investigation of the past.

An even stronger motivation for reconciliation is found in the civil sector. Losses from the war were tremendous. In the past, European countries tried to get protection against hostile neighbors by occupation of territory, by armament, and by establishing a coalition. Bismarck tried it after the German victory of 1871 over France, and France had taken all these measures after World War I. France had reoccupied Alsace-Lorraine, it built a huge defense line, and established a coalition not only with Great Britain but also with Poland and Czechoslovakia. All these measures failed. On the contrary, occupations caused the want for revenge, armament produced suspicion, and coalitions caused counter-coalitions. The international relations between France and Germany after the French defeat of 1871 and the French victory of 1918 show this clearly.

So, in both countries, as in other European countries, consideration was given on how to break the chain of wars, destruction, and fear. The only recourse seemed to be a profound reconciliation. This meant renunciation of national egoism and consideration of the wants of the other side. The advantage of both partners should be the advantage of every single partner. That these principles could be the basis of a successful policy was not an easy lesson to learn, particularly since this was opposite to traditional German and Prussian policy. The most important figure
in developing this policy was the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad
Adenauer.

Reconciliation took place not just between the governments, but also between the nations. Every
citizen in the western countries had to decide whether he wanted to support these principles and
policy, or not. Critically important was the personal meeting of single citizens. Travel was
crucial as people learned that citizens in other countries were men, not monsters -- men who shared
similar desires and dreams. They loved their families, were proud of their towns and villages, were
ready to help each other, to explain points of interest, to sell and to buy. Soon after the start of mass
tourism, it was nearly incomprehensible that these people and nations had once shot at each other.

Exchange student programs completed this process. Students lived weeks, sometimes
months, with families in other countries. They attended school, improved their knowledge of the
host country language, and learned about the way of life in the other country. Meetings between
administrators of towns and villages in participating countries contributed to the reconciliation
process.

In dealing with war crimes, it matters greatly who is perceived to have committed the crime. It
was less difficult for Germany as a nation to apologize for some war crimes when the crimes were
attributed to Hitler, his government, and his organization, the SS. More difficult to resolve were
crimes of the German Wehrmacht, soldiers who in civilian life were fathers and grandfathers, or
old men living throughout Germany. Some of these crimes were punished; many were not. It took
decades to achieve recognition that these crimes were committed.

Reconciliation is only possible with free neighbor nations that are permitted to speak
thoughts and feelings frankly. Poland’s boundaries, for instance, shifted westward as it lost its
eastern provinces and the population was expelled, meanwhile gaining the eastern provinces of
Germany. This was a calamity for both Poland and Germany, although Germany did not learn the
nature of Poland’s response until after 1990. Until then, under communist rule, Poland was not
allowed to speak about the calamity because a lament about the territorial shift westward could be
taken as a reproach of the Soviet Union.

This contributed to the fact that reconciliation between Germany and its eastern
neighbors, Poland and Czechoslovakia, is in its early stages. Until 1990, no reconciliation was
possible. Germans close to the national boundaries have had a communist education and admit no
responsibility for the war and war crimes. Moreover, many Germans suffered at the hands of Poles
and Czechs, and think the crimes of the Poles and Czechs were worse than German crimes. Due
to insufficient information, there is a shared lack of trust. This situation is rendered more difficult
because student exchange programs tend not to work as well. German students do not learn Polish
and Czech languages. For German tourists, Paris and London are more attractive travel locations
than Prague and Warsaw. With fears of the Soviet Union gone, Germany is a big country with a
strong economy and a high standard of living relative to Poland and Czechoslovakia, and therefore
is not compelled to rush to reconciliation.
Reconciliation is a long, arduous process. It may be explained by a recent example. In February 1945, a few weeks before the end of the war in Europe, the British Air Force bombed the German city of Dresden. Dresden, situated in what would become the GDR, was once considered the most beautiful city in Germany, full of art treasures. The bombing lasted two nights, with the town nearly totally destroyed and approximately 30,000 casualties. The most impressive city building, the Frauenkirche with its 93-meter high cupola, remained as a ruin. It was memorialized as a reminder of the ferocities of war and, not officially, the inhumanity of the British. The post-war communist government strengthened this attitude. When the communist system broke down, citizens of Dresden considered rebuilding the Frauenkirche. About $120 million was collected worldwide, including the United States and Great Britain. The British financed the cross for the top of the church. When the cross was delivered, church restoration was not yet complete. Consequently, the cross was suspended by a construction crane above the site. On October 30th, 2005, the Frauenkirche was consecrated, with the President and Chancellor of Germany attending. Over 60,000 people were in the streets to observe the ceremony, which was televised in a live broadcast by all German television channels. The Bishop of Coventry, the first English town bombed heavily by German airplanes, also attended and spoke to the German and international audience in German. The German bishop answered in English. Both countries could understand that people on both sides in the war suffered, were sometimes guilty and sometimes not, and that soldiers and politicians were oftentimes subjected to the dehumanization of warfare. Feelings of hate and distrust could be replaced with those of sorrow and compassion. Such events promote reconciliation.

Closing Remarks

Differences between Western Europe and East Asia are great. The imperialistic tradition was longer established and more deeply ingrained in Japan than in Germany. Many of the Japanese war crimes were committed by soldiers, and are therefore more difficult to realize. The danger of communist aggression was slight in Japan, so Japan did not feel an urgent need for reconciliation. China, as a great and strong nation, did not feel compelled to seek reconciliation with Japan. The greatest factor, though, for slow progress toward reconciliation in East Asia is the fact that many nations were not, and are not, free. They cannot speak frankly about national feelings. Tourism is in its infancy, and student exchange programs have not developed. Close relationships between China and Japan are rare. As these conditions slowly change, the process of reconciliation in eastern Asia can proceed.
The year 2005 is the 60th anniversary of the end of the tragic Second World War. The contemporary world, however, is far from the world of peace and human rights which people dreamed when they abandoned their weapons sixty years ago. Neo-liberal and market oriented globalization causes serious bipolarization, and threatens the peace of humanity. In this sense, recent descriptions that the Fourth World War against Humanity has already begun through neo-liberalist globalization, is not an overstatement. Rather, neo-liberalist globalization is accompanying ‘Armed Globalization’ symbolized by the war on Iraq and Preventive War, that is, an unprecedented logic underlying the war on Iraq.

In this paper, I will overview the issue of peace focusing on settling the past in Asia, particularly in South Korea (from now on, Korea) on this 60th anniversary of the Second World War. It is well known that unlike Germany as an ex-aggressor in Europe, Japan as an assailant in Asia has continued to take a highly negative and tepid attitude on the settlement of the past. This passive attitude is derived from the following factors. The US made a mistake in that it took a negative attitude on the settlement of the past such as the dismantling of the legacy of the Japanese imperialist regime because the US wanted Japan to remain a country strong enough to fight against communism particularly with regards to the situation in East Asia with the emergence of the Communist China and the Korean War. In addition, civil society and peace activism within Japanese society had been relatively weak. Thereafter, in contemporary Japanese society, more and more Japanese people tend to require Japan’s military and political influence in the world which corresponds with Japan’s incredible economic development. Peace and reformist activism in Japan was further weakened after the downfall of the so-called existing state socialism countries. The post war generation, who did not have direct experience of the war, and thereby do not feel a sense of guilt towards it, has become the majority in Japanese society. Extreme right-wing nationalism has tended to increase, and government and society further retreat from the already tepid attitude towards the settlement of the past. The Koizumi government represents this contemporary situation.

Based on this fact, I will critically overview the Korean experience. Korea has criticized the Japanese tepid attitude towards the settlement of the past. Taking into consideration the fact that Korea was the biggest victim of Japanese colonialism and the Pacific War. However, there are other issues as well we must also not forget. First, there is the fact that although Korea has criticized the Japanese passive attitude, Korea itself has been no more active than Japan on the settlement
of the past. To put it more precisely, Korea has been really generous to the Korean pro-Japanese collaborators during Japanese imperialism. The fundamental reason for this was, similar to the Japanese case, occupation by the US army. The US army which occupied Korea in 1945 employed pro-Japanese bureaucrats including pro-Japanese police which captured and tortured Korean activists struggling for its independence. The logic which justified this action was that this was inevitable in order to deploy them in the fight against Communism. A top officer of the US Military Government in Korea (USMGIK) defended the decision to reemploy pro-Japanese police by saying, “You cannot beat the machine…The machine is the same we found when we got here...All we have to do push the button, and somewhere some cop begins skull cracking. They have been learning the business under the Japs for thirty-five year. Why should anyone expect them to unlearn all they know now?” 4 Because of this decision, of the 8,000 Koreans who had been in the Japanese colonial police force in Korea, 5,000 ended up in the police force of the USMGIK, and 80 percent of officers above the rank of patrolman in the police force of the USMGIK had served the Japanese. 5 When the US army withdrew in 1948 and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) became independent, a minority of members in the national parliament in South Korea led the effort to settle the past by establishing an Act for punishing pro-Japanese actions. However, the effort was labeled a Communist movement and demolished by the pro-Japanese police. Thereafter, not those who had fought for Korean independence but those who had collaborated with Japanese imperialism have possessed power as the leaders of South Korean society for the last sixty years. While the most Koreans have been angry with the issue of wartime sex slaves operated by the Japanese military, Koreans have been silent to the fact that Korean leaders who persuaded Korean young women into entering the comfort divisions and Korean young men into volunteering the Japanese army, actually have remained in leadership positions after liberation. In fact, former president Park Chunghee, praised by foreign countries as the engineer of the Korean Miracle, was also one of the pro-Japanese collaborators who volunteered to enter the Japanese West point, swore loyalty to the Emperor, and served as a Japanese army officer when many other young Koreans fought against the Japanese Army.

Only in 2005, the 60th anniversary of the end of the war, National Assembly passed a law for investigating pro-Japanese actions under the Japanese imperialist regime, and by this law the long waited national investigation finally started. Even though Korea was democratized in 1987, even though the Kim Young-sam government, that is, the first civilian government in thirty two years came into power in 1993, even though Kim Dae-jung, the world renowned opposition leader who fought for democracy in Korea for long time, became president in 1998 by the first peaceful transfer of power between the political parties, throughout this period, the process of settlement of the past on Japanese imperialism and pro-Japanese actions during the Second World War had not proceeded at all and it was realized this year for the first time. In fact, while Kim Dae-jung won the Nobel Peace Prize, his government was in fact more retrograde than other governments in this aspect. In fact, in spite of strong oppositions of democratic movements and historians, for his
personal political gain, he decided to build the Park Chunghee Memorial, and provided a national subsidy of twenty billion won (twenty million US dollars) to Park Chunghee Memorial Foundation which was organized for the construction of the memorial. By constructing the Memorial, he wanted to gain the support of the electorate in the home region of Park Chunghee, in which the majority was antagonistic towards him. Fortunately, the successive Roh Moo-hyun government ordered the foundation to give the national subsidy back to the government because the foundation had fund-raised only one billion won, that is, one fifth of the promised amount as the condition of the national subsidy. However, recently, the court ruled that the Park Chung-hee Memorial Foundation does not need to follow the Roh Moo-hyun government’s order. However, there have been some other efforts related to another kind of the settlement of the past, that is, anti-human rights and anti-democratic actions by the successive despotic military governments. These actions began with the Kim Young-sam government which sent to jails two ex-presidents for the 1979 coup d’ état and the 1980 massacre in Gwangju, by which they succeeded in coming into power. The Kim Dae-jung government also sought the truth over questionable deaths during the military rules and for compensation for democratic activists maltreated by past despotic governments. The Roh Moo-hyun government has accelerated this process and has investigated violations of human rights by the National Intelligence Service (formerly KCIA), the police, and the military by organizing the respective truth commissions in which human rights activists from civil society participate. After the long hot debates, in 2005, the national parliament also succeeded in passing Act of Historical Truth and Reconciliation which would empower the independent commission to investigate the violation of human rights by the government including the massacre of innocent civilians during the Korean War and to take the necessary measures for the victims even though the law also empowered the commission to investigate the human rights violation by the anti-government democratic movements and “forces hostile to the Republic of Korea”. The law was a compromise between the democratic force and the supporters of the former dictatorial governments.

There are two other issues the Koreans should focus for the settlement of the past. The first one is the settlement of the past of Korea as an assailant in history, and the second is the settlement of not the past but the present. Even though Korea was a victim in its relations with Japan, Korea was an aggressor in its relations with Vietnam because Korea participated in the unjust Vietnam War and committed many war crimes against humanity. While the Koreans raise their angry voices against the wrong doings of the Japanese imperialism, not so many Koreans feel the guilt for what the Korean soldiers had done in the Vietnam War. It was only recently that a small number of human rights and citizen’s groups started to do something for the settlement of the Korean past as aggressor in the Vietnam War. Besides, the efforts still remain in their infant stage. Therefore, Korea must put more efforts to settle its past in the Vietnam War.

The final issue is not related to the past settlement but the present settlement, that is, the settlement of the ongoing war on Iraq. Korea has participated in the war on Iraq with Japan to in order to play up to the US. President Roh Moo-hyun was elected in the 2002 election, thanks to a
peace movement and candle demonstration, caused by the incident of two junior high school girls killed by a US tank. In fact, he tried to utilize anti-American feeling during the election campaign and argued for more independent diplomacy from the U.S. He also is pushing for the settlement of the past on pro-Japanese actions related to the Second World War as an unjustified war. However, in spite that most Koreans opposed to sending the Korean troops to Iraq, he himself also committed to the war on Iraq, which will no doubt be an object of the settlement of the past in future. In addition, despite the tragic incident of a Korean beheaded by a rebellious group in Iraq and the immorality of the war on Iraq having been exposed, Roh Moo-hyun is refusing to withdraw the troops and has continuously extended the period of the deployment.

In conclusion, what the Korean experience suggests is the fact that the settlement of the past is not just an issue of the past but one of the present, not an one-time event but an ongoing process, and not an unilinear issue but a conjunctural issue which can go back and force, depending on the balance of power between the peace force and its adversary. Therefore, the power of the peace movement in civil society which can force and keep the settlement of the past alive is of ultimate importance.

It is a matter of great concern that the world in this year of 60th anniversary of the end of the war is far from the ideal of peace for humanity and is dominated by neo-liberalist and armed globalization. In addition, in the case of North East Asia, in relation to Japan’s tepid settlement of the past, extreme right wing nationalism in one country stimulates that of other countries and that feedback strengthens nationalism even more so. Extreme right wing nationalism in Japan, Korea and China might accelerate in this circuit. In other words, in contrast to the growing efforts for regional integration symbolized by EU in many regions in the age of globalization, there have been little efforts for regional integration in North East Asia and growing nationalist sentiments in the region. For instance, even in South Korea, some right-wing columnists, who had shown strong anti-North Korean positions, argued that the Korean government must allow North Korea to install missile launchers toward Japan at Dokdo when Japan launched strong campaign which argued that Dokdo, the small Korean island between Korea and Japan, is a Japanese territory. Such a tendency will result, after all, in another war in East Asia. Only the international solidarity among the peace movements in each country can prevent it, and the starting point is the settlement of the past and the settlement of the present, that is, the war in Iraq.
MULTIPLE LAYERS OF “EAST ASIA” AS AN AREA

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Introduction

Though popular discourses on East Asia in mass media treat East Asia as a coherent and distinct geographic and politico-economic region separated from the rest of Asia, the development of the concept since the WWII shows that it is extremely difficult to conceptualize East Asia through a single framework. An anthropologist, Arjun Appadurai suggests that: “Regions are best viewed as initial contexts for themes that generate variable geographies, rather than as fixed geographies marked by pre-given themes. These themes are equally ‘real,’ equally coherent, but are results of our interests and not their causes.”6 Katzenstein and Sil also concur with Appadurai by stating that: “Regions do not exist only as material objects. Although they have a behavioral dimension indicated, for example, by the flow of goods and the travel of people across physical space, they cannot be represented simply and succinctly by accurate cartographic depictions. They are also constructs that are imagined and thus can bend to the efforts of political entrepreneurs.”7 I agree with Appadurai, Katzenstein and Sil that East Asia as an area should not be perceived as a group of nation-states with fixed memberships. Our general perceptions of East Asia are the product of, not the cause of, specific historical and politico-economic contexts in which East Asia as an area disguises itself with fatefulness and naturalness.

Without doubt, the existence of the hegemonic power of the United State in this region greatly influenced the concepts of East Asia as an area. Nevertheless, American hegemony itself has been operated by a few heterogeneous disciplines and forms, and consequently, facilitated the emergence of multiple realms – either supplementary or contradictory among themselves – of East Asia. This paper reviews four different sets of discourses on East Asia as an area, which have emerged as the results of interactions between the internally-heterogeneous American hegemony and the reactions from the regional actors in East Asia; East Asia as a “Security Complex”; as an “Economic Region”; as “the (potential) field of knowledge production”; and as “the community of history and memories.” Special emphases will go to the later two concepts.

East Asia as a Security Complex

By ‘security complex’, I mean “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”8 In terms of the inter-locking nature of a security complex, we can easily agree that the Northeast Asian security complex is comprised of five regional polities and one
outside force; China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States. A significant change of security policies of any of these polities may significantly change the overall security arrangement of this region and the politics of the rest of the polities.

The majority of the discussions on the security problems in this region evolved around two sets of problems: the Taiwan and the North Korean issue. In the contexts of the US policy toward global terrorism, the international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation, and the historical legacies of the Cold War, it is undeniable that those two sets of problems define the nature of the Northeast Asian security complex. Nevertheless, Avery Goldstein and many other IR theorists concur that the true nature of the Northeast Asian security issue is not about the North Korean nuclear program or the Taiwanese sovereignty issue, but the rise of China as a potential hegemon, which makes China as the hub of Asian security.

Since the end of the Cold War and the successful economic reforms of China, the rise of China as a regional hegemon has been the most important issue for American security scholars, due to the possibility of the sudden collapse of balance of power in this region. Even from the Chinese perspective, the disappearance of the Soviet Union poses a serious problem because the Chinese leaders and policy advisers clearly know that China is not ready to balance the American power in East Asia. The repetitive emphases on ‘heping jueqi’ (peaceful rise) by the top Chinese leaders show their unwillingness to raise the level of tension in this region. For many IR theorists, therefore, the sudden power shift of the East Asia implies overall a pessimistic future of the security arrangement. Both realistic and liberal accounts see the inherent instability of this reason due to the lack of multilateral security arrangements and low level of economic interdependence that would compensate the shifting power structures. Naturally, scholars have expected that the field of struggles among great powers will move to East Asia as the European showcase closed down by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the successful formation of EU; in other words, “Europe’s past could be Asia’s future.”

The problem is further complicated by the new defensive doctrine of the United States. In addition to ‘neo-conservatives’ world view that already caused much problems in Middle East and in deepening the North Korean issues, the new strains of realism, ‘offensive realism’ is gaining popularity among security communities in America. Signaled by the publication of Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, a group of new realists began to think that traditional concept of balance-of-power is not the inherent nature of the world politics. According to him, once the balance of power is replaced by a unipolar system, the hegemonic state seeks to prevent any possibility of the rise of peer competitors and would do everything to put it down. From this perspective, the United States’ offensive measures against China are natural outcomes of a hegemon’s instinct even though the Chinese might not be able to match the American power in East Asia in the foreseeable future. Hence, the rise of China as a balancer is seen as a security threat to the United States, instead of re-stabilizing world security as the classical realist might argue. The calls for strong measures to supervise and contain China and for deepening ties with Taiwan and Japan are
The recent move of the United States in East Asia, the strengthened US-Japan alliance through the revised guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation announced on September 1997 and the deterritorialization of American troops in Korea for mobility and flexibility imply the US efforts to prevent the rise of China as a balancer, leaving China two choices, pursuing hostile balancing or joining the multilateral security arrangement in this region. As mentioned above, it seems quite clear that the China will not take the first option in the foreseeable future. The dilemma is, however, that there is no East Asian multilateral security arrangement to which China might be willing to join.

The lack of multilateral security arrangement in East Asia is a defining factor of the security environment in this region. Though compensated by interlocking “spider web” form of bilateralism between the U.S. and East Asian states, from the end of the WWII to the Korean/Vietnam War and to the end of the Cold War, East Asia failed to establish an equivalent to NATO. The U.S. unwillingness to form a multilateral security arrangement in East Asia suggests us to rethink the role of America in the long-term regional stability in this region. As Mastanduno argues, though the U.S. has helped to defuse regional crises and discouraged conflicts, it has not made it a priority to promote a significant improvement and enduring solutions to regional security problems in East Asia, while sustaining the status quo of tensions and conflicts. In that sense, Asian states’ uncritical reliance on the security initiatives by the U.S. will help the immediate solutions to many problems including Taiwan and North Korean issues but will not make ultimate change in the current tensions and conflicts.

A small number of scholars made a deeply provocative but inspiring suggestion. For example, David Shambaugh argues for a fundamental epistemological shift for the issue of China and East Asia. He suggests to see the rise of China as a phenomenon, not as a problem and to prepare to accept and accommodate the rise of China and stabilize the regional order. He further states: “Why should China’s pursuit of regional preeminence be considered unnatural (as Khoo and Smith imply)? And how does this differ from U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere? Is it unnatural, for example, for China’s navy to patrol the sea-lanes of East Asia (and perhaps the Indian Ocean) and establish a string of security partnerships as the United States has done throughout the Americas? I would suggest that these aspirations are legitimate and will one day become reality.” Shambaugh’s seemingly idealistic argument, I argue, is more realistic than many realist theorists. Surprisingly many American realist scholars build up their arguments based on a hidden but apparent assumption: China is an alien and unreliable partner and fundamentally different from great powers in Europe. That assumption delimits the scope and agendum of security discussions regarding East Asia, by excluding the possibility of the inter-regional security partnership. Hence, the most realistic solution for the long-term security arrangement for the East Asia is possible only through the acceptance and accommodation of that reality, the rise of China as a regional great power regardless that Chinese look alike or are different from Americans, Japanese and Koreans.
In spite of overwhelming pessimistic perspectives over the East Asian security problems, we should not forget that, in reality, East Asia is far more stable and safe with relative peace for more than two decades. The irresponsible politicization of the discourses of the China threat or Yellow Peril in the United States, Japan and South Korea will deepen the already complex security problems of the region by unnecessarily increasing the sense of insecurity and danger in both state and popular levels. What is necessary now is to build up the capacity to produce the security agenda by the East Asian players themselves, instead of uncritically subscribing to the American sense of security and insecurity. The North Korean issue might be a good chance to re-think the security arrangement in East Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, the Six-Party talks including the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, North and South Koreas, was one of the most long-lasting security negotiations in this region and each player has accumulated skills and knowledge of performing effective dialogues.

East Asia as an Economic Unit

As Higgott suggests, East Asia in terms of international political economy means the continuing battlefield. Soon after the WWII, the Korean peninsula and Taiwan Strait has not only marked the ideological fault line but also symbolized the competitions between two different economic systems; free market capitalism and the Soviet style collectivism. The end of the Cold War reformatted the shape of economic competitions; between Asian models of Japan and rising NIEs (Newly Industrializing Economies) and (neo)liberalism lead by the United States. The 1997 financial crisis in East Asia and the long lasting Japanese stagnation are often understood as the evidences of the final victory of the Western economic model.

The economic sectors of East Asia have endured the lack of multilateral formal institutions, as much as the security sectors have. Without a well-defined concept of East Asian economic region, the area has grown through dense webs of informal/private relations promoted by the huaqiao (oversea Chinese) capital and Japanese FDI. Though there was a warning, especially by the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, on the emergence of economic blocs in Europe (EU) and North America (NAFTA), the most concrete Asian form of economic regionalism until the 1997 financial crisis, besides a narrowly defined ASEAN, was Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which relies on a vague/open/expanding concept of ‘Pacific Rim.’ The financial crisis that deeply destabilized the economies of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Hong Kong and Vietnam created a wide-spread perception in this region, regardless of the varied opinions on the real source of the trouble, that “the IMF was acting to protect the interests of Western lending institutions and to open Asian markets for Western firms at the expense of Asian workers and the sovereignty of Asian countries.” The earlier critical theories that saw the emergence of APEC in the early 1990s as the transformation of the Pacific Rim into ‘American lake’ and that understood the concept of Pacific community as “a baby whose putative parents are American and Japanese...
and whose midwife is Australian” has gained more audience among Asian leaders and scholars. The asserted supremacy of the Japanese economy over the United States, the rise of NIEs, and the successful reform in China gave the notion of Pacific Rim and Asian Pacific that predicted the gravity of the world political economy will shift from the Atlantic Ocean to Pacific. Nevertheless, the financial crisis and the subsequent readjustment, the abandonment of the Asian model of capitalism and the adoption of neo-liberal tenets, reaffirmed the illusionary nature of the APEC.

As many began to believe that the open and expanding concept of APEC ignores the vulnerability of Asian economies to the whim of the Western interests and predatory global capital, the necessity of the post-crisis Asian regionalism is broadly sensed under the notion that “weaker states must band together regionally, strengthening their solidarity and advancing their common interests.” Since the nature of the 1997 economic crisis was financial and few of Asian countries have been suffering from trade deficit, the discussion of the economic regionalism since 1997 has been focused on the issue of monetary regionalism that would counter and replace the hegemony of the IMF, Wall Street, and the United States Treasury Department.

The first reaction against the 1997 financial crisis was the Japanese proposal of Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) that would replace the influence of the IMF in East Asia. This proposal, however, vehemently refusal by China and the United States for different reasons. From the perspective of China, the formation of Japan-led AMF means the establishment of financial hegemony of Japan. American policy makers, on the other hand, saw the emergence of the ‘Yen-bloc’ as the persistence of heterogeneous economic system, “Asian model,” and as a hindrance to the complete financial globalization strongly promoted under the Clinton administration.

In spite of the initial failure of the AMF proposal, the financial regionalism in East Asia made significant progresses through innovative financial arrangement based on multiple bilateral agreements. Based on the New Miyazawa Initiative in 1998 and the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000, East Asian states are now connected by 16 bilateral currency swap arrangements by April 2005, amounting 37.5 billion dollar. Though the size is not big enough to fend off another attack by global hedge-funds, considering the size of foreign exchange reserves in this region, 2.5 trillion dollar, the multilateral arrangement on this liquid fund for financial security in this region might be possible and plausible if meaningful political efforts are followed by regional players. Further, Japan and other states are currently developing Asian Bond Market Initiative to strengthen regional financial governance and provide long term fund for development in this region. The first Asian bond fund started with 1 billion USD and gave grants to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and the second bond was approved, 11 billion USD, which is denominated in Asian currencies. With the multiple bilateral currency swap arrangements and the growth of Asian Bond Market, East Asia seems to be preparing the formation of East Asian economic regionalism in an innovative way which is heavily focused on financial areas, unlike EU and NAFTA that started with intensifying free trade agreements.

The most notable movement of the East Asian formal economic regionalism since 1997
is the concretization of the framework of ASEAN plus Three (APT) which China, Japan and Korea in addition to ten ASEAN states. APT has functioned as the main thrust for the currency swap arrangements and the development of Asian Bond Market. Most notably, this semi-formal organization symbolizes the formation of the authentic East Asian regionalism by excluding the Western members (the United States, Australia and New Zealand). Another notable recent development is the East Asian Summit scheduled December 14th, 2005. Unlike APT, it includes India, Australia and New Zealand and, as China complains, lacks the geographic and politico-economic cohesion. The exclusion of the United States distinguishes it from APEC but includes all American allies in this region (South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand). Overall, the East Asian Summit might perform the role of buffer zone, if successful, in-between the rising East Asian politico-economic regionalism and the continuing American hegemonic presence in this region.

The 1997 financial crisis and shifting nature of East Asian economies – the Chinese search for sustainable growth, the end of high-speed growth in many NIEs, the efforts to overcome the long-lasting economic stagnation in Japan – made the regional players to think the successful formation of multilateral regional institutions as the cure-all solution. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that East Asia as a region is not alike American or European counterparts. None of East Asian states is as dominant as the United States in American continents, which has been able to exercise hegemonic forces to accomplish NAFTA. Unlike EU, most of Asian states do not enjoy political stability and firm domestic political legitimacy through which the state can persuade societal forces to accommodate and adjust themselves to embrace the collective economic re-arrangement in the region. The most fundamental problem of the imagination of the East Asian regionalism is its inherent nature of developmentalism. The idea of the economic regionalism in East Asia has taken the distorted or changed form of state developmentalism that sees East Asia as a new center of global capitalistic production. Hence, it created a protectionist dream; replacing the pre-War autarchy that deletes borders within but, as a regional entity, creates borders without.

The imagination and planning of the East Asian economic regionalism, therefore, inherently encounters multiple conundrums. To avoid the possibility of protectionism that might intensify the formation of dangerous politico-economic blocs around the globe, the new regionalism should be open and flexible. Nevertheless, the experiment of APEC has shown that openness and flexibility may not protect the region from predatory global capital. The uneven development of capitalism and market economy in the region forces each state to be extremely wary of the possibility of regional domination by one actor. It should be noted that the only experience of solid and formal politico-economic regionalism in East Asia was the nightmare of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere before the WWII. Equally futile is the expectation that the United States would give up her long-sustained hegemonic position in East Asia and allow the formation of the non- or un-American politico-economic regionalism without resistance. Hence, any realistic design of the East Asian regionalism should accurately interpret and consider the American interests in this region. Since
I am not a political economist, I do not intend to project a new vision of the East Asian economic regionalism. Nevertheless, I argue that any design of the sustainable regionalism should be highly realistic in terms of calculating particularistic interests of each player. With the existences of deep dilemmas and conundrums, a utopian design would bring another disaster as the world witnessed in 1930s.

East Asia as a community of shared memories and history

East Asia is an area of collective memory and history, not necessarily because each nation shares them but because one’s memory is interlocked with the imaginations about the others. The Japanese national identity emerged through the century-long efforts to differentiate herself from both the West and Asia at the same time. When Japan was orientalized by the West with essentializing Orientalist discourses, she has to impose vigorous Orientalist schemes upon her neighbors, Korea and China. Japan has been an Asian nation to defend the totalizing universalist claims of the West and a modernist/Western power to manufacture the deep sense of cultural and racial hierarchies among Asian nations30. Similarly, the Korean national identity was the product of long-lasting struggles to differentiate itself from two empires, Japan and China31. The deployment of ‘nomadic people’ or ‘horse riding people’ to separate Korean identity from China made the borderline with Japan blurred. The authentic Confucian civilization or literati tradition to differentiate Korea from Japanese ‘militaristic’ history damages the borderline with China. China itself has long been swayed between China as a civilization and as a nation. The un-sinicized territory and people inside of the border disallows the straightforward pursue of the nationalistic identity, whereas the Westphalian world system in the 19th and 20th centuries has forced China to forget the imperial tribute system. Overall, all nation states in East Asia heavily rely on each other to sustain concrete national identity; even with countless loopholes in those efforts.

Though the problems of history and identity started from the invasion of the Western modernity in the 19th century, East Asia as a community of shared memory and history becomes particularly significant with the continuing problematization of the memories of the colonial and the war-time periods, as the political legitimacy of each nation state largely starts with the national memories of these periods. For China and Korea, the anti-Japanese imperialism has been the foundational discourses of the post-war nation state building processes. For Japan, the denial of the militaristic history has been the source of the post-war Japanese identity as ‘peace-loving’ and ‘civilized’ nation.

The fact that the memories of the colonial and war-time periods are the sources of national identities for all three East Asian states does not mean that those nations share same forms and contents of the memory. Ironically, since each nation has too much stake in the historical interpretation of the same periods, the politics of memory has become one of the most difficult problems among those nations. A series of recent events show that each nation state invests equal amount of passion and energy to
produce ethno-centric historiography of the WWII: Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine since 2001; the tension aroused by the emergence of a revisionist textbook sponsored by right-wing business and political circles in Japan and the subsequent hysterical reactions in China and Korea; and incessant mobilization of anti-foreigners (sangokujin: meaning Koreans and Chinese in Japan), anti-Japanese sentiments by nationalist politicians in each country. At the center of all these political tensions and popular distrusts against each other lie each nation’s competing claims for the authentic/universal historical knowledge that presumably makes the distinction between victims and victimizers indisputable. In this sense, East Asia is a community of shared memory and history in a strange way; a sustainable national identity of each nation state is possible only through denying the others’ history. The morality, legitimacy, and glory of each national history are possible only at the expense of the others’ claim of historical subjectivity.

As to the intensifying politics of memory in East Asia, I argue that the controversies and debates regarding the colonial and war histories in East Asia were intensified because of a false belief and/or hope that historical accuracy could solve political conundrums in the region. In other words, it is not ‘politicized history’ but the myth of ‘non-politicized history’ that reproduced political tensions and, more fundamentally, the instability of East Asian historiography. The realities of the past, which are “an infinite multiplicity of successively and coexistently emerging and disappearing events, both ‘within’ and ‘outside’ ourselves”32 cannot speak for themselves. Events can address justice and morality by themselves only when they take the form of unmediated spectacle that denies the laws and science of causalities33. An atrocity, the vocabulary of which is already morally charged, cannot be narrated without shared, collective agreement upon a fixed set of memories concerning the events of killing and raping. The (re)emergence of the memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Comfort Women in the international scene is, therefore, more a function of the new subject formation in China and Korea than the natural outcome of unearthed historical truths.

Prasenjit Duara contends in his thought-provoking article that history is antitheoretical because it is comprised of nation-centered narrations of flowing events and facts without a “satisfactory model for theorizing over time, over flux and change” and with uncritical acceptance of “the subject-object distinction that makes it so difficult for us to recognize that what we think of as our object also constitute us as subjects.”34 In other words, history as a modern academic discipline has been an indispensable tool for a nation-state to construct a linearity of collective memory while suppressing localized or heretic methods of narrating time. Historians, as the conscious or unconscious accomplices of these nationalizing projects, have concealed the subjectivity of historical writing by not questioning the volatile relationship between authors and historical facts35. By doing so, the historical inquiries have been “determined to pose the question of ‘what?’ before the question of ‘who?’” despite philosophical traditions that tend to favor the egological side of the mnemonic experience.36

If we give priority to the issue of “who” over the issue of “what,” we can see that history is the central field of political struggles, not merely a tool for mobilization, in East Asia. In that sense,
the accusation of the Western media, Japanese high officials and right-wing politicians against the Chinese and Korean governments for politicizing history is fundamentally and categorically flawed. A national history, which is essentially political, cannot be politicized in a strict sense. Equally futile is the Chinese and Korean popular belief that collective efforts “to set facts straight” can solve the issue. The inclusion of the comfort women and the Nanjing Massacre into the Japanese history textbook primarily depends on the fluctuating Japanese collective identity as opposed to the factuality or truthfulness of those events. The emphasis on political subjectivity in historical writing and reading, however, neither implies nihilistic or cynical perspectives of history nor endorses the deniers’ claims, since both attitudes are based on the normative superiority of objectivity and factuality in historic writing. To the contrary, history, as the field of political struggle, is the space of both problems and solutions for contending political identities.

As I argued elsewhere, the comfort women issue and the Nanjing massacre could be narrated as a collective memory through the formation of new historical subjects. The new historical consciousness produced by democratization movement and the rise of feminism in Korea enabled the collective memory of the comfort women and, eventually, produced the history of victimization as the core of the identity formation by adding women as co-subject of national suffering, while making a sharp contrast with the developmental nationalism symbolized by the Park Chung-hee era (1961-1979). The new national identity reinforces its own narration of victimization by excluding those outside of the story; collaborators. The ever-changing discourses of the Nanjing Massacre also reflect the shifting position of the CCP and the new subjectivity emerging in the Chinese society in the process of reform. Taiwanese moves toward independence by distancing themselves from the Chinese nation by constructing a hybrid identity of a Chinese/Japanese/Indigenous nation also forces Chinese popular nationalism to admit the unending national humiliation. Occasional voices of ‘denial’ from Japan is actively vitiating the CCP’s identification with the ‘victorious’ Chinese nation. The memories of the comfort women and the Nanjing Massacre have never been stabilized and will not in near future.

A number of scholars problematized a recent trend of the debates about the Nanjing Massacre; the game of numbers. When the CCP and the Chinese popular discourses use an indisputable number, ‘three-hundred thousand’ victims, to prove the magnitude of the suffering of the Chinese nation, any attempt to verify or re-calculate the number – either by Japanese right-wing deniers or by sincere academic inquiries – is perceived by the CCP and the Chinese public as another attempt to humiliate China. The Chinese refusal of ‘audit’ reinforces the Japanese and American perception of the unreliable CCP and irrational Chinese nationalists, and, eventually, strengthens the Japanese right-winger’s notion of the Nanjing Massacre as a fiction. Further, the game of numbers is eventually petrifying and killing the richness of the memory by reducing the events to abstract numbers. The real pitfall of the game of numbers, however, is that it leaves no room to ponder the question of ‘who,’ while forcing the debates to be obsessed with the question of ‘what.’ When some Japanese right-wing politicians argue for a sharply reduced number of victims,
the argument is firmly based on the identification of Japan with the Japanese Imperial Army in Nanjing. Or, reversely, the number becomes very important because those politicians believe Japan and the Japanese Imperial Army are identical. As such, the positivistic inquiries of the Comfort Women and the Nanjing Massacre often hide the politics of identity, which produces the very source of the conflicts over history.

As I mentioned earlier, East Asia is a community of shared memory and history defined by ‘negativity.’ I believe the overcoming of the negativity of history and memory in East Asia is possible only through the formation of multiple subjectivities that ignore the national borders. The recent publication of history sub-textbooks by the committee on ‘Modern History of East Asia’ and the committee for Korean/Japanese textbooks for Women is a significant step toward the solution of the problems of memories. The Modern History of East Asia, co-written by a group of left-wing/liberal scholars from China, Japan and Korea, tries to re-interpret the history from the perspective of renmin/minjung (people), not of the nation-state (guojia/kukka) or national citizens (guomin/kungmin). It impressively inserts a significant portion of the suffering and resistance of the Japanese people against the Japanese fascist regime during the war. By doing so, it tries to interpret the history of the war as the Japanese fascist versus the people of East Asia. Similarly, The Modern History of Korea and Japan through the Women’s Eye, published by Japanese left-wing and Korean feminist scholars, tries to use the perspective of gender politics to re-interpret the modern histories of Japan and Korea. Both works show an attempt towards a radical solution; construction of new identity across the national border. It is too early to evaluate those books’ actual impact on the current debates on the comfort women and the Nanjing Massacre. Especially, it is questionable if the artificially created regional identities can overcome the nationalizing historiographies in all three East Asian societies. Whether successful or not, the editors and authors of these books seem to understand the fundamental nature of the problems of memories. Since history is not a tool of but the very field of identity politics, any viable approach should presume a political solution first – in a deep sense – before seeking a solution to the problems of memories.

Let me put a short final note on the presence of the United States in the memory and history of East Asia. The United States involved in East Asian monumental memories through three main events; the WWII, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Three wars are remembered in America in radically different ways, theatrical victory (the WWII), forgotten war (the Korean War) and a bitter defeat that changed American psyche (the Vietnam War). In East Asia, however, the memories of American presence fundamentally differ depending on one’s position during the Cold War, which is yet to be a distant history in this region. Nevertheless, except for the two twin-states in the Korean peninsula, the memory of American post-war presence in East Asia is malleable, since Chinese and Vietnamese official historiography regarded the Korean War as a victorious one and Japan has been the staunchest ally of the United States. Compared to the varied memories regarding the Japanese militarism before the end of the WWII, the history and memory of the American presence in East Asia will not be a main factor in making of the common historiography in this region.
East Asia as the field of Knowledge Production

Sun Ge, a Chinese literary critic, once confessed the extreme difficulties of making meaningful and constructive discussions among East Asian scholars while introducing his experiences in four inter-regional conferences on “Intellectual Community in East Asia” to promote communication among East Asian intellectual communities. Though she introduced the term of ‘trans-cultural knowledge’ to solve the deep epistemological problems in East Asia, the most important point she made in her article is the reality that majority of intellectuals in China, Japan and Korea heavily rely on the frame of references to the West to create their own discourses. In other words, the local structure of concepts and discourses are framed to dialogue with the West, not among Asians. In fact, inter-regional academic interactions are thin and significant dialogues more often occur in the western metropolitan centers where political scientists, sociologists, historians, and economists identify themselves as “Asian study scholars” who presumably dialogue with ‘universal disciplines.’

Let us first think about the emergence of the western, especially American, area studies that have determined the modern form of academic knowledge about East Asia by training thousands of ‘native’ Asian scholars in American academic institutions. In America, majority of area scholars are not specialized in regions but in a single state, country, nation, and society. And each regions and nations are presumably separated as the cultural essentialism of the American area studies has long dictated. The study of non-western societies in the western societies emphasizes culture. As Rey Chow, a Chinese American literary critic, argues: “In the name of studying the West’s ‘others’ then, the critique of cultural politics that is an inherent part of both post-structural theory and cultural studies is pushed aside, and ‘culture’ returns to a coherent, idealist essence that is outside language and outside mediation. Pursued in a morally complacent, anti-theoretical mode, ‘culture’ now functions as a shield that hides the positivism, essentialism, and nativism – and with them the continual acts of hierarchization, subordination, and marginalization – that have persistently accompanied the pedagogical practices of area studies, ‘cultural studies’ now becomes a means of legitimizing continual conceptual and methodological irresponsibility in the name of cultural otherness.” In that sense, the arguments of the clash of civilization are not produced by a single author, Samuel Huntington, but the structure of American academia itself.

The cultural essentialism based on a single state in American area studies is not only the result of the orientalist epistemology of the West but also the product of the Asian nation states’ incessant nationalistic efforts. The essentialism that was originally imposed by the West to make a certain society particularistic so that the West can claim the universality of its civilization is ironically re-deployed by the otherized nations themselves. The government academic funding structure in East Asian states shows it vividly. All of Korea foundation, Chiang Ching-kuo foundation and Japan foundation discourage studies that blur the national or ethnic borderlines.
in this region. The only area other than ‘national studies’ encouraged by those foundations is the research on the relationships between each country and the United States. Compared to the active encouragement to the US-East Asian relations, the efforts of those foundations to promote the relations among the regional players are disappointing and minimal. In this sense, the orientalist essentialism has become the very tool of Asian nation states to solve the identity problems and, as a result, the cultural and social sciences in this region structurally cannot achieve universality. In other words, the study of Korea, Japan and China in East Asia takes the form of ‘area studies,’ that objectify their own subjectivities.

One of the most ambitious discourses that possibly resisted against the Western totalizing discourses of modernity was ‘Confucian civilization’ or ‘Asian values’ which was actively promoted various East Asian leaders. To some degree, nationalists and right-wing thinkers in East Asia made awkward and invisible alliances in promoting the sense of Asian uniqueness. The potential power of the discourses of Asian values and Confucian civilization went bankrupt by two notable events. On the one hand, the 1997 Asian economic crisis destroyed the material basis of those discourses as well as the long-envied economic model of the developmental state. Though China and Japan evaded the direct impact of the financial storms in East Asia, the utopian hope of building up an ideal economic system based on the ‘essential virtue’ of the Asian civilization could not be viable anymore as the victims of the financial crisis quickly embraced the universal path of the globalizing neo-liberal economic model that denies the active roles of state or, in some sense, culture. On the other hand, the recent Chinese push for nationalizing Confucian legacies made the Confucianism as a regional ideology less attractive. The Chinese efforts to reify Qufu as the sacred place for ‘the Chinese nation’ naturally made other communities feel Confucianism as a somewhat alien cultural element. Similarly, the Chinese authority’s promotion of nationalism transformed the history of Chinese civilization as an open source to the exclusive narration of the Chinese nation that claims the intellectual property right of the civilizational achievement.

The economic crisis in 1997 replaced “Confucian civilization” discourses, if not the tendency of essentialization itself, with “East Asian Popular Culture.” The popularization of Hong Kong martial arts film, Japanese manga, and the Korean soap opera syndrome created a sense of homogeneous metropolitan; Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing, Taipei, Shanghai and Singapore. As cultural agencies in Asian cities began to consider cultural markets outside of the national borders, it might be possible to predict the emergence of regionally defined collective cultural sensitivity.

Nevertheless, the syndrome of East Asian popular culture is circumscribed by an inherent obstacle. The communication via popular culture in East Asia has hardly been interactive. The fevers of the Hong Kong films, Japanese manga, and Korean soap opera emerged and overwhelmed the regional cultural market separately. Further, none of the pop-culture fever shows any sign of de-nationalization of the discourses. The Koreanness of Pae Yong-jun in 2005 is graver and deeper than the Chineseness of Chow Yun-fat (Zhou Run-fa) in the 1980s. The success of the Korea wave is dominantly, if not entirely, understood as the cultural victory of Korea over other nations in
Korean society; whereas it is often perceived as a form of cultural invasion by many Chinese and Japanese commentaries. None of the cultural fever in East Asia is de-nationalized in its form and its economic and political objectives. To my knowledge, none of soap operas and films co-produced by two or more societies was successful in market. It might be the structural and semiotic fate of the cultural industries other than Hollywood if “in postindustrial capitalism, profit is gained through the commodification of different itself and the conscious production of that difference.”48 In other words, the postindustrial cultural production system successfully manufactures the Korean wave as a market phenomenon by essentializing, commodifying and reifying the Koreanness in Japanese and Chinese market. The emergence of research institutes for cultural market in Chinese government and universities also indicates a wide-spread understanding in China that the realm of popular culture is the place where ‘national essences’ competes with each other in commodity forms. Hence, it is too optimistic to expect that the East Asian popular culture would produce the regionally integrated cultural sensitivity.

Let us go back to the issue of the problem of intellectual community in East Asia. As Edward Said and Spivak suggest, the post-colonial societies as synthesis cannot imagine themselves without the process of self-otherizing49. Hence, any attempt to create the sense of Asianness should face and negotiate the hegemonic/totalizing western modernity from the very beginning. The notion of direct return to the pure “indigenous” culture and civilization is not a viable option because of the history of imperialism50. The Asian attempt to find its own modernity is inherently the product of the region’s history of facing the western modernity. The problem of finding Asianness is even complicated via the history of internal imperialism of the region. The western technology of the knowledge production on the colonial others was precisely duplicated by the Japanese colonialists in Korean peninsula and Northeastern China, notably by the South Manchurian Railway Research Institute. Hence, for the Korean society and, to lesser degree, the Chinese society, the burden of knowledge and identity produced by the colonialism of a neighbor makes the production of Asianness against the Western modernity even more complicated and difficult. This double layer of colonial history in East Asia, in that sense, makes the newly emerging post-colonial scholarship which is based on the dichotomy of imperialism and colonies inapplicable to this region.

I do not intend to suggest a fine solution to these complexities of epistemologies and knowledge production. Nevertheless, as in the case of the politics of history and memory I discussed earlier, I believe that the new space for area based knowledge production is possible only through the process of de-nationalization. If East Asian feminists can write a common history textbook for Asian women, they are able to produce knowledge that crosses borders. If East Asian peasants can protest against APEC meeting together, they can agree on their common history and produce their own knowledge. The scheme of common space for knowledge promoted by Sun Ge is, therefore, perfectly plausible in this context. In sum, the space for regional knowledge production is possible not though negations among national intellectuals but though the formation of new identity that crosses border. The vulgar but simplest suggestion is, therefore, the creation of regional civil...
societies based not on nationality and citizenship but on the location in the web of global production – both material and symbolic.

Conclusion

I have not tried to suggest a new model of East Asian community in this paper. Rather, my aim is limited to point out the conundrums, dilemmas and problems of the making of East Asian community by delineating the multiple layers of the concepts of East Asia as an area. Those layers, as anyone can easily agree, are not separated or isolated from each other but deeply entangled and, in most cases, working simultaneously. Nevertheless, by analyzing the multilayered nature of the concept of area, we can see that community building is not possible without a broad perspective for comprehensive solutions of the problems embedded in those layers. The problems of history and memory will negatively impact the rising sense of economic integration and unnecessarily provoke the sense of insecurity. The failure of the space for regional knowledge production will produce policy makers who are insensitive to neighbor’s worldview and uncritically subscribe the American perspective of regional prosperity and security.

The ultimate issue for the making of the East Asian community is how to denationalize and build the regional networks of civil society and intellectuals. The necessity of denationalization, however, does not mean that it should happen overnight. In the age of globalization and neo-liberalism, the nation state might be the only shield against the destructive force of the global capitalism. I conclude this paper with two very rough suggestions in the making of the East Asian community.

1. The new project of the East Asian community should be able to partially replace the positive role of the nation states under globalization. The currency swap arrangement might be an exemplary case. Nevertheless, this effort should be strictly differentiated from an attempt to make an exclusive economic bloc.

2. A rush to making of the East Asian community will be challenged by two formidable forces; the United States which might see it as the emergence of a peer competitor and the social forces in each country that should yield and give up significant portions of interests in the making of the East Asian community. Hence, the transformation should be gradual and incremental. The gradual promotion of the “web of spider” approach which relies on multiple bilateral agreements might reduce the resistance.
As a new global system took shape in 1945 following the end of the Second World War, the possibility of states acting unilaterally around the planet was circumscribed by freshly-created global institutions. Under the leadership of two American presidents, Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, the building blocks of a new world order were put in place. In order of importance, first came the United Nations, then the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, later on NATO, SEATO, OAS, the Arab Union, and various other global organs. The most important of these, the UN, barred any interference by one nation with another without the prior approval of the UN Security Council.

Talking about why he believed that this unique body would ultimately be a success, Roosevelt stated: “It ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries – and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all these, a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join.”

For the next fifty years, American presidents, Republican and Democratic, subscribed to this ideal of multi-lateralist cooperation. Successive regimes in Washington supported the UN on a regular basis.

The United Nations, meantime, did not always stop conflicts. Over the next fifty or so years, major lands like the Soviet Union, China, the United States, France and Belgium, among others, intervened in other countries without the prior authorization of the Security Council. Some of the victims of those incursions were weak states, including Hungary, Czechoslovakia, South Korea, Grenada, Vietnam, Chile and Lebanon. In addition, the UN was not able to prevent genocide in countries like Rwanda and Cambodia. However, as the years passed, and the collapse of the Cold War occurred, the UN was able to start taking a more active role in settling disputes, working on reconciliation between enemy forces, helping in writing constitutions and assisting in nation-building.

Then in the 2000 presidential election, a new leader was chosen in the United States, George W. Bush. Mr. Bush repudiated much of the commitments of the past 55 years. He decided to take the US in a completely new direction. From the day the former Texas governor ascended to the presidency in January 2001, he steered toward a course of unilateralism. Despite his very limited background in foreign affairs, Mr. Bush brought with him some basic ideas about where America
should be going in the world and why its past conduct under President Clinton, in his view, had been deplorable. George W. Bush believed that, while America should remain “humble,” it should always look out for itself. Under the Clinton Administration, it had not always done so, in his view, and U.S. global authority had deteriorated. By Bush’s reasoning, Clinton had too often sought multilateral solutions to the detriment of our national interests – especially acting through the United Nations – had refused to use the US armed forces when needed, and had incautiously apologized for past American foreign policy mistakes when it was not necessary. Bush’s intention as chief executive, as articulated repeatedly during his presidential campaign, was to reverse the Clinton path.

More than anything else, Bush wanted the United States, as the most powerful land on earth, to advance American interests around the globe using whatever assets, troops, or diplomacy were needed. This meant, no longer compromising US interests on behalf of other nations; enhancing US military power so that no other country would ever threaten America or out-arm America; and bringing retrograde regimes to heel and eventually into the democratic community by persuasion or, if necessary, armed means. To accomplish its goals, Washington would, on some occasions, circumvent the global authority of the UN and act alone. If the United States had to undertake unilateral operations, however, it would do so unconstrained by outmoded treaties, unaffected by adverse public opinion and unembarrassed by its use of force.

The go-it-alone approach became evident in the first nine months of the administration. Within two months of assuming office, he renounced the Kyoto Protocol on global warming -- even though the United States today accounts for 25 percent of world-wide greenhouse gases. Bush argued that the pact was fatally flawed because it allowed developing nations an exemption from emission reduction targets and placed too much of the clean-up burden on industrial nations. He claimed that he could instead propose a credible alternative for cutting gas emissions by 18 percent over ten years (which, so far, has not happened). On another issue, early on in his term, he made clear his opposition to the International Criminal Court (ICC). He contended it would lead to politically motivated prosecutions of American soldiers and U.S. leaders -- even though the drafters of the juridical covenant had included strict provisions allowing nations to prosecute their own citizens. In 2002, he publicly disowned Clinton’s signature on the ICC document.

Fulfilling another campaign promise, Bush said in 2001 he would pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty because he claimed it interfered with the development of America’s Star Wars program – and in mid-2002, he fulfilled that vow. In the summer of 2001, he also sent U.S. diplomats to the UN to block a proposal to add on a monitoring and verification system to the 1972 treaty banning the production of biological weapons, a pact that the United States had ratified. The Bush representatives argued that such an arrangement was unenforceable and would, in any case, give foreign inspectors access to the trade secrets of American biotechnology companies. Bush’s opposition forced postponement of the talks. That same summer, Bush emissaries weakened key provisions of a draft U.N. accord to curb illicit small arms traffic that could restrict some civilian gun ownership in America. They contended it would interfere with the 2nd Amendment right of
U.S. citizens to bear arms. The United Nations finally accepted a watered-down version of the pact. Lastly, at the insistence of American anti-abortion groups, in late 2001 the State Department unilaterally cut off all U.S. assistance to foreign private organizations which provided legal abortion information services, counseling, and referrals.

Bush’s State Department, Defense Department and National Security Council, in addition, made every effort to demean, discard, or block different global accords stretching back for the last two decades. The agreements ranged from the START 2 treaty reducing nuclear weapons, which President George W. Bush’s father negotiated; to the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas, which 133 nations ratified; to the Biodiversity Convention supported by 168 nations; to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that the U.N. General Assembly adopted 158-3 in 1996 and which Republicans in the U.S. Senate helped to defeat during the Clinton Administration in 1999; as well as the 1997 convention banning anti-personnel landmines, the Conventions on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, and the Nunn-Lugar initiative that helped dismantle Russia’s weapons of mass destruction but which required a boost in funding by Congress. In addition, George Bush boycotted the August 2002 U.N. World Summit on Sustainable Development held in South Africa, attended by most other leaders of the world.

But, the Bush approach was, as the State Department’s head of Policy Planning, Richard Haass, noted, “a la carte multilateralism.” The Republican regime still supported several ratified non-proliferation treaties dealing with nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry. These included: the Missile Technology Control Regime, an informal arrangement among 29 countries to prevent the export of technologies for delivering nuclear warheads and weapons of mass destruction; the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans chemical weapons and provides for inspections of chemical factories; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not have them, and which has 182 signatories; the Australia Group, an informal arrangement of 33 countries to prevent the export of biological and chemical weapons; and the Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, production or possession of biological weapons. Bush, in June 2002, also secured an agreement with the G-8 nations, pledging an American contribution of $10 billion over ten years, to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Finally Bush and President Putin of Russia negotiated the so-called Moscow Treaty which intended to reduce nuclear warheads on both sides though it had few real enforcement mechanisms.

But, aside from these ventures into multilateralism, the Bush position on international legal agreements was but a foreshadowing of the new administration’s more muscular outburst toward any world-wide pacts, following the horrific savagery of September 11th. Though the unprovoked terrorist attack first led Bush to reverse, at least temporarily, his single-minded course of going-it-alone, and rally a coalition of like-minded democratic nations around a campaign to track down, attack, and defeat the al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan, within months, members of the Bush strategic planning team were already considering ways for the United States to take measures
on its own against all rogue nations that potentially possessed weapons of mass destruction. The reasoning was expressed by the State Department’s Policy Planning Director, Richard Haass, “Sovereignty entails obligation. One is not to massacre your own people. Another is not to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet these obligations, then it forfeits some of the normal advantages of sovereignty, including the right to be left alone in your own territory. Other governments, including the United States, gain the right to intervene. In the vase of terrorism, this can even lead to a right of preventive, or preemiptory, self-defense.”

This approach gradually developed into a plan by the United States to support preventative military strikes that could be mounted outside of global assemblies, including the United Nations. The policy became known publicly in fits and starts through a series of speeches that President Bush delivered shortly after the World Trade Center attacks.

Starting with his September 2001 address to Congress, Bush stated the case that any nations harboring terrorists would be fair game for American troops. He issued a challenge to the nations of the world that “you are either with us or against us”. Four months later, Bush enunciated a more specific terrorist threat in his State of the Union speech, the so-called “axis of evil” nations as embodied in three states -- North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. The United States, he contended, would now have to take the major responsibility for dismantling the weaponry of those renegade countries. Five months later, in a talk at West Point, in June, 2002, Bush for the first time spelled out in full detail his doctrine of American preventative war. He told the cadets: “Our security will require all Americans . . . to be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.” “If we wait for threats to fully materialize,” he went on to say, “we will have waited too long” and, finally, he added, “we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”

In taking this position, Bush disowned the past geopolitical strategies developed during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in the 1940s and 1950s which guided America for almost sixty years -- the concepts of deterrence and containment. He argued they were now inadequate or antiquated. Deterrence, which promises a devastating military retaliation against any nation that attacks America, he claimed, would have no impact on shadowy terrorist networks that have no nation or peoples to defend. And containment, he said, would not constrain unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction from passing their arsenals along to terrorist allies. This new kind of threat meant we could no longer count on our foes to send out the kind of classic warning signals beforehand that could be handled by deterrence or containment. Thus the United States had to prepare for a different sort of conflict – one without traditional battlefields. As a consequence, Bush said the United States could no longer respect the principle of absolute state sovereignty and would cross borders at will to protect America’s territory, subordinating the security of every other nation to our own. In 1999, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan had told the organization that it should, on occasion, override a country’s sovereignty in humanitarian emergencies, but he never mentioned a rationale based on eliminating weapons of mass destruction.
By September 20, 2002, Bush elevated his thinking to official doctrine when he offered to Congress a thirty-three-page policy document, “The National Security Strategy of the United States.” It spelled out his administration’s full agenda on global security. While Bush made some obeisance’s to multilateralism, primarily he wrote of the need for a “distinctly American internationalism” that could deal with failing states. One central feature of this new approach was called “counter-proliferation” -- the dismantling of fearsome foreign weapons in outlaw states while simultaneously building up a U.S. missile defense system. In conclusion, Bush said that America could no longer permit “any foreign power to catch up with the huge lead the United States has opened up since the fall of the Soviet Union more than a decade ago.” Fundamentally, this version of foreign affairs was an outgrowth of a viewpoint that America lived in a Hobbesian universe, in which no nation could be ruled out as a possible adversary, international laws were unreliable, and only military power exercised by a single democratic nation alone could bring order and sustain freedom. Washington’s policy under Bush, in short, now seemed to be one of military supremacy over the entire earth – an endeavor more ambitious than that sought even by ancient Rome which merely confined itself to the Mediterranean and Europe, or even by a 19th century Great Britain, which claimed but a fifth of the globe.

In his first four years, Bush backed up his openly aggressive posture with a series of moves to enhance the American military. First, he boosted U.S. defense spending 13 percent in the 2003 budget, the largest increase since the Reagan era. In military spending, the United States today currently outspends all of the rest of the world combined, over half of the $800 billion or so a year for defense expended today. In a Nuclear Posture Review released in January 2002, Bush also embraced the notion of “offensive deterrence” whereby as president he would consider authorizing the use of specially constructed nuclear missiles during a conventional war to penetrate underground bunkers. Bush indicated he might even order resumption of nuclear testing – a first for a U.S. President since the era of President Kennedy.53

In furtherance of his fight against terrorism, Bush also dispatched American Special Forces to various countries to combat terrorism -- including Yemen, Philippines, Georgia, Pakistan, Colombia, and many of the former states of the Soviet Union. By 2003, the Bush administration had constructed, renovated, or added onto military facilities in Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bulgaria, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman; planned training missions, including some placement of U.S. forces on an open-ended basis, in Georgia, Djibouti, and the Philippines; won airfield landing rights in Kazakhstan; and undertook major military exercises that involved thousands of American soldiers in India, Jordan, and Kuwait. In addition, the Pentagon stockpiled thousands of tons of military equipment in Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf states, including Jordan, Israel, Qatar and Kuwait.54

Then, in early 2002, Bush announced a crusade against the man he deemed as the most noxious leader among the so-called axis of evil countries, Saddam Hussein. He made an impassioned appeal to his countrymen that America needed to undertake a preventative attack on Baghdad to
rid the world of weapons of mass destruction supposedly possessed by the Iraqi tyrant as well as to sever its ties to Al Qaeda. He said he was basing his power to act in this case on his inherent powers as president as well as on earlier U.N. resolutions enacted against Iraq during and after the Gulf War of 1991. As Bush began to ratchet up the campaign, however, he drew criticism from many quarters -- within his own Republican ranks, from Democrats, and particularly from overseas allies.

The core argument of the opposition was that the United States had succeeded for eleven years or so in containing Iraq, had deterred Saddam Hussein from invading his neighbors, had stopped him from building a nuclear bomb and had prevented his transfers of weaponry to terrorists (unlikely as Al Qaeda was a religious group that detested Hussein and might well have turned borrowed armaments against his secular regime). Containment had also already weakened Hussein’s army, eroded the potency of his chemical and biological stockpiles, and shifted about forty percent of his land from the dictator’s grasp into enclaves for Kurds patrolled by American bombers. Finally, containment had proven a successful strategy against the Soviet Union, a far more dangerous adversary. Hence it wasn’t clear why Washington should abandon such a policy now and start a war. Bush officials countered, nonetheless, that they believed the embargo was too porous.

Other skeptics about the Bush policy, however, argued that, quite apart from whether containment was working or not, preemptive action was flatly against international law and constituted aggression – especially when that action was actually “preventative” in character, that is, aimed at what a country might do in the future rather than what it was doing right now. Preventative strikes had, it was pointed out, triggered both World War I and World War II. Indeed, it was such a history that led to the creation of the United Nations. The reasoning behind the founding of the UN was to preclude nations from attacking other countries unilaterally based merely on a fear of an attack or on the supposition of possible harm at a future time. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter only permitted a country to go into battle against another state, without first seeking approval from the U.N. Security Council, when it was the victim of an “armed attack” or it was under the direct and immediate threat of a military invasion. In those limited occasions a state could invoke the right of self-defense against an aggressor. Israel had cited this provision to justify its surprise attacks in 1967 against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, when it saw Arab troops massing ominously along its borders. But the United States was not yet facing a similar situation in Iraq, these critics contended – namely, an instantaneous, overwhelming threat that left no other choices of means or time for deliberation. Iraq might, in brief, be a long-term hazard, of which Washington should properly be wary. But any U.S. intervention against a quiescent and non-threatening contemporary Iraq amounted to preventative war.

As a result of these and related arguments, the Bush administration went to considerable lengths to demonstrate in detail an immediate threat emanating from Iraq. The first was the purported menace of weapons of mass destruction, the most frequently cited excuse for preemption, though one for which there was as yet no “smoking gun.” The second was a so-called link to Al Qaeda terrorists, or to other Islamic countries hiding in Iraq. As Secretary of State Powell put it in
his dramatic February 5, 2003, presentation before the U.N. Security Council, there existed a “sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder.” He also cited past support of Saddam for Palestinian terrorists, and indeed the main character in this story was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Palestinian working with Osama bin Laden, and allegedly directing operations across the Middle East from Baghdad. “Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al Qaeda together, enough so al Qaeda could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al Qaeda could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction,” Powell declared. He then summed up the Bush Doctrine in a dramatic flourish underscoring the need for preemption: “When we confront a regime that harbors ambitions for regional domination, hides weapons of mass destruction, and provides haven and active support for terrorists, we are not confronting the past; we are confronting the present. And unless we act, we are confronting an even more frightening future.”

Here, then, was the most direct statement linking transnational networks of political violence and new U.S. doctrine to unseat regimes that might provide support, even passive support, to these migratory threats. The Bush Doctrine, as applied to Iraq, had to include the terrorist threat—and one that was by its nature transnational— in order to be credible, in order to justify the case for self-defense by projecting military power into a sovereign state. Powell’s was not a convincing performance, but it was a necessary one.

The Bush Administration could point to some precedents in American history for its new policy. Between 1800 and 1934, the American military had intervened many times -- almost 180 times -- mostly in Central and South America, often for legitimate reasons of saving Americans from harm, but also preventively, to collect debts and overthrow hostile anti-U.S. regimes. America secretly spawned covert CIA operations in Iran in 1953, in Guatemala in 1954, in Indonesia in 1956, and in other trouble spots well into the 1970s and 1980s that were preventative in nature -- and few of which brought about the felicitous results America sought. But -- at least on a public level -- in that post-war period, the United States inveighed against unilateral forms of warfare. Indeed, at one especially hot time, during the most frightening crisis of the Cold War -- the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis -- the United States had had an opportunity to launch a preemptive attack on Havana to wipe out the Russian missiles, but declined to do so. The Kennedy administration believed such a precipitous move by the United States would violate international law, be seen as cowardly as the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, and tarnish America’s democratic values. And when it did finally decide to impose quarantine on Cuba, Washington acted under the U.N. Charter Article 51, which allows regional bodies, as in this case the Organization of American States, to take action in self-defense in face of imminent peril. In another example, twenty or so years later, one of the most deeply conservative Republican presidents of modern times, Ronald Reagan, condemned Israel for its preventative destruction of Iraq’s nuclear facilities in 1981 as a violation of the U.N. Charter.

But irregardless of how past administrations indulged in excesses or exercised restraints,
America’s present embrace under President Bush of preventative war measures, critics argued, was likely to prove contagious for other nations. If the United States could act preventively without UN authorization, why then could not every other nation in the world take similar liberties? Why shouldn’t India invade Pakistan or China overrun Taiwan? In addition, once such a policy gained standing, would it not trigger arms races all over the globe, as every country would have an incentive to buy more weapons to protect itself against possible preventive wars. Some nations, indeed, might even initiate their own preemptive incursions to forestall surprise attacks. All of these consequences would spell the doom of the over 350 years of state-to-state diplomacy starting with the Westphalian Settlement in Europe in 1648 that recognized the sovereignty of the nation-state as the basis of world order. It would inevitably lead to the collapse of the United Nations since the argument for that body’s collective security would be destroyed. In short, this new paradigm would shift the world away from the stable system of the past half-century that has required states to operate within international law to a lawless world dominated by raw power, shifting alliances, and rival blocs in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas, possibly precipitating the very anarchy it claimed it wanted to eliminate.

Perhaps the most self-deceptive feature about preventive war, opponents lastly pointed out, was that it was based on the fundamental illusion that it is possible to foresee what is to come. As historians are wont to tell their students, history does not follow a logical path. It has a distressing habit of outwitting all certitudes. As the English historian, Sir Herbert Butterfield, once wrote: “The hardest strokes of heaven fall in history upon those who imagine that they can control things in a sovereign manner, playing providence not only for themselves but for the future reaching out into the future with the wrong kind of farsightedness, and gambling on a lot of risky calculations in which there must never be a single mistake.” By these standards, preemption could well lead to many unforeseen consequences.

In the final analysis, skeptics noted, preventative war rules out the route of negotiations, arbitration or classic diplomacy. A state that feels imperiled by a possible threat of mass destruction might have first gone to the international community to ask for assistance. A country could have requested the U.N. General Assembly to strengthen the global treaties designed to control weapons of biological, chemical and nuclear arms, including such accords as the nuclear non-proliferation agreement and the various pacts designed to mitigate the perils of chemical and biological weapons. If such efforts failed or outlaw nations remained unwilling to comply, there would be recourses to more potent U.N. enforcement measures through the United Nations Security Council -- for example, sanctions against an offending state, embargoes, seizures of assets abroad, or, in extreme cases, military action. Indeed, it was such a combination of constraints and disincentives action against Libya’s terrorism that finally yielded results -- not the military action of 1986, which only brought about more terrorism.

All of this, though, seemed to be of little interest to Bush strategists. It is clear that this administration, indeed, saw preventative action as embracing larger stakes. President Bush and his
foreign policy entourage were apparently persuaded that employing such military strikes around the globe advanced the “zone of democracy” and could reshape the entire world in a pluralistic way. As Bush put it in his West Point speech: the United States has “the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.” And he vowed that “America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge thereby making the destabilizing arms race of other eras pointless and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”

Shortly after the destruction of the World Trade Center, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice offered up her own blueprint for the planet: “I really think this period is analogous to 1945-1947 in that the events…started shifting the tectonic plates in international politics. And it’s important to try to seize on that and position American interests and institutions before they harden again.” With these pronouncements, while they remained mum on their new global order, Bush and his team seemed ready to replace most of the existing commitments of prior American administrations, with an outsized vision of an exalted role for the United States leading the way alone by its wits, superior intelligence, and unrivaled muscle. Nonetheless, now in his second term in office, President Bush and his advisors appear to be recalibrating their thinking about some of America’s policies overseas. This has become most evident in the Bush Administration’s still uncertain relationship with the globe’s most important security body, the United Nations. On the one hand, President Bush was offended by Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s comment that the US intervention in Iraq was “illegal” under the UN Charter. On the other hand, Annan championed certain changes in the UN structure which the Bush Administration desired. And Annan himself went out of his way to accommodate the Bush White House by appointing former Bush Agricultural Secretary Ann Veneman to head UNICEF and selecting a tough chief of staff, former head of UNDP, Marc Malloch Brown, to fire underachievers and deadwood on his staff. And, at the request of Washington, the UN Security Council is now supporting the US occupation of Iraq, as well as monitoring Iraq’s elections and assisting on its new Iraqi constitution. This, in turn, evidences a new US understanding of the UN’s importance. As well, the Bush Administration has moderated its rhetoric against nation-building, against negotiations with “axis of evil” nations like North Korea and Iran, against involvement in the Mideast peace talks, and against global loans and debt forgiveness. Nonetheless, President Bush went ahead and selected a notorious UN baiter, John Bolton, to be the new US envoy to the UN.

Simultaneously, a reform process began to develop serious momentum at the UN. Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a commission in 2003 -- as a result of the intense controversy over the US invasion of Iraq -- to propose restructuring the Security Council, new ways of handling terrorism and genocide, and fresh approaches to resolving nuclear threats, human rights abuses, economic needs, and UN management problems. It recommended a series of reforms. Kofi Annan himself, in March, 2005, in a report to the General Assembly entitled “In Larger Freedom”, endorsed many of the proposals and added a few of his own. A US Congressional Committee
cochaired by former Democratic Senator George Mitchell and former Republican Congressman Newt Gingrich offered its own set of ideas last Spring. Republicans in Congress, on their own, forwarded legislation, but threatened a cutoff of half of US dues if 32 specific reforms were not adopted by 2007. Other nations jumped in with advice.

Meantime, in the summer of 2005, UN diplomats patiently stitched together a forty-page reform package. However, the notoriously combative Bolton, just weeks before the World Summit at the UN was to begin in mid-September, demanded more than 700 changes in the document, including elimination of all mention of the Millennium Development Goals which the United States had backed in 2000 to eradicate global poverty—the very reason for this summit—as well as all references to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court, global warming and enhancement of the General Assembly’s powers. Bolton’s deletions, reflecting the Bush Administration’s continuing hostility to multilateralism, reopened the debate over reforms. The smaller nations, resentful of Bolton’s intrusion, jumped in with their own alterations.

In the end, only a few changes survived — enough to give the patina of transfiguration without its substance. Limited new powers were given to Annan to make personnel changes; the definition of terrorism was partially expanded; the Millennium Development goals were reinstated; some form of UN intervention, with “ifs” attached, was permitted against genocide; a Peacebuilding Commission and a Democracy Fund, two non-controversial favorites of the Bush Administration, were adopted; and rich Western lands now went on record promising to aspire, on a voluntary basis, to give 0.7 percent of their GNP to poorer nations annually. But most ideas were watered down, as in the Human Rights Council, or dropped entirely, including several nonproliferation ventures.

However, though the reform movement faltered, and despite the ambivalence the US displayed toward basic changes in the body, this did not necessarily leave a crippled or defunct UN. After all, at present, the organization maintains sixteen peacekeeping missions; it leads the efforts to recover from the Asian tsunami; it has overseen elections in Iraq. It also handles transnational issues like environmental degradation, sexual trafficking, drug smuggling, nuclear proliferation and AIDS. It continues to serve as a round-the-clock diplomatic forum to stave off conflicts. And even if all of the reforms are enacted, this would not, of course, make the UN act differently on crises like Darfur. For that, you still will need political will.

The foremost curiosity is that President Bush so abruptly departed from this internationalist tradition which was embodied by all of his presidential predecessors over the last sixty years, including prominent leaders from his own party, like Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon and even Ronald Reagan – and showed scant interest in helping to establish modern-day rules of global conduct. Yet it is these very intricate and integrative obligations and legal frameworks, forged by the United States with its allies that have led to global stability and world-wide prosperity and have essentially eliminated world war over the past sixty years. “The United States,” as John Ikenberry has written,” made its power safe for the world, and in return the world agreed to live within the U.S. system...The result has been the most stable and prosperous international system in world history.”57
Bush’s reassertion of unilateralist American power over and above the value of global cooperation, especially in the United Nations threaten to disrupt, if not shatter, all of these achievements.

In the end, if he is to strengthen the possibilities of peace around the globe, President Bush must heed again the words of Harry Truman. Truman spoke to the closing session of the 1945 UN Conference in San Francisco and told the American people: “We all have to recognize – no matter how great our strength – that we must deny ourselves the license to do always as we please. No one nation, no regional group, can, or should expect, any special privilege which harms any other nation... That is the price that each nation will have to pay for world peace. Unless we are willing to pay that price, no organization for world peace can accomplish its purpose. And what a reasonable price that is.”
WORLD WAR II AND SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS: REFLECTIVE VIEWS AT THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE WAR

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The year of 2005 is the 60th anniversary of the end of WW II and the Sino-Japanese War. During the year many conflicts and problems in Sino-Japanese relations have arisen one after another. It’s true that these conflicts include some collisions raised in recent years. However, the remained historical conflicts left from the War have been affecting the relations between the two countries. For example, the Yasukuni Shrine issue has resulted in the break of mutual visits among leaders of the two nations. Therefore, reflective views on the past war will help us learn more lessons which make sense for the future Sino-Japanese relations.

Breakout of the WW II and the Sino-Japanese War

WW II (September 1939- August 1945) was the largest and cruelest war in the human history. In East Asia, after such international affairs as “9.18 Incident” (1931) and “7.7 Incident” (1937), the Sino-Japanese War began, followed by the Germany invasion to Poland (1938). Germany aggression was widely considered as the beginning of the WWII in Europe. After breakout of the Pacific War, more countries were taken into the WWII. The Sino-Japanese War, part of the WWII, actually drew the curtain of WW II in Asia before the war in Europe.

The world system, which included not only such European countries as Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary, but the United States and Japan, expended to the whole world after the World War I at the beginning of the 20th century. Before the war, two contradictory groups had formed. One was The Entente with Britain, France and Russia as the centre; the other was the Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary as the centre. Kindled by the Sarajevo Incident in July 1914, their continuous conflicts finally led to the WWII, which took the United States, China and Japan into the war. The First World War ended in 1918 and the Alliance was defeated with Germany surrendering and Austria-Hungary disaggregating. At the same time, the Entente was also divided. Just before the end of the war, Russia withdrew from the war due to the national war and stayed in opposition with the Entente. Last but not the least was the emerging powers of the United States and Japan, which became the center of the world system. To be specific, Versailles-Washington System came into being after the Versailles Meeting and Washington Meeting.

“9.18 Incident” on September 18, 1931 and “7.7 Incident” on July 7, 1937 were attemptable actions for Japan to break the Washington System. The so called Washington System was a balanced
structure among such countries as the United States, Japan and China to maintain the security in Asian-Pacific area. Its main course was to admit the integrity of sovereignty and territory in China, to apply the Opening Policy to China and to enjoy equal opportunities for all powers. However, “9.18 Incident” was the start for Japan to occupy China alone. It broke the balance among powers and led to the Sino-Japanese War. Meanwhile, the incident enkindled the conflicts of powers, esp. the United States, for their interests in China. At last, Japan withdrew from League of the Nations.

Just at the same time, the fascist nations in Europe like Germany started to break the Versailles System and withdrew from the League of Nations. Germany brought Europe into the war after it swallowed Austria and occupied Czechoslovakia. It was not until Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939 that Europe was in the war. Some European nations with the leading Britain began to resist.

While the Versailles System was endangering the whole breach, frictions between China and Japan still continued. Japan occupied three provinces in North-Eastern China and established a puppet nation— “Manzhou State”. Japan was yet to stop its aggression in China. It completely broke the Washington System and entered into the Sino-Japanese War. The confliction between Japan and US was further intensified and was approaching to the edge of the war. Especially in September 1940, Japan, Germany and Italy signed jointly the “Military Allied Contract” and formed the Axis Group, which connected the wars in Europe and Asian-Pacific area. Not long after that, Japanese planes attacked the Pearl Harbor without warning on December 7, 1941, destroying or severely damaging 19 naval vessels and some 200 aircraft. The United States entered World War II the following day. Sino-Japanese War was, however, still the main battle field in Asia, and naturally a part of WW II.

From the perspective of the world system before WW II and the whole process of the outbreak of WW II, the Sino-Japanese relations in 1930s was a major component in the international relations. From the very beginning, the war between China and Japan was a part of WW II, even the curtain of the catastrophic war.

Cause of WW II and Conflicts between China and Japan

The Second World War raged more countries which can be divided into two parts: One was called “the Allies” such as Britain, France, US, the former Soviet Union and China; the other was called the “Axis Group”, who were dissatisfied with the world pattern and expected more interests, such as Germany, Japan and Italy. In Europe, the rival countries of Britain, France and Germany finally declared the war.

The basic principle for international relations since 1840s which started in Europe was to believe in and pursue the power politics on the basis of strength and to try their best to seek advantages, hegemony and power range of their own. That is to say, each nation, esp. the super powers, took priority in their own benefits and attempted to develop themselves in ways of invasion, occupation
and exploration in other nations. So did the colonist policies applied by super powers in Europe and America, starting from the second half of 19th century. The First World War resulted from the scramble of colony; so did the Second World War.

The biggest change in East Asian pattern since 1840s was the transition of international status for China and Japan and the related turbulent alteration to international relations in Asian-Pacific area. Since then, stiff turbulence and disorder had happened in international status. Before 1840s, both China and Japan were in the “Tribute System” whose center was China. Japan was deeply affected by China and absorbed all kinds of Chinese advanced culture from political system to culture, although Japan was an independent nation. Meanwhile, China stood in the world as the most powerful and influential nation in East Asia. In 1840s, the powers in Europe and America, which were getting stronger thanks to the Industrial Revolution, explored in east and colonized the backward feudal nations. China was one of the raped nations and began to lose its powerful status in East Asia. China was defeated in the “Opium War” with Britain and was forced to sign the unequal “Nanjing Treaty”. Gradually, China became a semi-colony with more unequal treaties signed and more interests lost. In the year of 1952, Japan was also forced to open the door of the nation. American fleets entered into Tokyo Bay, Japan, and ordered forcefully the trade between two nations should be conducted. Both Japan and China experienced the pressure from the western powers, but two nations had completely different results: China was weakened and Japan was strengthened. Japan had become richer and stronger after the Innovation. Therefore, great changes had taken place in the international status of both China and Japan and Japan had altered their views about China. Japanese thinkers like Fukuzawa Yukichi advocated learning from Europe and America and distained China, which Japan had admired long before. Fukuzawa Yukichi proposed “Leaving Asia and Entering Europe” which also became the state police of Japanese government then. With fast-paced development, Japan was listed in colonial countries in Europe and North America and declared invasive wars against Korea and China. Since then, the relations between China and Japan had become the main parts of international relations in East Asia and China issues had been the major ones in Asian-Pacific area. The control and anti-control, invasion and fight of invasion between Japan and China had been on the agenda of Sino-Japanese relations. The two nations were in conflicts and contradictions. Japan’s expansion in Asia conflicted with Asian policies adopted by Britain and US. All of these factors made the status in this area more complicated.

Japan had gradually turned to a military nation with such Asian countries as China as the major targets of invasion since 1840s. It had been seeking hegemony in East Asia. All those invasive wars like Korean War (1894), Yellow Sea Campaign with China (1895), Japanese-Russian War (1904-1905), were steps for Japan to seek powers in this area. The victory in those wars swelled the ambition of Japanese militarism so that it started the whole invasive war against China and the war in Pacific area, which brought East Asia into the Second World War. Finally, however, Japan was badly defeated in the disaster.

Through the analysis of status in the Asian-Pacific area before the Second World War, we can
draw the conclusion that Japanese pursuit of hegemony in East Asia and its invasive policies toward China were roots of the war between the two nations; meanwhile, Japan had a direct conflict with China, which was the major cause of disturbances in East Asia and the precursor of the WWII.

Results of WW II and Post-war Sino-Japan Relations

The results of the Second World War were the Axis Group was completely defeated and the Allies were in victory. So defeated Germany was in military occupation by the United States, the former Soviet Union, Britain and France and was transformed from the former Nazi country to democratic one. In the same way, Japan was in the occupation by the Allies and democratic reform was conducted basically at the will of the United States.

Due to the Second World War, dramatic changes have taken place in the whole world and nations which played an important role in the international relations before the war. As a powerful nation in Asian-Pacific area before the war, Japan was badly weakened because of the defeat, the destruction of the militarism and the democratic transformation, so the status in this area was totally different. Sino-Japanese relations since 1840s especially experienced huge transition: the former unequal relations ended and an equal and cooperative new stage might start. After the democratic reform, Japan abolished the invasive and expansion policies and became a peaceful nation. China, however, resumed its status as a powerful nation and started to play the major role in East Asia. Although the National War broke out all over the country soon after the Second World War, it didn’t fundamentally change the status which had been resumed. In view of Chinese interests and policies toward Japan, no matter the government ruled by Chinese National Party (CNP) or the new government by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tried to establish a new type of relations between the two nations: equal and cooperative relations.

However, the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union soon after the Second World War and the subrogation of the Chinese government had greatly affected the Sino-Japanese relations. The United States and the former Soviet Union were allies in the Second World War and won the victory of the war, but they were in opposition in the term of ideology after the war. Therefore, the Cold War was the priority in the post-war international status. The national war in China between the CNP and the CCP ended with surrendering of the CNP. Then the CCP established a new government instead and the CNP withdrew to the Taiwan Island. The start of the Cold War and the subrogation of the Chinese government pushed the division among the Allies. The United States and the former Soviet Union were completely in the status of opposition. The American government still admitted the regime of the government ruled by CNP and refused to admit the new government established by the CCP and applied the blockage and containment policies to the new People’s Republic of China.

As to Japan, dramatic changes happened in American policies in October, 1948. The policy used to explore, weaken and transform Japan and then started to support Japan instead. In September
of 1951 San Francisco Meeting was held, where San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed. According to the treaty, Japan resumed independence. What’s more, Japan has become a part of Asian-Pacific strategy for America and one of the allied members to stand against the former Soviet Union and China under the Treaty of Security and Safeguard between the United States and Japan. On such condition, the Sino-Japanese relations lost the chance for improvement. On the contrary, the relations between the two nations were deteriorated due to the so called Peaceful Treaty between Japan and Taiwan in 1952. Actually, Japan was under the pressure from the United States to admit the Taiwan Regime. The opposition between China and Japan was different from the aggression and confliction during the war, but it continued to prevent the formal diplomatic relations of the two governments. Under such conditions, the Chinese government began to focus on the non-official ways to deal with the Sino-Japanese relations. The “Non-official Diplomatic Policy” was applied by taking advantage of traditional trade and culture exchanges in the term of non-official relations so that close relations were still between China and Japan, even when there was no official relations. The continuous “Non-official Diplomatic Policy” was helpful in the normalization of the Sino-Japanese relations and became one of the important factors for the improvement of the relations between two nations.

With the dramatic changes in the international status in 1970s, the factors which affected the Sino-Japanese relations altered. These factors, including the improvement of Sino-America relations, the rising status for China in the international community and Japanese growing independence, all pushed Japan to actively seek normalization of relations with China. In September, 1972, Japanese PM Tanaka realized the dream which hardly came true in the 20 years after the Second World War under the efforts of both Japanese and Chinese leaders, such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Since then, Sino-Japanese relations have truly ended the abnormal status which lasted over a century and developed on the basis of peace and equality. During the following 20 years, the two countries have established close and cooperative relations in all kinds of fields including politics, economy and culture and both have benefited from the friendly relationship. It’s sure that good relations between China and Japan have also brought peace and stability to Asian-Pacific area.

However, the dramatic changes in the international status have forced the relations among different countries to be altered since the end of the Cold War. The Sino-Japanese relation was one of them. That is to say, the status of Two Groups and Three levels of World have been fundamentally altered. The fast-paced development of economic globalization and geographic integration has made the economic and cultural relations between China and Japan closer and closer. But in the political field, there have always been some problems. For example, such historical problems as the Yasukuni Shrine, historical textbooks have diplomatic conflicts from time to time and have affected the bilateral visits of leaders in both countries. Meanwhile, due to different ideology, such issues as the intensified allies between Japan and the United States and Taiwan Issue have brought the sense of disbelief and alert to each other. Recently both China and Japan blamed each other on such issues as the division of ocean area and exploration of recourses in East China Sea, and the disputed Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands). They have strengthened their abilities of diplomatic activities and
military power respectively. Therefore, the possibility of confliction between the two countries has been intensified. The main cause for the changes of Sino-Japanese relations after the Cold War lies in the alteration to strength of the two countries, i.e. both China and Japan have existed in East Asia as powerful nations. In the respective of history, despite of close relations they were unequal in term of strength: China was the strongest nation in East Asia before the middle of 19th century, while Japan was only an ordinary nation which was in awe of China. However, there was nothing unchanged. Since the middle of 19th century, Japan had replaced China as the number one in this area, while China had been weakened and become a raped and invaded nation. But since 1990s, China and Japan have no longer been unequal in their strength. China is changing to a comprehensively powerful nation including the strengthened economic power from a politically powerful nation and Japan is from the economically powerful nation to a comprehensive one including its political status in the international community. That means “Double Poles” East Asian relations are emerging. It’s regretful, however, that the sense of regional cooperation in East Asia has been weakened due to the huge differences in development levels, political systems, races, cultures and religions among variety of nations in East Asia. This in turn made China and Japan unavoidably plunged into the existing traditional way of thinking, that is, if there is more than one power in the same area, they will definitely compete or conflict with each other to struggle for the control power in this area. So both China and Japan now are trapped in the so called “Security Dilemma” which means two rival parts are both suspicious and worried about the rising strength and future plans of each other and attempt to restrain or intervene in the rising power of the rival. Therefore, it’s reasonable for us to worry about the future Sino-Japanese relations which might replay the tragic history and compete for the control power in East Asia if the bilateral relations deteriorate. If that happened, there would be turbulence once again in the area.

Lessons from the War and Establishment of New Sino-Japanese Relations

Generally speaking, war is the extension of politics and international wars are the final means of solving contradictions and conflicts of rival nations. The Sino-Japanese War and the following Second World War were good examples. Japan kindled the war to set up its own control and hegemony in East Asia, even the whole world. But the ironic result was its complete defeat and democratic transformation, which made its evil dream unsatisfied. The war told the world that no country can realize its development and prosperity through aggressive wars and reign of other peoples. Both China and Japan suffered from the war and lost many lives and resources. Only under the peaceful postwar conditions can China and Japan realize their prosperity. Especially in 1970s when China and Japan normalized their diplomatic relations, they truly entered into a new stage of equality and cooperation and gained huge interests through bilateral cooperation in variety of fields. In spite of new problems arising in their relations after the Cold War, conflicts are absolutely not in their interests. Now most politicians and common people from both countries believe that peace
can bring bilateral benefits and conflicts can cause bilateral harm. Peace and cooperation are in their common interests. It’s certain that we should think over how to establish new relations between two nations and realize their equality and cooperation in new era.

Both China and Japan have their own national interests. Under the “Jungle Law” contradictions and conflicts kindled by Japan resulted from Japanese excess pursuits of its own interests at the sacrifice of Chinese national interests. Today, under the bilaterally beneficial and cooperative “Win-Win” rules China and Japan as powerful nations in East Asia shoulder common responsibilities and maintain the peace, development and stability in the area. The two countries also benefit from their cooperative relations in various fields in economy, culture and environmental protection. Therefore, the new bilateral relations should continue to push the cooperation which has already been conducted, foster consciously a regional perspective and attempt to establish a frame of regionally multilateral cooperation. Only in such multilaterally cooperative frame can Sino-Japanese relations be improved and continuously developed. That is to say, the major course for the new relationship is to attempt to establish a regionally multilateral cooperative frame in East Asia and the cooperation in the cause between China and Japan. Certainly, it’s not only the business of China and Japan, but the common efforts and cooperation among all nations in the whole region to establish such multilateral cooperation. China and Japan without question play the most important roles. It’s hard to imagine a regionally multilateral cooperative frame in East Asia without China or Japan to maintain peace and stability in this area.

It is only in such multilateral cooperative frame in which both China and Japan play major roles that the “Security Dilemma” in Sino-Japanese relations can be solved gradually and trust can be established step by step in the process of realizing their common interests and responsibilities. In this way, sustainable peace, development and prosperity in East Asia can be realized with the close cooperation between China and Japan and their common efforts. The human tragedy like the Second World War and the Sino-Japanese War will no longer happened again.
The context of India, World War II (1939-1945) had vastly different ramifications, when compared with the belligerent countries in the West and the East. United Kingdom took the decision that India, which was then one of its colonies, should participate in the war and contribute to the war-effort. India contributed immensely, in terms of both men and material. However, when the war ended in 1945, there was little cause for jubilation. The country was in the grips of the problem of communalism and the economy was reeling under the impact of inflation. Epidemiological disasters, and the famine of 1943 and widespread destitution in Bengal, in eastern India, were some of the concerns on which the colonial government was keen to pull a veil of secrecy. In this paper, I will explore questions related to military and strategic ‘relevance’ of India for Britain in World War II and how the colonial structure promoted its interests even in a situation when large segments of population were faced with hunger, destitution and disease in Bengal. I will also re-evaluate how the war encouraged trends within the country that contributed to the growing problem of communalism.

Strategic Importance of India and Its Military Vulnerability

The facts regarding the strategic and economic importance of India for the war effort of Britain are staggering. After Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, India provided an army of 2,500,000 men. Auxiliary work for this force employed 8,000,000 Indians and war industries employed 5,000,000 Indians. The production of Indian timber increased from 242,000 tons in 1940-41 to 1,274,000 tons in 1943-44. India was the third largest consigner of supplies to Australia for the Pacific War. Russia and China received war material from India. Within India, the eastern part of the country, particularly Bengal, emerged as the centre for war industries and a base for operations.

The Japanese advance in the Far East in December 1941 had caused considerable panic and concern in India. The Eastern Command failed to put up a tough fight when the Japanese Army began its aggressive drive in Southeast Asia. The Japanese occupied Singapore on 15 February 1942, Rangoon on 8 March and the Andaman on 23 March 1942. However, as late as January 1942, Gen. Wavell had little information about the capacity of the Japanese army ‘to prosecute a long war’ and particularly its capacity to maintain large forces of aircraft at great distance from Japan. The British were not strong enough at sea to meet the Japanese in the Indian Ocean. Japanese air
and naval superiority over the Bay of Bengal during 1942 had already made the East Coast ports of Calcutta, Chittagong, Madras and Vizag in south-eastern India, largely unusable. Thus, India faced an imminent threat on her Eastern land frontier and on the almost undefended Eastern seaboard in 1942.

That wars are destructive is a truism. However, in the colonial context, World War II was doubly detrimental to the long-term interests of the colonies. Imperial authorities ordered the destruction of valuable resources in order to deny access to the ‘enemies’. Some of the confidential documents of the period highlight the priority attached by imperial authorities to destruction of resources. A secret telegram from the Secretary of State for Colonies, dated 29 January 1942 read as follows: ‘One of the lessons of this war has been the great military importance of ‘scorched earth’ policy in territory invaded by the enemy’. The telegram added that destruction was much better than concealment and where destruction by fire or explosives was not practical dumping in the sea or rivers was sufficient. Compensation due to damages in the course of military operations or on order of the military forces was to be given after the war ended. R.E. McGuire, warden of the oil fields in Burma during the Japanese air raids in December 1941, has recounted the elaborate preparations made to destroy the oilfields, refineries and the oil tanks with millions of gallons of oil, as the Japanese threat grew more menacing. The authorities also issued instructions to burn the unissued stock of ten and five rupee notes of the Reserve Bank of Burma by pushing it down a furnace of a rice mill!

Colonial subjects, both the combatants and the civilians, were among the first ones to be ‘abandoned’ as the Japanese military began its offensive in Singapore and Burma. Thousands of hungry and cholera-stricken refugees began arriving in Calcutta and Chittagong. They had come either by ships, traveling in the midst of the dead and the dying or had trudged hundreds of miles of rugged mountainous regions, barefoot and in constant dread of the Japanese and the Burmese marauders. An estimated 14,000 refugees from Burma had passed through Calcutta in January - February 1942. The discerning public knew that the British army was on the retreat. There were numerous reports of how the British authorities in Burma had discriminated against Indians while evacuating people in Burma. There was widespread resentment against the apathy shown by authorities to Indians fleeing from Burma.

The Denial Policy

In its plan for the defense of north-east India, drawn up on 12 February 1942, the General Staff had worked out a ‘Demolition Policy’. This policy was different from a ‘scorched earth’ policy on the ground that it was limited to denying the Japanese forces access to essentials and demolishing strategic and tactical installations. However, when elaborated, the policy involved destruction of power stations, oil installations, wireless and cable as well as telegraph stations. The destruction of the ports of Calcutta and Chittagong was on the cards. The sinking or destruction of river crafts
and removal of railway stock were part of the demolition policy. The Denial Policy, in the wake of this decision, involved removal of rice and other essential items and boats and bicycles from the inland areas of Bengal in order to prevent Japanese intrusion. Military authorities enforced the Denial Policy in February 1942, when troop movements increased and garrisons were stationed in different parts of Bengal. The measures were necessarily coercive and their consequences for the civilian population were grave. Local authorities not only requisitioned food but also boats, bicycles and elephants to deprive Japanese of means of transport. As per the plan they sunk and destroyed boats and confiscated bicycles allowing them to rust. In north Bengal, they moved privately owned elephants to forest camps in Jalpaiguri. There was considerable tension when authorities ordered evacuation of nearly twenty to thirty thousand people in places like Chittagong and Comilla.

These measures that were undertaken by authorities in order to ‘protect’ the colony from the military threat posed by the ‘enemies’ caused immense damage to the credibility of the British Raj. Rumors played an important role in disturbing the image that the official propaganda machine was keen to promote about victories of the Allied Powers in the war. Rumors presented images of rampant destruction which stimulated prices of essential commodities such as kerosene and caused an artificial scarcity. Rumors were afloat that Calcutta was in flames after the Japanese bombings and that the Japanese planes were flying low over the city, fitted with loudspeakers that urged Indians to leave the city seemed true. The Bengal Government failed to timely disseminate information combating the rumors. The military vulnerability of the Second City of the Empire already stood exposed. The winds of political change were blowing in favour of the Japanese in the war. Unconfirmed reports appeared now of people evincing an interest in learning the Japanese language and about the sale of a well-known primer in this language. Reports trickled in from different parts of the province that people were declining to pay rents and repay loans. Since the names of the contributors to the War Purposes Fund were generally on record, many among the educated were now reluctant to contribute. They were also unwilling to take part in propaganda against the Japanese. There was, thus, a loss of faith in the military might of the British.

**War and the famine of 1943**

The inflationary spiral of the war-years played havoc with the rural economy of Bengal. The increase in the price of rice was related to the large-scale civil and military expenditure in Bengal. Since the bulk of the war expenditure undertaken by India was recoverable as Sterling balances owed by Britain to India, the Reserve Bank of India could print notes worth about two and a half times their total value. The recoverable war expenditure had a stronger inflationary impact than expenditure on India's account. In Amartya Sen's words, ‘the 1943 famine can indeed be described as a 'boom famine' related to inflationary pressures initiated by public expenditure expansion’. The problem of price-hike compounded in regions characterised by acute transport bottlenecks. These bottlenecks were fallout of Japan’s entry in the war in 1941, which changed the direction of army
operations. Railway traffic that was till then concentrated on India's western outlets was oriented towards eastern India to meet the new situation. The Government gave war-needs a priority and instructed that there should be a rigid control of goods traffic, particularly movement of food grains. But there were certain discrepancies at work. The authorities allowed vehicular movement of jute at a time when the movement of rice was restricted.

Food shortage and acute scarcity of other essential items affected the lives of vast sections of the population of Bengal as the market played truant during World War II, and industry and institutions, like the military, stored food-grains to the hilt. Compulsions of World War II claimed the limited resources of the village economy. Government agents transported rice from the districts of Bengal to Calcutta and the cantonments, industrial establishments and government offices located in different parts of Bengal. The British Indian Army commandeered enormous amounts of food-grain. The rice purchased by the army amounted to 22 thousand tons in 1940-41, 47 thousand tons in 1941-42 and 115 thousand tons in 1942-43. Subsequently, the Famine Inquiry Commission Report (FICR) of 1945 admitted that additional pressure from the army for the supply of rice had an inflationary effect on prices. Even during the famine in 1943, army authorities transported rice by rail or river from the districts of Bengal to Calcutta and from there as army supplies to outstations. The army authorities zealously defended the stocks of food and engineering goods that they held in reserve. The exports to Ceylon – strategically very crucial for the Allied Powers fighting the Japanese in the East – and Mauritius continued in 1943. While the Bengal Government repeatedly spoke of preventing exports, Viceroy Linlithgow’s correspondence with the Secretary of State, Amery, provides an insight into the military priorities of the colonial state and the pressure put by the Home Government on Bengal to export rice to Ceylon ‘even if Bengal itself went short’. In June 1945, the Central Government asked Calcutta to supply 9,000 tons of rice to Ceylon on a monthly basis for six months- a time when the famine and the epidemics in its wake had taken a toll of millions of lives.

The implementation of the Denial Policy in early 1942, when the administration forcibly removed rice and boats from the interiors of Bengal, also contributed to the scarcity of food and other essential items like salt and kerosene. When boats were seized and sunk or destroyed, the measure created havoc in the production and exchange network that characterised the rural economy of Bengal. Boats that carried both men and cattle to and fro were the only mode of transport used for cultivating the chars or the alluvial islets in east Bengal (presently Bangladesh). This activity was a lifeline for boat owners, boatmen, builders and artisans. As the Denial Policy became operational, haats or village fairs and markets became a rarity. This slowed down the supply of timber from the forests in Khulna in east Bengal and Assam, which further affected the manufacture of boats.

The magnitude of the impact of the Denial Policy forced even the administration to admit that it had caused ‘complete destruction of internal economy, trade and administration in east and west Bengal. In the wake of the Denial and Evacuation Policies the administration removed nearly 40,000 tons of rice and took over 35,000 homesteads from the villages affected by them.
gave rise to an atmosphere of great insecurity and prompted speculation and large-scale hoarding of essential goods. Items such as matches, salt, kerosene, mustard oil, sugar, and finally, rice disappeared from the village markets. The military authorities failed to relent even when a cyclone hit the Bay of Bengal in October 1942. Large number of people and cattle stranded in the coastal tracts of Midnapur (west Bengal) were swept away due to lack of transport. A feeling grew strong that by denying timely assistance to the inhabitants of the region, the authorities were meting out punishment to them for their participation in the Quit India Movement.72

According to unofficial estimates, the famine of 1943 and the epidemics in its wake took a toll of over 3.5 million lives in Bengal.73 Yet the imperial government chose not to declare a famine. World War II not only determined the pace and manner in which the famine unfolded, it also influenced the Bengal government’s nervous dismissal of the famine. The question to ask is that if war determined the priorities of the government, did the overbearing presence of the military contribute to turning food shortage into a famine? The answer would be a resounding ‘yes’. The 1945 Famine Inquiry Commission acknowledged the failure of the imperial government in preventing the crisis. The famine had a decided impact on the food and rationing schemes of the post-war years in India. Questions related to nutritional knowledge and public health acquired a new dimension with the famine.

The famine of 1943 caused large-scale destitution and affected demographic trends in different parts of Bengal. The spread of disease and destitution in Bengal was an indelible aspect of World War II. There was an increase in charges of violence and sexual abuse by both the U.S. and the British Indian Army. There was a spurt in incidents of indiscipline and violation of laws of an unprecedented nature. With the increase in the number of cases of grave offences involving the military, army authorities were unwilling to risk court martial as a punishment. The justification provided was that there was a need to conserve military manpower for the eventuality when the war would draw closer to the borders of India.74 Also, the military authorities did not communicate the results of many cases of court-martial to the civic authorities.75 The colonial government accorded greater priority to military needs than to issues of social, medical and economic concern. Studies have shown that the sharp increase in venereal diseases and prostitution during and after the war in Calcutta and in other areas of increased troop movement had a debilitating impact on the health and family structures of famine victims, particularly women.

The hope of political gains after the end of the war encouraged both, the national movement and the movement for political separatism. The Japanese and the British Indian military officials encouraged communal propaganda by throwing out a bait to the Muslims of the Arakan region. The partition of India in 1947 and the communal holocaust in its wake has shaped bitter memories in the subcontinent. The denunciation of fundamentalist forces and prevention of war is thus a crying need of the hour in the South-Asia region. World War II prioritized the survival and ‘success’ of certain nations and groups of people over and above others. In the background of colossal social cost of the World War II, the essential lessons to be drawn are reiteration of the relevance of non-violence, non-
alignment, disarmament, peaceful co-existence and promotion of confidence building measures in the geo-politics of the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere.

(Footnotes)

17 Some argue that the lack of multilateral security arrangement in Asia should be understood as the result of racist foreign policy by the United States during the Cold War era. Hemmer and Katzenstein argue that the US foreign policy makers saw their East Asian allies as inferior and alien communities. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity, Regionalism and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization, vol. 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 575-607.
18 David Shambaugh, “The Author Replies [to Nicholas Khoo and Michael L. R. Smith]” International Security,


Ibid., p. 252.


Paul Bowles, Ibid., p. 262.


Ibid., p. 392.


Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).


More fundamentally, as Harootunian suggests, the problem surrounding the interpretation of the past events comes from the false belief “that relies on the fixity of the past and its capacity to yield a historical knowledge that can reveal how the present developed from it, even though the perspective of the present must be detached from the quest for knowledge.” Harry Harootunian, History’s Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 15.


<Đồng sanguo de jinxiandaishi> Gongtong bianxie weiyuanhui ed. Dongya Sanguo de jinxiandaishi (Modern History of East Asia) (Beijing: Shihui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005).

Chin-song Chong and Yuko Suzuki eds. Yosong ui nun ero pon Han-Il kunhyondaesa (Modern History of Korea and Japan through the Women's Eye) (Soul: Han'ul, 2005).


Rey Chow, op. cit., p. 111.


The New Yorker, April 1, 2002.


Or, as Michael Duffey in Time magazine, has suggested: “Bush’s pre-emptive doctrine assumes that we may never have all the intelligence, we may be able to make only educated guesses about our enemies’ arsenals and intentions, and we’ll need to rely on wisps and warnings and our guts.” Michael Duffey, Time magazine, September 30, 2002.


L/WS/1/513 Defence of Eastern India, p. 25, OIOC.


L/WS/1/1242 Defence Scorched Earth Policy, p. 27, OIOC.


Fortnightly Report (hereafter FR), second half of February 1942. West Bengal State Archives (hereafter WBSA), Calcutta, India.

L/WS/1/513 Defence of Eastern India, Most Secret Cipher Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, India, General Wavell to the War Office, 19 March, 1942, pp. 11-21, OIOC


FR, second half of March 1942. WBSA.


While heroism and sacrifice are associated with the war-dead, lives lost through a famine evoke a totally different imagery. However, if we go by sheer numbers, the famine of 1943 and the epidemics in the wake took a toll of more than 3.5 million lives—a number far more staggering than the war-dead in Britain. In Arthur Marwick’s estimate, the casualties in Britain included 300,000 combatants, 60,000 civilians, and 35,000 merchant seamen. Arthur Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War (London: The Bodley Head, 1968).

L/MIL/17/5/1821 Memorandum on Summary General Courts Martial (GOI Press, New Delhi, 1941), p. 10. The imperial administration and military were far stricter in application of rules in earlier years

Home (Poll.) Confid. 547/44 1944. WBSA.