Beyond Diasporas
Peace and Human Rights in the Asia Pacific

Report of the Inaugural Symposium of Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP)
Osaka University of Economics and Law
This document offers selected papers drawn from a major International Symposium held on February 25, 2004 under the auspices of the Osaka University of Law and Economics at the Tokyo Azabudai Seminar House to inaugurate the Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP). With a special emphasis on the diaspora, the authors address a variety of issues related to the diaspora, fully recognizing their complexity, historical and regional specificity, and the changing global environment.

The transformation of the Asia-Pacific region offers both challenge and opportunity for serious engagement at multiple levels. Underscoring the need for reflexive regional partnership, the Symposium provided a wealth of ideas which can serve as a basis for further inquiry and policy-implementation. The thematic core of the papers reinforces CAPP's commitment to serve as an important regional forum and bridge for continued discussion and dialogue. It is my privilege to share our conversation with you.

Kinhide MUSHAKOJI
Executive Director
Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership
Osaka University of Economics and Law
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INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
PEACE & HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
With special emphasis on the DIASPORA

Programme

Wednesday 25 February 2004
Symposium at Tokyo Azabudai Seminar House

Opening Session 9:00-9:50

Opening Address: Sei FUJITA, the President of Osaka University of Economics and Law

Video Message: Ms. Mary ROBINSON, Former President of Republic of Ireland, Former
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Guest Speech: Ms. Misako KAJI, Director, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JAPAN

Keynote Address: Prof. Kinhide MUSHAKOJI, Executive Director, CAPP

Main Symposium

10.00-12.30 [Session 1] Contemporary Historical Significance of the Diaspora
Chair: Prof. Tessa MORRIS-SUZUKI (Australia National University)
Panelists: Prof. LI Anshan (Peking University)
Prof. HIRANO Kenichiro (Waseda University)
Prof. Brij V. LAL (Australia National University)

12.30-13.30 Lunch

13.30-16.00 [Session 2] Problems and possibilities of the Diaspora in East Asia
Chair: Prof. Surichai Wun'Gaeo (Chulalongkorn University)
Panelists: Prof.LEE Jung-Ok (Daegu Catholic University)
Prof. MUN Gyong-su (Ritsumeikan University)
Associate Prof. YIN Hongbiao (Peking University)

16.00-16.15 Coffee Break

16.15-18.30 [Session 3] Challenges and Agenda in Researches of the Diaspora in Asia-Pacific Region
Chair: Prof. Kinhide MUSHAKOJI, Executive Director, CAPP
Discussion among panelists and discussants
LIST OF PANELISTS AND DISCUSSANTS

PANELISTS

Prof. Tessa Morris-Suzuki (The Australia National University)
Prof. Brij. Lal (The Australian National University)
Prof. Surichai Wun’Gaeo (Chulalongkorn University)
Prof. LI Anshan (Peking University)
Associate Prof. YIN Hongbiao (Peking University)
Prof. LEE Jung-Ok (Daegu Catholic University)

Prof. HIRANO Kenichiro (Waseda University)
Prof. MUN Gyong-su (Ritsumeikan University)
Prof. Kinhide MUSHAKOJI, Executive Director, CAPP

DISCUSSANTS

MOTO Yuriko Meiji University／CAPP）
KIM Kyung-Mook (Tokyo University／CAPP)
HONG Ki-wi（Rikkyo University／CAPP）
UEMURA Hideaki（Keisen University／CAPP）
Julia YONETANI（New South Wales University／CAPP）
MORIHARA Hideki（IMADR／CAPP）
HANOCHI Seiko（York University／CAPP）
INABA Nanako（Ibaraki University／CAPP）
CHUNG Kap-Su（One Korea Festival／CAPP）
HAMA Kunihiko（Tokyo University of Foreign Studies）
HAYAO Takanori（Hebrew University）

CHAIRPERSON

KIM Tae-Myeong（Visiting Professor, CAPP）
Invitation to a Dialogue through Internet on Peace and Human Rights in the Asia Pacific with Special Emphasis on the Diaspora

Professor Kinhide Mushakoji

CAPP and the Symposium

The Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP) of the Osaka University for Law and Economics, founded on 1 April 2003, held an International Symposium at the Tokyo Seminar House of the University to celebrate its creation and to start-off its international research activities on 25 February 2004.

The Centre plans to develop its future research activities on the basis of the conclusions reached by this Symposium. CAPP believes that the Asia Pacific is composed by a variety of nations and cultures interacting intensively in this world of globalization. Most of them are nations including a considerable number of their nationals migrating to and settled in other countries. The future of the Asia Pacific depends on how the Diaspora communities from the different nations of the region interact with the host nationals in creating a rich multi-cultural regional community, by overcoming the historical and contemporary legal, political, economic and socio-cultural obstacles. We believe that it is only when the human security of the Diaspora communities is guaranteed, and its member contribute actively to the good cooperation between their home and host countries, that the Asia Pacific can become a region of justice, peace and prosperity.

The Symposium was meant to initiate a dialogue about this key problem for the future of our region. The Symposium discussed the following major issue areas attempting to relate them into an integrated analytical framework:

1) The often painful historical background of the socio-cultural contexts of the host societies influencing the relations between the Diaspora communities and the host civil societies and States, affecting their common human security.

2) The contemporary problems and prospects regarding the role of the Diaspora communities as part of the inter-State conflicts between their home and host countries, or as a source of hope in promoting mutual understanding and cooperation between them.

3) The domestic and international measures required to guarantee the human security of the Diaspora communities providing the base for justice, peace and prosperity of a multi-cultural Asia Pacific Region.

The Symposium explored these problems in their worldwide contexts in its first Session, and then focused on the Asia Pacific Region in the second. It discussed the priority issues requiring research in view of eliminating the negative factors and promoting the positive factors in promoting the partnership between the diaspora communities and the State and civil society in the different countries in the third Session.
"Diaspora" as a Multifaceted Problematique

We proposed to use in the Symposium and in this Cyber-dialogue, the term "diaspora" in its multiple and broadest sense. This term originates from the history of the Jewish people and has a particular theological/philosophic meaning in the eschatology of the three Abrahamic religions. It then has been used in reference to the African "Diaspora", i.e. the massive migratory movement from Africa across the Atlantic Ocean to the Caribbean, Latin America and North America caused by the "slave trade". The third and broadest referent of "Diaspora" is the global migration from the developing South to the industrialized North. In the United Nations (UN) context, the 2001 Durban World Conference Against Racism, chose as one of its focus, the human rights of the Afro-descendants and of the Asia descendants, thus of "Diaspora" caused by slavery and colonialism. The Report of the U.N. Commission on Human Security, "Human Security Now" talks about the "Diaspora communities" in connection with the reduction of the human insecurity of the peoples on the move in the global context. We proposed to connect the latter two meanings of "Diaspora", keeping in mind the original meaning of this term with a rich implication on the historical understanding of the relationship between the States and the peoples on the move. Any points on this concept are welcome in the cyber-dialogue for which we propose the following three questions as main themes for dialogue.

Three Questions Proposed for the Cyber-dialogue

1. The political, economic and legal dimensions

   Migration as a modern, global phenomenon. How do we see the role of the modern capitalist economy, the modern territorial State and the interactions between the legal institutions of emigration/immigration and the informalization and feminization of migration?

2. The historical, cultural, and social dimensions

   Migration of specific identity groups within conditions of modernization, colonialism, and globalization. How do we see the geo-historical longue duree with the negative and positive influences of the "Diaspora" on human rights, human security, and human development in the contacts and cohabitation of people on the move and people who stay in their society?

3. The Asia Pacific as a multicultural region of cross-Diaspora interactions

   The specific aspects of "diasporas" in the Asia Pacific. How do we see cultural contacts, nationalism and identity politics in the Asia Pacific, the process of hybridization, the future of "homogeneous(?)" States like Japan, the "clash" or the "dialogue" among civilizations, the interstate relations and regional economic development in the Region?

Request to participate in the cyber-dialogue

1. Please send to the e-group any of your articles related to the three subjects, so that we can share a common stock of knowledge facilitating the discussion in forthcoming CAPP symposia.
2. Please share any thoughts about the above three questions. Any proposition, related questions,
remarks, and information is welcome. Once the ball has started rolling, remarks, questions in dis-
agreement or in support of the comments already made by others are especially useful to develop
an exchange of views. (Please mention on each of your comments to which of the three above
questions they refer to, so that we can develop parallel dialogues on each theme. Comments on
more than one of the themes or on additional themes are also welcome.)
Mary Robinson's Video Statement

I am honored and pleased to send warm greetings to the participants in the international symposium on peace and human rights in the Asia and Pacific with special emphasis on the diaspora. I congratulate Professor Mushakoji and his colleagues at the Center for Asia Pacific Partnership of Osaka University of Economics and Law for mounting this important symposium. I only wish I could be there. You are focusing on human rights and also on diaspora communities and also their links with the host countries, the civil societies and governments of host countries in that region. Interestingly, when I served as President of Ireland in the 1990s I saw the importance of linking the modern Ireland with the Irish diaspora world wide. So I do understand very much the thinking at the back of this particular symposium.

I know that you will be examining the contemporary historical significance of the diasporas, and that you will be looking at the issues and problems and how to create effective links. I would hope that you will give special attention to some of the more vulnerable diaspora communities in your region. I'm thinking of domestic workers. I'm thinking of women in the informal sector and those who are minorities that suffer discrimination and need the support from their host country but also of their country of origin.

It's very good, in my view, that you are linking human rights, human security and I hope also human development. I believe there is a very significant linkage. I would commend to you the "Report on Human Security Now" co-chaired by Professor Amartya Sen and Mrs. Sadako Ogata. That could be a very good background paper.

There are so many issues that I know that you will be addressing in an innovative way because of the people who are participating in this distinguished international symposium and because of the thoughtful planning which has gone into it. And I really think it is wonderful that the new center of Osaka University of Economic and Law has been able to plan this important symposium.

I'm glad that this important symposium will look at ways of gathering accurate information, information data, will look at the research that is needed, will perhaps plan a programme for the next three to five years of how to really build on the ways this international symposium has shown how important it is to make those links with diaspora communities, to look to diaspora communities to help to build understanding, reconciliation and a shared way forward.

I can tell you how strongly I feel that this symposium is going to make a big difference to perceptions in the region and that you are pioneers of a new way of opening up a human rights debate of having a way of addressing some of the concerns with a wider context that will open up new space.

I really urge you to recognize that this conference, the symposium is the start of new thinking in your region a new possibilities and I hope you will give it the commitment that this very well planned conference and symposium deserves. Thank you.
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

With special emphasis on the Diaspora

A REPORT

Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP)
Osaka University of Economics and Law
Tokyo, Japan
February 25, 2004
Introduction

An International Symposium was held on February 25, 2004 under the auspices of the Osaka University of Law and Economics at the Tokyo Azabudai Seminar House to inaugurate the Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP). This report summarizes the proceedings of the meeting.

The special symposium began with an opening address by FUJITA Sei, the President of Osaka University of Economics and Law. Fujita extended a warm welcome to the participants and stressed the salience of the Asia Pacific region. He was very hopeful that the symposium would produce great results and success. His address was followed by a video message by Mary Robinson, former President of the Republic of Ireland and former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Robinson sent warm greetings to the participants in the international symposium on peace and human rights (with special emphasis on the diaspora) and congratulated Kinhide Mushakoji and his colleagues at CAPP for organizing this important symposium. The former UN Commissioner on Human Rights urged participants to give special attention to some of the most vulnerable diaspora communities in the Asia Pacific region, especially domestic workers. According to Robinson, vulnerable populations included women in the informal sector and those who are minorities that suffer discrimination and need the support of their host country, but also of their country of origin. Robinson stressed the linkage between human rights, human security and human development. She recommended the "Report on Human Security Now" co-chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako OGATA as a very good background paper on this question. Robinson felt that the symposium would make a big difference to perceptions in the region, starting new thinking in the Asia Pacific region, opening up new space.

To commemorate the event, the Director of Human Rights in Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also made a brief statement. She emphasized the need to promote human rights. Since the 1993 United Nations Human Rights Convention (Vienna Declaration), human rights had been recognized as a universal value. However, in the real world, the Director pointed out, human rights were being violated. The Asia Pacific region was no exception in this regard. She reminded the audience of the upcoming 60th session of the Geneva Convention. With globalization, illicit trafficking and immigration had become intertwined, resulting in diverse forms of human rights violations. Meaningful efforts were needed to arrest these trends. The Director of human rights underscored that Japan's foreign policy encompassed the important perspective of promoting human security, which was now a focal point. Traditional concepts of national security had to be combined with human security. With the new empowerment of the individual, the 21st century was a people's centred century. In this regard, increased cooperation with non-governmental organization (NGOs) was important. The Director noted that since 1993, three symposia addressing this question had been held. She concluded her remarks by pointing out how diversity has had a big effect on the human rights situation.

Keynote Address

The keynote address was presented by Kinhide Mushakoji, the Executive Director of
CAPP. Mushakoji explained the meaning of the symposium and the rationale behind the establishment of CAPP, which was principally to gather wisdom to develop research in the Asia Pacific region. In a multicultural environment, new difficulties as well as new possibilities had been created by the rise of a multicultural reality. CAPP was especially interested in the diaspora. Mushakoji provided a brief background to the establishment of the Osaka University of Economics and Law. This was a unique institution in the sense that it had been established by members of the (Korean) diaspora, affording dialogue between citizens and members of Japanese society.

Mushakoji’s address focused on the importance of mobile people in a rapidly changing world. Both people on the move and people staying were the basis of intellectual creativity. CAPP was envisioned to see how we could develop new possibilities to promote peace and human rights in the context of mobility. The United Nations Conference Against Racism in 2001 had recognized the importance of diaspora communities. However, there were also negative aspects to the diaspora, particularly the emergence of criminal elements and human trafficking.

Historicizing the problem, Mushakoji contrasted two kinds of diaspora communities: the Afro-descendants and the Asia descendants. The former community which went across the Atlantic to the New World was marked by resentment towards the consequences of historical problems of slavery and colonialism. Africans who crossed the Atlantic were resentful of the historical past, but also proud of their cultural achievements, having linked Africa and America as well as the Caribbean. The Asian diaspora basically consisted of coolies from Asia, living in a semi-slavery situation.

Migrants living in Japan had experienced both colonial rule and slavery, the most striking example being that of comfort women and sexual/military slavery. There were still bonded slaves working in Tokyo and other parts of Japan. As a part of the diaspora experience, contemporary forms of slavery were still a matter of concern which have exacerbated under globalization. Other Asian societies were also characterized by the experience of the diaspora, but not necessarily of colonialism. China and India, for example, were not enslaved. Yet, there developed intermediate classes between colonial rulers and ruled. On balance, there were many shared problems of the past amongst Asian countries.

The key contemporary issue was the condition of vulnerable members, a mixture of mobile and immobile populations. Cultural pluralism was now a reality, but it had also created many problems. While Japan could be proud of being a unified and homogenous people, this could also result in rejection of others now placed on a pyramid with the Japanese exercising hegemony over the non-Japanese. We needed to develop dialogue between the diaspora communities and the natives.

Mushakoji alluded to the Chinese expression of China, 'Let a hundred flowers bloom'. Although an ideological expression, it was appropriate to characterize a multicultural society. In reality, only the same flowers were blooming in Japan as noted by a musician from Okinawa. Perhaps this could be due to the sentiment that we had pretty cheery blossoms and there were no
other flowers other than cherry blossoms. Similarly, there were the impression that only Samurai qualified as citizens and others did not count. This was a very exclusionary ideology of xenophobia.

The main idea of this symposium was to move from a situation where other flowers could be recognized as flowers and diversity respected. There was a need to establish a new ground. It was not simply a question of rights, although equality as a principle was very important, but to begin with human rights. We should begin with the notion of difference and feel proud of difference. The real question was to live in a pluralistic Asia Pacific region and to turn diversity into strength if people could come together: In this regard, hybridization was important but also recognition of each other’s identity. Whether we could realize this vision in Japan remained a significant question. The situation, especially with North Korea, was not very optimistic. Perhaps we could make the question of a new vision not as a question mark, but as an exclamation mark, Mushakoji suggested.

First Session: Contemporary Historical Significance of Diaspora

Mushakoji’s keynote address formally inaugurated the symposium, which was followed by the first session devoted to exploring the contemporary historical significance of the diaspora. The session was chaired by Tessa Morris-Suzuki (Australian National University) who introduced the theme with reference to the recent six-party talks on Korea. She invoked the analogy of flowers, suggesting that research in ecology had demonstrated that monocultures were very susceptible to environmental changes. Biodiversity allowed sustainability. Systems could change without collapsing. In the midst of significant changes in East Asia, Morris-Suzuki underscored the importance for Japan to promote and acknowledge its diversity in order to adapt to that change.

Li Anshan (Peking University) focused his remarks on the theme of achievement and challenge with regard to the Chinese diaspora. Providing an historical context of diaspora and diaspora studies, Li suggested that during the 20th Century, overseas Chinese had attracted international interest four times: at the end of 19th century, during World War I and World War II, after World War II; and in the past decades. Studies of the Chinese diaspora since 1949 had passed through three periods: (1) pioneer period from 1950 to 1966; (2) period of stagnation, marked by the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976); and (3) the period of revival (post-1977). According to Li, three branches of the Chinese academic world had been involved in the study of the subject at both the central and local levels: universities, the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences, and Chinese society for overseas Chinese history. Over the decades, there had been considerable improvement in linkage and study of the subject matter. Another role of these studies was to coordinate and train graduate students at home and abroad. In the past 50 years there had been vast data collection on various facets of overseas Chinese, including selected data on overseas Chinese investments to spur economic development, a 10-volume study on indentured labor, and a 12-volume encyclopedia on overseas Chinese. Li noted that the situation regarding the Chinese diaspora was changing as more and more Chinese were going abroad with different objectives. However, the legal and life conditions were unique. In terms of human rights, Chinese remained part of the most vulnerable diaspora
population and were susceptible in all kinds of ways. Recently, the component of the Chinese diaspora had become increasingly complex with both rich and poor as well as educated and uneducated Chinese being a part of the diaspora. Moreover, the impact of the Chinese diaspora was both economic and political. Diaspora had spread to all walks of life, including shadow industries, business, and computer industries. Politically, the situation was more complicated with regard to human rights. Chinese diaspora, especially in the border areas was also connected to transnational issues. Li dispelled the notion that most Chinese were only Han. The Chinese population included 56 minorities or ethnic groups. There was also the question of anti-terrorist activities as certain ethnic minorities were allegedly involved. The question of Chinese citizenship was closely linked to human rights since nationality was regarded as a primal right under Chinese law. The issue was how to remain peaceful and yet recognize difference. Once you obtained citizenship of another country, you automatically gave up Chinese citizenship. In recent years, the situation of the Chinese students was especially important.

(Li began his remarks by first presenting CAPP a gift of books produced at Peking University on overseas Chinese).

The next presentation was made by Hirano Kenichiro (Waseda University) who is heading the Center for Excellence (COE) focusing on questions of globalization and migration and new and meaningful ways of studying Asia. Hirano tried to situate the diaspora in a wider framework, stressing new challenges to borders. He had looked at movement of people crossing borders across Asia and examined migration in an historical perspective. A new perspective on Asian studies entailed the concept of the diaspora, but also of sojourners, migrants, and more generally, the contemporary forms of international movement of people crossing borders after 1970s. There had been immigrants in Manchuria in the past, but after 1973, especially in the wake of the oil crisis, new patterns of immigration began to emerge throughout the 1970s, which had to be contrasted with migration trends in the 1990s. Hirano noted that borders were more porous in recent times. This was a modern notion as people were able to cross borders more easily, but there was also a correlation between porous borders and increased migration. Specifically, there was greater diversity in migration trends. Around 1970s, migration was considered a big event, but now borders were easily crossed. The example of Japanese baseball players as well as soccer players was pertinent. Frequently these players returned to play for Japanese national teams. This illustration highlighted the contemporary feature of migration flows. In the contemporary context, there were a diverse multitude of migrants.

Hirano’s central point was that recent trends were now challenging the nation-state as well as civil society. There was a clear difference between the old migration and new migration trends. One facet of the latter was that pressures to assimilate were less significant. There was a need to recognize the relativity of assimilation. Immigrants did not necessarily have to assimilate and societies had to learn to accommodate many heterogeneous groups. Hirano noted the importance of empirical approaches to migration in Asia, but also the innate difficulty to quantify migration.
Migration was mainly a qualitative issue. Hirano concluded his presentation by identifying greater intra-Asian migration, given especially relatively shorter distance and more developed modes of transportation, but also the translocal nature of migration.

The last presentation of the first session by Brij Lal (Australian National University) examined the Indian diaspora, placing it within the larger global context. Having worked on the theme for over two decades, Lal noted that in recent years diaspora studies had become a big business. Diaspora was ultimately linked to the changing condition of modern world itself. Migration and marginality had become issues of greater concern. However, there was greater complexity to the phenomenon of the diaspora. Increasingly, even governments had grasped the economic salience of diaspora populations. The example of China to tap into the financial reservoir of overseas Chinese was quite relevant, but India had also followed suit. An illustration of the importance of Indian immigrants was the celebration of Overseas Indian Day. However, and regrettably, there was too much emphasis on the economic role of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs or what Lal caustically called "Newly Rich Indians"), to the exclusion of social and cultural aspects of the diaspora.

Lal stressed the need to think of Diasporas, not diaspora. The plural designation underscored the historical fact that Diasporas had formed at different times by different historical influences. The first stage of the Indian diaspora: preceded European colonialism with the activity of Indian traders in Asia. The second phase began in 1833 with the abolition of the slave trade in the British Empire, which lasted until about 1920 and entailed the migration of about one million people. The movement was mainly to Natal in Africa, to Mauritius, Fiji and the Caribbean. This was the case of Indian indentured migration to the colonies. One feature of these migrants was that they lost contact with India; they lost language and culture and were deformed by the vagaries of the plantation system. The third phase of the diaspora begins in the 20th Century after World War II with Indians migrants going to North America and Europe, particularly England. These migrants were neither peasants nor proletarians, but professionals. All phases of the diaspora suggested different patterns and motivation. According to Lal, the relation between the old diaspora and the new one was very complex, characterized by a mixture of unease, suspicion, covert hostility and sometimes mutual contempt since the reference point for cultural validation was different. Both sides felt they were superior. The new migrants felt that they had preserved their culture; they could speak language, and preserve the social system. Old Overseas Indians felt superior because they maintained they had lost the caste system; they were much more modern and more at home in the modern world.

A pivotal part of Lal's presentation was his notion of the 'twice-banished' diaspora communities. He specifically mentioned the migration of Indians to Fiji and then from Fiji to Australia or New Zealand. Other examples in this regard were of Malaysian Chinese living in Australia and Chinese Indonesians in New Zealand, people formed by two kinds of cultural and historical influences. This was a growing phenomenon, Lal noted. Australia regarded itself as a multicultural nation. A similar kind of situation could be found in Britain. Migration of the twice-banished was increasing and becoming important. This trend raised two issues: How do these people construct
their cultural identity in an environment that is fluid and changing, not rooted, bounded and unchanging? For instance, Indo-Fijians lived with three sets of influences: one was Indian and one Fijian, and yet a third one was Australian. Which aspect of their identity did they accentuate or relegate in trying to make sense of who they were in this complex and changing world? Secondly, an important theoretical issue that migration and settlement of the twice-banished raised was that migration took place within the changing context of global capital that rendered older understandings and bounded concepts of migration obsolete. A new kind of migrant population was beginning to emerge and bi-pluralities were blurred and ideas of here/there, us/them, gain/loss, centre/periphery, global/local, traditional/modern were conflated. The new migrants in fact inhabited a world that encompassed the life both of the host society and home society. A more accurate description of the new migrants was that they were trans-migrants since they maintained multiple relations, familial, economic, social, organizational, or religious. They were linked simultaneously to two or more societies and their interaction with home society was colored by the nature of networks. Lal echoed Hirano's suggestion that borders were porous, adding that boundaries had grown elastic and opportunities endless.

**Discussion on First session**

A lively discussion followed. Hama Kunihiko (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies) spoke of the historical salience of the diaspora to the Caribbean, stressing the need for caution in using the term. He noted that new features had emerged since 1970s. Hama reminded the audience of the original meaning of the term, linked to the dispersion of the Jewish people but also the assurance of return offered in the doctrine of Zionism. We could not rule out the notion of return in the case of African or Palestinian refugees, but there were complexities in the phenomenon. The possibility of frequent visitation complicated the return aspect, rendering the original notion of diaspora problematic. Hirano reiterated that after 1970s, more frequent travel had become possible with periodic visits. He questioned the use of the term diaspora, noting also that until recently migrants never knew that they were an object of analysis.

Mushakoji emphasized the point that diaspora now was a completely new phenomenon which ought to be distinguished from the past phenomenon. He also suggested that there was another side to the complexity between old comers and new comers. Were we dealing with migrant or diaspora communities? Clearly, there was discontinuity in the phenomenon. Perhaps the new and old were not interacting. The use of the term diaspora highlighted the fact that migrants came at different historical times and that there were plural Diasporas. Sharing Mushakoji's point about discontinuity, Lal noted that the meaning of the term ‘diaspora’ had changed. Return to a mythical homeland was no longer key aspect nor was cultural attachment to the place of origin. He believed that people generally had a sense of what it meant to speak of diaspora. Li opined that migration was neutral term and could be used with many kinds of objectives in mind. Diaspora, by contrast, suggested displacement due to external forces. Migration could not sufficiently describe this aspect.
There was also the important distinction between old and new migration. The latter was differentiated by class within a nation as in addition to selling their labor, there was also the urge to use skills to gain status, a case of upward mobility. There had been a conjuncture in the late 1990s under globalization as migrants were both forced as well as (voluntary) spending resources to learn new skills. According to Hirano, migration was essentially an empirical concept, a neutral term. The choice of diaspora underscored the important relationship between the diaspora community and the home country.

The discussion on the terminological uses of the term diaspora provided a focal point of some very stimulating exchanges amongst the participants. Hayao Takanori (Hebrew University) noted that the concept of the diaspora in Hebrew had a special meaning and nuance because it was mainly a theological concept. The idea related to the fact that the: Jewish people were spread all over the world and this situation would persist until the Day of Judgment. However, during the Zionist struggle, diaspora was denied. Instead, the idea was to create a nation state called Israel. In its original Greek meaning, diaspora meant to transcend national borders and for minority groups to be spread all over. In our contemporary times, perhaps, there was the possibility of the term to become neutral.

Morris-Suzuki noted that the participants were engaged in an international project and the question of translation was quite important. Words did not translate very well and there was a need to be very conscious of how words were translated. Moreover, the meaning of words kept changing. Hanochi Seiko (York University) noted that the diaspora was an inter-disciplinary term. It was a new phenomenon given a new form of capital accumulation. Since the early 1970s, there had been an institutionalization of the diaspora. In a post-Fordist society, and under conditions of neoliberal globalization and accumulation of capital, diaspora was necessary. Hanochi gave the example of female workers who had come to Japan in the 1980s on an entertainment visa. But now diaspora was integrated into the political economy and there was a clear hierarchy of migrants.

Moto Yuriko (Meiji University) also stressed the newness of the phenomenon, but cautioned that within diaspora communities there were the relations of power and gender conditions. Conservatism and paternalism could be a part of diaspora communities. There was discipline within the community and belonging to a community might not be a free choice as there was an enforcement of norms. The tension between the individual and the community was a real one. Therefore, it was crucial not to affirm community on an unconditional basis and make it sacrosanct. Furthermore, community was not inevitable for survival of the individual.

Mushakoji underscored the difficulty of conducting objective research on communities. Clearly, community provided places where migrants could feel safe. In this regard, the example of living in Chinatown demonstrated the presence of a tacit agreement. There was also the class dimension where residence was tied to privilege. Wealth provided protection. There was also the fact that illegal migrants protected each other. Mushakoji also noted that there was hybridization within communities and the blurring of borders. In this vein, legal institutions and the economic
mode of accumulation remained very important. Given the changing picture, what kind of vision was needed? There was the vision of the Major of Tokyo who believed that Japan could no longer be a homogenous society, but Japanese nation must keep its unity and refuse to be mixed with other. In sum, Japanese should be pure Japanese. In the periphery, diaspora communities could be allowed. This was a pyramid notion of a multicultural society. This raised the nature of problem which had to be addressed in future research.

Mushakoji’s concerns were shared by Kim Tae-Myeong (CAPP), who urged the importance of overcoming dichotomies and sharp distinctions between the old and the new migrants. Hong Ki-wi (Rikkyo University) also stressed the need to be aware of the terminological issue given the differences between migration and the diaspora. Discussion over terminology provoked Hirano to show his willingness "to surrender" to his colleagues over the use of the term diaspora. However, he insisted that the concept of migration was a neutral one and more comprehensive. Within this broader framework, diaspora could be considered, entertaining a double-decker, dual approach in research. Li shared the view that Chinese scholars were also split on the use of the term diaspora. The term was unique for Jewish community, but was also a common term used in African studies. Since 1978, in Chinese studies the notion of a Chinese diaspora was acceptable. There had been a gradual acceptance of the term. Referring to another term, ‘Chinatown’, Li noted that it too had different meanings. The old generation of Chinese were opposed to the term in South Africa since it had negative connotations, not simply Chinese of low income without protection of state. There were questions of identity and mental linkage implicit in the term. More positively, however, 'Chinatown' made Chinese immigrants 'feel more at home'.

Lal proposed that certain terms described certain conditions. The term 'diaspora' also had the implication of being used to deny equal rights. In some cases, authorities used 'migrants' or 'guests' to attain similar goals. Hence, there was a need for caution is using certain terms. Words were 'dangerous weapons to deny equal rights', Lal insisted. Kim Tae-Myeong drew attention to the specific colonial experience of Koreans in Japan. The term 'migrants' connoted choice. Diaspora captured the coercive side of migration. There was social mobility around people and its context was critical to choice of terms. In sum, there were political implications of terms. What were the implications of defining people on the move? Kim stressed the importance of context.

The real issue, Mushakoji proposed, was one of identity. Diaspora was a term laden with identity. Tamils, for example, were proud of their diaspora. On the other hand, most Japanese people believed that Okinawans were Japanese. There was a Sikh diaspora within the Indian diaspora. There was also the tendency to lose caste distinction. Dalits, who were not discriminated in Canada, Australia, faced discrimination in other contexts. Could we talk of Dalit diaspora? Ultimately, this was a question of identity. Lal suggested that he viewed the Indian diaspora in a generic sense, mainly as a question of geography. It was true that Tamils wanted a Tamil homeland and this was also true of the Sikhs. There were different agendas for each group. Terms, Lal, argued, got politicized and fragmented.
Hirano was intrigued by Lal's choice of the term 'twice-banished'. Did 'twice-banished' refer to one generation or two or three? Clearly there was a generational crossover. Lal suggested that it had taken a hundred years on a continuum to establish the contours of the 'twice-banished'. For the Indian Fijians, their ancestry was from India. But there were also, what he called 'professional migrants'. The question of identity was extremely pertinent. Did you feel whether you were Indian or Fijian? The Constitution called him Indian, but there had been three major influences in constructing his identity: Indian (in terms of language, food, and religion); Western (language and the political system); and Oceanic (the environment in which the sea was an essential component).

Morris-Suzuki proposed that the meaning of the term 'diaspora' had gradually expanded and it was now widely used. She, however, noted a paradox that there wasn't a British diaspora. Clearly, this had overtones of power relations, whether one was referring to deliberate force or economic forces. Colonizers were not part of the diaspora. Was there a Japanese diaspora? Morris-Suzuki reiterated a point made by Kim that context should determine terminology.

Mun Gyong-su (Ritsumeikan University) also believed that diaspora was a more appropriate term since it underscored the compulsion to move. In migration, on the other hand, free will was involved. The main issue had to do with human rights and the identity of diaspora communities. But protection also meant the right to participate in public debate. On the obverse side, social responsibility toward host community was also necessary if you were a part of the diaspora.

Lal reinforced Mun's point about participation in public debate. 'There was no need to feel sorry for yourself', Lal insisted. Rather, there was a need to participate in the community. Drawing from his own experience of Fiji over the question of ethnic and political reconciliation after three coups directed against Indo-Fijians, Lal informed that the community faced two options: armed resistance or dialogue. He believed that violence as an instrument of public policy did not work. Hirano believed that institutionalization of the diaspora was taking place in Japan. Once you became a tax payer there should be political participation for minorities as well. But Japanese Brazilians were not active in becoming part of Japanese society. There was a need to educate children that they would integrate.

Mushakoji offered a synthesis of the preceding discussion by recognizing migration as a general category which could then be deconstructed to appreciate questions of identity, gender and social class. The classification of forced versus voluntary migration was useful since economic power and free choice colored migration. Diaspora connoted coercion and the presence of economic, political or military pressure. The important point, Mushakoji noted was that often there was a strong desire to maintain the diaspora community. Assimilation was a form of structural violence. Identity politics could lead to war. The Enlightenment philosophy of convergence was not the correct approach. The concept of identity was very important. There was, however, on the other extreme, the notion of a hundred flowers blooming. The key issue was how to create a society which honored difference.

Li noted that often sub-identities subordinated dominant identities given different lan-
guages. What was meant by Chinese identity? Was it a notion of dynasty or territoriality? What was the material basis of identity construction? Were we speaking of the modern nation-state or a dynastic state? Chinese construction of identity was a very complicated matter. In the final analysis, it was culture that made life worth living. Chinese identity was based on values toward family, neighbors, and ways to handle life. Identity was a complex issue and there were many levels at which it worked. In response to a question on the mechanism of Chinatown, Li saw that at one level Chinatown simply provided a certain atmosphere to the Chinese. It provided a variety of food and cultural experience. But from an historical perspective, Chinatown was the center for all Asian, not simply the Chinese. He noted the example that the City government in Toronto, Canada had actively encouraged Chinatown as a tourist stop.

Morris-Suzuki returned to the question of the relation between the diaspora and human rights by raising the issue of how best to link a universal concept of human rights with the question of identity. In response, Mun proposed that ethnic identity always existed but it depended upon the individual. There were diverse levels of identity. Some were more Koreans or Chinese than others. Their voice should be heard. How can their voice be factored into policy? It was very difficult to generalize. For instance, how could one maintain Korean identity? In Japanese society there was considerable pressure on Koreans to keep Japanese names. How could conditions be created to maintain different identities? These were complex questions.

Mushakoji gave the example of Meiji Gakuin University where Koreans had been given certain representations to have an international outlook and but also to recognize that there were different degrees of identities of different groups. He also gave the example of the One Korea Festival to help foster common understanding. Mushakoji was hopeful that Japan could be a place where people of different backgrounds could live in harmony. Mun concurred with Mushakoji that there were degrees of identity and assimilation was very problematic. One should be able to choose one’s identity. To attain that goal, ethnic education had to be restructured.

Kim Tae-Myeong returned to the theme of the terminology of the diaspora. Involuntary pressure was the key ingredient to the diaspora. He also noted that was the question of minority rights versus human rights. There had to be coexistence and the need to balance the two. Concerning the component of return in the language of the diaspora, Kim Tae-Myeong saw no possibility of return to Korea. On the one hand, there was the issue of broken up families, but third-generation Koreans could not be considered to be a part of the diaspora since returning to the homeland was not an option for many Koreans.

Hayao saw the diaspora as an integral aspect of the Jewish community and most people accepted this view. However, people were also influenced by local culture and mixed culture had been maintained for hundred of years. The Jewish people also accepted the notion of mixed identity.

The session concluded with Hirano reiterating the significance of migration studies. In this vein, both the nation-state and the identity of people were crucial elements. However, identity should not be limited to nation-state and ethnic factors were pertinent. Hirano saw that an Asian
identity was emerging. Although diaspora has an element of return, not affirmed for some members, once the concept of Asia took root, one could return to Asia. Finally, Hirano made a distinction between voice effects and exit effects of the diaspora. While political participation in the host country was important, the option to exit from certain communities should also be provided. Li saw the whole question of diaspora in long historical terms. Diaspora had been around since the 17th century. Globalization was not a process of returning back to the old days, but was opening up possibilities. The role of the nation-state role was diminishing in terms of migration either consciously or unconsciously. Lal cautioned against inflexibility. While conceptual clarity was important, one could not be 'disabled by doubt or get marooned in terminological lakes'. The real important issue was human rights.

Mushakoji cautioned against the spectre of a xenophobic Japan given recent trends, which worked largely at an unconscious level. Morris-Suzuki also saw increasing exclusivism with new border controls globally.

Second Session: Problems and Possibilities of the Diaspora in East Asia

The second session was devoted to case investigations of the diaspora in East Asia and was chaired by Surichai Wun'Gaeo (Chulalongkorn University). He began the session by noting the exciting and interesting nature of the morning discussion over terminology, about usage of words and the reality they wanted to capture. The afternoon session, he noted, would address possibilities and the realities around us.

Lee Jung-Ok (Daegu Catholic University) contextualized her discussion of the Korean diaspora within the larger framework of her understanding of globalization through participation in international gatherings in the 1990s, information and ideas drawn from research, especially on women workers in South Korea, and analysis of Korean migrants in the former Soviet countries. She stressed that there were complexity and contradictions, which were transforming system to a more balanced shape with the intervention of civil society. There were new social agendas in Asia, combined with the legacy of colonialism. Rapid growth oriented growth economy appeared to over duplicate past trends in the ambiguous name of globalization. Lee took the French historian Ferdinand Braudel's advice by looking at the problem in terms of the longue duree as well as the global context to see it both widely and longitudinally. East Asian diaspora, in her view, was related to the longue duree and ordinary material civilization, socio-economic conjuncture and political surface events. First, the Korean diaspora was related to colonialism as a scarlet letter of the colonial past and territorial competition amongst nation-states. In the age of globalization, East Asia was again at the crossroads of repeating the old mistake of emphasizing the security of the nation-state security without acknowledging conditions of ordinary people, especially human security. There was also the question of human dignity, which was a basic right. Hence, there was a need to focus on human dignity. In the experience of subjugation, it was virtually impossible to separate interpersonal relations, inter-communal relations and inter-state relations. Trauma could result due to the
denial of human dignity, as the historical lessons of genocide and the negation of existence had shown. To get out of this vicious cycle, there was a positive way out.

Lee gave the example of women from the Philippines and Russia who had come to United States (US)-army base areas on entertainment visas to South Korea. Most Philippine women were married women with experience of working in foreign countries, while most Russian women were young, unmarried and inexperienced. The latter received unexpected cultural shock especially how prostitution was interpreted. Their insecure situation resulting from language barriers, cultural difference and penalty-based patriarchal regulations, and low-wages was reported to the mainstream media through the mediation of women rights organizations. These organizations had fought for human security and human rights of working women in the base areas. Those reports became internationalized very quickly and the South Korean government and local authorities sought fact-finding research in concert with NGOs, resulting in attempts to have new regulation in line with global standards. Those concerns induced by small NGOs resulted in new regulations to protect rights of sex workers as victims. The new laws affected the conditions of work, not of the client or agency. The experience of authoritarian practices prepared these NGOs to seek transformation. This example demonstrated that activism could deal with the problems of the Asian diaspora.

The Korean diaspora in the former Soviet Union was the consequence of migration before and during colonial regimes. Yet, it was difficult to separate choice verses voluntary migration. Transition to market economy also created an identity crisis and globalization introduced an unexpected factor for coping with the new turmoil. Globalization was an imposed, not an Asian initiative. Now, we were experiencing the formation of new diaspora communities. The key issue was not to distinguish 'we' and 'them' as things had become more complex. East Asia, in Lee's judgment was going through the turmoil of globalization and nobody was secure. Human security could provide the only security. It was the responsibility of the home country to deal with the diaspora. In short, it was important to contextualize issues in East Asia and to bring the Korean diaspora into perspective.

The next presentation by Mun dealt with more specific concerns, cautioning the audience that he was usually misunderstood given the nature of the topic, namely Koreans in Japan. It was important to take an historical view. Koreans in Japan had always enjoyed a border existence. Koreans had often crossed borders to enter Japan, but it in 1940 that they were forced to migrate. He dispelled the notion that Koreans were simply victims since this was the wrong stereotype. Undoubtedly, they were victims as well, but most Koreans were already in Japan during the 1930s, especially in Osaka. Nearly one-fifth to one-fourth of the Korean diaspora came to Osaka. The Korean diaspora, therefore, had a cross-border character. Secondly, the problem of Koreans in Japan was principally the result of the framework of the nation-state which prevented them from being defined properly. During 1945-1950, there was nationalization of Koreans in Japan, but also in Asia. The 1950s was a period of national independence as Koreans had considered themselves subjugated. The self-definition of DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) illustrated this point. Many problems were associated with this self-definition. The period after 1980s until the
present time was too delicate to determine with precision. After the Plaza Accord which paved the way for greater immigration, there had been swaying or fluctuation of nationals. The Japanese people have a different way of appreciating otherness as there was a new awareness. At the same time, a new sense of nationalism had arisen, different from its previous forms. The new awareness of Japan as an aggressor and a new nationalism coexisted. In 2000, a second plan was envisioned to deal with settlers in Japan. Hence, if people were connected with Japan they were to be classified as settlers in Japan, as Japanese nationals. Given Japan's low fertility rates, utilization and control of foreign workers became facts. However, there was no reference to Koreans in Japan. In this sense, Koreans in Japan had come to an endpoint as a problem.

Mun believed that there were new pressures for Koreans to live like the Japanese, despite the growing juxtaposition of Japanese and others. There had been a movement amongst Koreans to acquire Japanese nationality. In a broader context, there were various connections to Japanese society for foreigners. The question of how to deal with East Asia remained.

Mun's presentation was followed by a paper by Yin Hongbiao (Peking University) on the topic of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia and America. Although traditional Chinese communities could be found in these regions, the phenomenon was now different since the new immigrants consisted of students. Historically, millions of Chinese had immigrated during 19th and mid-half of the 20th century. During the 1950-70 period, relatively very few (210,000) people had gone abroad for personal reasons. With the introduction of economic reforms and open door in the late 1970s, the situation had changed radically. Nearly three million Chinese had migrated to the developed countries. The new trend was based on mainly student migration. More than 500,000 students had gone overseas for higher education since 1980s. According to the Chinese Education Ministry, during the 1979-2002 Period, nearly 580,000 Chinese went abroad. In actual terms, the figure was lower than reported. Estimates showed that only one-third went back, while two-thirds found work and settled down as new migrants based on a 'permanent residence' status. The main reason for immigration was economic, not political. Better money and living conditions and not the aftermath of June 4, 1989 were the principal reason. Also, there were host country needs, but also the assimilating culture of North America. Overseas Chinese, Yin proposed, contributed immensely to host countries and to international exchange. Legal identity was easy to find in North America. Yet, the new immigrants maintained closer ties to China. Having grown up in China, there was a desire to do something for China's development. Needless to say, brain drain was a big problem. The Chinese government was encouraging students to study abroad, but also to return. With that goal in sight, it has set up Green card regulation to award 'permanent residence' status. Most holders of Green Cards were Chinese. With rapid economic development, many Chinese were now returning to the mainland.

Yin also cited the incidence of smuggling. Thirty-percent of all Chinese migration was illegal. There were irregular Chinese migrants in Japan. Unemployment was a key propellant of this trend. In the coastal regions, working and going abroad had been a long tradition, especially
amongst small businesses. However, irregular migrants had brought trouble since they were amongst the poorest people and lacked legal identity. Many Chinese had died on the way. Criminals were involved in human trafficking. In the new future, Yin speculated, irregular migration may not stop, but Chinese rapid economic development may be a positive development

**Discussion on Second Session**

Surichai noted that migration as a strategy for living emerged as principal theme from the second panel. Hong drew attention to irregular migration, citing a recent campaign by Japan's Ministry of Justice to have citizens send an anonymous email to report illegal aliens. This encouragement by the authorities compromised human security. Hong also raised the question concerning the criteria to establish the diaspora as an East Asian issue. Was it colonialism, the Cold War or globalization? Clearly, there was a temporal level of understanding. Spatially also the flow of people was very complex. He returned to the theme that pervaded the symposium, namely the importance of guaranteeing human rights of immigrants and diaspora communities. What should be the relation of approval (for the host nation)? How could civil society be brought into the picture?

Surichai reinforced a shared sentiment amongst the participants on the need to bring in the issue of recognition of people who were victims of violence. He cited the case of the Southern part of Thailand, which consisted of 14 provinces, including four mainly Muslim provinces. Recently, there had been violence and a drive towards separatism. The government had offered a 'Cold War style response' by declaring an emergency and imposing curfew. Cultural recognition was the key issue. In Thailand, Surichai noted, the education system forced Muslims to study Thai. How could we guarantee human dignity in this environment? We still suffered from an old perspective and an old language.

**Chung Kap-Su** (One Korea Festival) believed that to show vision was important, a goal of the One Korea Festival. Diaspora was returning to the home country. How we implemented human rights? The Koreans, he thought, were living in Japan because of colonialism and Japan's postwar policies toward former colonies. No freedom of choice was given to Koreans in Japan. Citizenship had become a complex issue. The tension between nationalism and Asian identity was quite real. Integration was inevitable as the world was changing.

Surichai urged the participants to think of identities beyond the nation state. The level of identity politics had to be deepened as well. This provoked general discussion on the new difficulties imposed by globalization upon diaspora communities. The nation-state had to be thought in relative terms. Comparative history showed that land policies towards Native American had changed and that there was now a phenomenon of urban Indians. The Ainu people were living in Tokyo, not Hokkaido since they no longer owned land. Okinawa was another problem. Okinawans had now spread everywhere. What was the framework to consider diaspora people in this revised historical context?

Mushakoji noted that the diaspora was both international and legal. With regard to
Okinawa, he stressed that as a non-violent people, the Okinawans had spurned violence, but that should not lull the discussion of cases of discrimination against them. Unfortunately, given their non-violent character, manifestation of their identity was not taken very seriously. He shared Surichai’s view that the key issue in the Southern part of Thailand was one of cultural and religious identity. He cited a totem in the American Indian Museum, which shows a dark city in the night and black wolf in the black sky. When you were in big cities, your totem was still watching you and protecting you. This was quintessentially a manifestation of cultural identity. In big cities, the American Indians were safer. With belief, one felt safer. The wolf was more relieving than the state. In less metaphorical language, the question was how the state could protect diaspora communities? Immigration laws had to be reconciled with moral principles to make them more effective, not simply as technical regulations imposed by the state. Japanese law had to reflect the new realities on the ground, notably the diaspora.

Hanochi also believed that technical immigration laws were very discriminatory. Immigration had been envisioned mainly from the perspective of national security. In the past, this had led to the deportation of Koreans and in 1952 Koreans had lost Japanese citizenship. In the state’s assessment, they were simply hostile entities that had to be resisted. Recently, there has been growing slave trade and human trafficking, especially from the Philippines and Thailand. Exclusivist laws had predated 9/11 as there was the need to identify a new enemy after the Cold War. Japan had made stringent controls. In the present context, how were we to devise an Asian vision based on human security? How could we transcend nationalism? Returning to Asia, Hanochi urged, was a very important concept.

Mun noted that in the mid-1990s, Japan went into its pluralism. Returning to a theme he explored in his paper, he mentioned that there were different variants of nationalism as nationalism had many faces. Speaking in comparative terms, the Chinese and the Korean people, respectively, had created solid nation states. In Europe, the victors suffered because of former colonies. Japan has had no experience of dealing with former colonies. Its high economic growth provided a buffer. In essence, the nation state has certain limitations, a point noted by Li. The notion of one people, one nation was problematic. The solid nation-state had to be broken.

Morris-Suzuki concurred with Mushakoji that laws were imperfect. One of the most basic problems that the world faced was the juxtaposition of immigration laws and illegal immigration. While it was necessary to make laws to prevent suffering, the rules in place often victimized the people who moved, as they became criminals. All that they were doing was to enable their families to survive. From the perspective of the state and despite its illegal alien policies, the government knew that migrants were needed. States took advantage of that situation and migrants were exploited. Human rights abuses were generated because states turned a blind eye to illegal migration, but gave them an appalling treatment. Given this wider context, was the concept of an East Asian community, a regional forum, a better way of thinking? Morris-Suzuki believed that a new sort of explosion was possible when movement within community was allowed but not outside.
The wide ranging discussion included a reference (Michael Segal) to the International Treaty on the Rights of Migrants and Their Families, which had only been ratified by seven countries, to illegal migration from China to the Russian Far East. The latter highlighted the growing influence of the Chinese people according to one participant, but also anti-Chinese sentiment in Russia. The discredited Yellow Peril Theory persisted in Russia given territorial claims from both Japan and China. The discussion also focused on ways to address the problems of the diaspora given that the nation state had been reinforced in some respects. According to Morihara Hideki (IMADR/CAPP) the Ministry of Justice was soliciting information on illegal aliens on the Internet on an anonymous basis. There were no way to make judgment of legality in this regard and this could result in harassment. He also believed that regional integration was needed since diaspora communities needed protection. But this was not a simple matter. Where would be the locality of the movement? Was it a question of human rights of a person or group since there were strong connection between the two? One suggestion was to have a network rather than a geographical affiliation. Discrimination remained a key issue both inside and outside diaspora communities. For instance, within the Indian diaspora there was caste-based discrimination. There was also mental and psychological discrimination. Furthermore, the issue of migrant labor rights had to be approached from an international perspective.

Li believed that the role of the nation-state was becoming less effective. There were two perspectives on this question. On the one hand, we were no longer following government policy from the perspective of human rights. On the other hand, both legal and illegal migration had weakened the government's control. With regard to Chinese migration to the Russian Far East, the government had tried to stop it, but there were local Chinese markets and business remained peaceful. There was both supply and demand for migrants, hence trafficking. Illegal migration was linked to crime, but migrant communities also became scapegoats whenever there was a crisis. The Japanese in the United States during World War II and more recently, the Muslim community after 9/11 were relevant examples.

Hirano also saw both problems and possibilities of the diaspora in East Asia. The possibilities entailed a broader notion of the region. What was the definition of East Asia? Was it Northeast Asia plus three? Was it connected to Southeast Asia? The idea of return to the Asian region offered greater possibilities. On the other side, diaspora rights had to be protected. The Koreans were proposing an East Asian community and asking for their rights under Korean nationality laws.

With regard to Korean Chinese, Lee mentioned, many progressive NGOs were supporting their citizenship rights. The government had also been affirmative. However, some unexpected problems emerged from the one-nationality policy of the Chinese government. The Korean Chinese faced a dilemma whether to keep their Chinese citizenship or not. Chinese education and adaptation made them insecure in Korea. Most Korean Chinese, therefore, decided to remain Chinese citizens. According to Lee, the question of an East Asian community and regional integration had often been
raised in international meetings, especially during the Cold War period. Given the plurality of communities and different cultural and economic situation, there were serious problems of integration. Was this a new kind of empire given the presence of regional giants like China and India? The European community had arisen both from the nation-states and the people themselves. Amongst Asian nation-states and people, there was no urgency for integration, except for the Korean Japanese. Lee cautioned that an artificial creation out of necessity might be dangerous given the realities. The presence of a strong nation-state was a reality in East Asia. What would be the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion for nation-states, especially the vulnerable parts within the Asian community? It was necessary to first build trust amongst the people in the region. Territorial competition in Northeast Asia was a reality. Despite the age of globalization, the 20th century nation-state framework still remained supreme, Lee insisted. We needed a 21st century framework.

Kim Tae-Myeong wanted to return to the main theme of the discussion and to get a basic sense of issues. In his view, the central issue was the relationship between minorities and host people. Confrontation and violence in Thailand illustrated the nature of relations between hosts and migrants. Was it a question of aborigines or minorities? What was the nature of the confrontation? In previous times, the problem was easily identifiable. In the post Cold War period, there was confrontation of culture, religion and value orientations. It was not a question of allocation or distribution, but value orientation. Which side was correct or not? What kind of social vision or legal framework would work? Integration was one vision. Segregation and integration were running in parallel terms. East Asian community had the same problem. People should have rights to migrate.

Lal suggested that these issues were best dealt with in a comparative framework. What was the situation with other minority communities? He was also curious about some empirical details on Koreans in Japan and the generational issue of membership in a diaspora community (Would you consider fourth or fifth generation of American descent as part of the diaspora?). Mun quoted 2002 statistics which listed 500,000 Koreans, less than one-third of foreign residents in Japan. Immigration laws had been directed mainly at Koreans, but now Koreans were declining significantly. They were becoming Japanese at the rate of 10,000 a year. At that pace, in 15 years there would be no Koreans in Japan. Mun believed that there was the possibility of an East Asian community, a common house, a common framework. Regrettably, globalization had tended to enhance nationalism. It had reaffirmed national identity under a new nationalism. While integration of East Asia was very difficult, several alliances had also emerged. Korea had the option to integrate with Southeast Asia.

Surichai proposed that there was a new context, namely a regional framework, of discussing the diaspora. It was a question not only about new terminology, but new realities. On the other hand, the issue of identity under globalization was very important. The diaspora provided a new entry into discussions of identity. He also believed that a new global identity was being constructed from below, not above. How had globalization created the possibility to construct new identities? There was also the question of consciousness of identities, whether it was victim con-
fulness or aggressor consciousness. In the diaspora, Surichai suggested, we discuss as victims. Increasingly, though we were also interested in diaspora as an agent, as a human experience issue. The common concern resonated in the symposium was protection of diaspora communities by the state, but also but security from the state.

Third Session: Challenges and Agenda in Research of Diaspora in the Asia-Pacific Region

Chairing the final session of the symposium, Mushakoji opened the discussion by contrasting formal and informal aspects to all societies. When the formal part closed its door, people moved to the informal side. He cited the example of boot-legging in the United States in the period of prohibition. Criminal organizations, Mushakoji cautioned, prospered if laws (including immigration laws) were too discriminatory. Such laws typically helped criminal groups. In examining the diaspora populations, thus, there was a need to look at both sides. There was also the distinction between top-down and bottom-up approaches. The diaspora of the rich had to be contrasted from the insecurity of the vulnerable populations. Mushakoji gave the example of Shinjuku where many communities of traffic victims in the sex districts worked. From the official standpoint, the Mayor was concerned about Japanese society, but it appeared that the principal concern was the protection of the Japanese mafia against the growing influence of the Chinese mafia.

Japan, Mushakoji noted, was already a multilateral society. He expressed the hope that if Japan could be made into a pluralistic society we could make Northeast and Southeast Asia a pluralistic society as well. Placing his remarks in an historical context, Mushakoji identified two major cultural spheres: China as a central kingdom empire with a tributary system and the Indian empire as a Mandala with a main god, surrounded by smaller deities. Both empires had renounced to be the centre of the world and promoted peaceful coexistence under the Bandung Principles in the Afro-Asian meetings. The larger framework of a multi-cultural level society already existed. In this vein Mushakoji cited the metaphor of Kabuki Chowk.

The discussion included comments from Mustapha Kamal Pasha (American University) who noted that we were prisoners of spatial metaphors, but we were also prisoners of the state. The state could not get out of our mind and enjoyed a hegemonic presence. From this vantage-point migration/diaspora appeared to be a problem. He insisted that migration was a normal phenomenon; only borders were abnormal. A post-Westphalian world was being created due to globalization. Pasha suggested that there were three principal levels to address the question of the diaspora: the global level, which was not reducible to the international level; the national level, which was the regulated level; and the trans-local level. The state, he believed was being sandwiched between the global and the trans-local levels. There were also religious dimensions of diaspora communities. Religion was an important identity marker and it was being redefined. Proposing another avenue of research, he suggested that migration took place within family structures, which were extended networks sustaining identities. On the issue of community, Pasha warned that communities were both inclusive and exclusive. Reiterating Mushakoji’s point about the inflexibility of formal structures,
he believed that an expanded notion of a liberal environment would prevent communities from becoming exclusivist. There were also different strategies of migration and different strategies of adaptation. Notably, he saw compartmentalization (staying within the economy, but not living in society, underscoring a basic disjuncture between work and life); enclavization (building hamlets without much contact with the mainstream culture); and assimilation as three main strategies. Much of the conflict was produced by assimilation. Finally, the boundaries of the nation and state were not fixed and were being constantly redefined. In this context, uncritical celebrations of civil society ought to be resisted since some of the worst forms of racism and exclusivism towards minorities originated within civil society.

Mushakoji saw the three-level strategy to investigate the East Asian diaspora as a useful premise for discussion. The trans-local level, especially, underscored the importance to look at local-to-local mobility while the nation-level offered the window to study the role of the state, laws, and civil society. In the context of globalization, how had these processes changed?

Several participants noted that globalization was a new actor. Local-to-local mobility allowed an investigation of anthropological differences. But what kind of research should be developed to capture the local-to-local level migration and its consequence on negative and positive problems? There was also the question of formal local to local and informal local to local interactions. The role of individuals could be studied in more detail in this regard. Hirano cited his research on Thailand focused on Thai workers from local areas. What was the impact of migration on those areas? What was the influence on the migrant's compatriots? There were personal strategies involved. The translocal level also allowed a study of the structure of the migrant's rural village and in-depth sociological analysis. Hirano mentioned Asia-Pacific Researchers in Migration (APIN), an international network devoted to similar studies.

Mushakoji cited the example of overseas Koreans in different cities (Tashkent or Nagoya, for example) as a part of examining the diaspora at the translocal level. What kind of linkage existed between different localities? In this context, the case of overseas Chinese networks was quite relevant. How were remittances managed via families? What was the network of villages that made these transactions possible?

Lee suggested that the focal point was not the locality itself but exchange. The example of exchange of bridegrooms from locality to locality was a case in point. With regard to Philippine women, the existence of marriage networks belied notions of traditional migration. Tradition and migration are combined, but there was also the economics of marriage in procuring 'cheaper brides'. Mushakoji cited the example of 'mail order brides', a lucrative business in Japan and China, to reinforce Lee's point. But he also cited the trafficking of wives (and husbands in some instances), which demonstrated that there were positive and negative exchanges. Over the issue of remittances, Li mentioned two ongoing projects in China, one focusing on the history of remittances and the other involving current remittances. He also identified a five-university project on home villages.

Addressing the Thai context, Surichai noted that there were two million undocumented
workers from neighboring countries, mainly from Burma, Laos and Indonesia. Thais were leaving, too, especially to Indonesia. Thailand was both a sending and a receiving country. The intriguing question was how Burmese people could come to the other side of Thailand. This could not be done in an apparently legal context. Trans-local networks made the journeys possible. Surichai believed that people who managed the economy had given a blind eye to this reality. There was also the other issue of nearly 2000 stateless children born in Thailand every month, only 6 to 70 kilometres from Bangkok. For health professionals committed to preventing AIDS, this was an important problem. Hence, these officials and not officials from the Ministry of the Interior had collected the data. From the point of the state this was a very complicated issue. A Memorandum of Agreement had been signed with the Myanmar Government, but this would only help manage legal migrants. How were illegal ones to be managed? Surichai urged that research had to be framed not only to capture the victim aspect but also the agency aspect of the migrant community. In some ways, this was a normal issue, with many abnormal aspects. We needed to specify local research. It should be a research-and-cooperation project. It was necessary to incorporate the question of agency into research. Furthermore, the issue of the state as an actor could be placed in relative terms and other standpoints could also be entertained.

Responding to a question regarding the citizenship rights of stateless children, whether they were entitlement or birth rights, Surichai noted that Thai authorities had avoided the problem since the establishment of displaced people’s camps twenty years ago. By insisting on calling these refugees ‘displaced people’ the Thai government was dodging the legal issue. Children without fathers were denied any rights, which had only complicated the whole issue. The Myanmar government did have any control. Hence, the suffering of people went on. Research project could help bring complex issues in the forefront.

Mushakoji suggested that it was possible to detach the local-to-local aspect from laws. He specifically cited a project at The Hague dealing with the question of value-chain of human trafficking. Who was getting what at what stage? This could provide some useful insights.

Uemura Hideaki (Keisen University/CAPP) proposed that the linkage between locality and human rights should be analyzed. The situation in the region was very uneven without uniformity. There was a tendency on the part of government to move only when problems had become very dire. He noted how initiative had been taken at the civil society level with the establishment of Foreign Citizens conferences. Kawasaki City was one of seven cities in Japan which had explored that idea to ensure that the human rights of foreigners were protected. Legal aliens enjoyed certain rights, but what about the rights illegal aliens? We need to identify the kind of sites and struggles in this regard.

Mushakoji referred to a UNESCO project that was trying to develop a network of human rights cities in order to implement the recommendations of the Durban Conference. The basic idea was to protect the rights of minorities. This issue was linked to the question of how to study the interaction between complex civil societies and complex diaspora communities. How were civil
society and state interrelated? How was civil society influencing the state on immigration laws? In turn, how were immigration laws shaping the consciousness of civil society? Furthermore, there was a need to study how diaspora communities can establish really mutually beneficial dialogue with the citizens of sending and receiving countries. The South Korean government should put pressure on Japanese government to facilitate the rights of the Korean diaspora community. The same feeling would be shared by overseas Chinese in Japan. In this context, inter-state relations could be used to facilitate the rights of diaspora communities. Mushakoji cited the example of Turkish and Greek governments putting pressure on the two governments in Cyprus to protect their respective Islamic and Christian diaspora communities.

The complexity of diaspora community was noted by an example from one participant over the brewing conflict between two Jewish communities in Toronto who had not been able to fully assimilate. There was tremendous friction between the new and the old community. One community supports Israel against Palestinians. The other diaspora community was very skeptical about Israel’s existence.

Returning to the question of the Korean diaspora, Mushakoji recognized the positive aspects of the diaspora community by citing the example of the One Korea Festival and the movement for one Korea. By contrast, overseas Chinese communities were divided in the past between pro-mainland and pro-Taiwanese segments.

Morris-Suzuki cautioned that the relation between the state and minorities was very complex. There were major differences between what the state said, what was in the laws and how laws were actually carried out in practice. Similarly, how did migration officials and police actually relate to minority community? Then, there was the relation between majority civil society and minorities.

Kim Tae-Myeong maintained that the relations between the state and the individual was quite complex. In the East Asian community, states and regions should have an open relationship which meant ‘open to inside, not simply outside’. How could we open up Japanese society? How could we open up Korean society? The Korean pay taxes, but they cannot be drafted. One option for Koreans is to retain Korean citizenship while living as Japanese residents. Kim Tae-Myeong believed that there were two aspects to being a citizen. One was the freedom to pursue one’s own desire. The other was the right to make decisions. Brazilians, for instance, were at the bottom as illegal aliens. Only lawyers and doctors were now successful. Without Japanese citizenship, one could not participate. How would Japanese society respond to the new realities? According to the Mayor of Tokyo, colonization was a good thing, but that was not the core of the issue. Koreans were forced to come as foreign workers, but they did not want to be used as efficient workers. They should have the freedom to decide their own destiny. Could Japanese society respond favorably?

Discussing the issue of overseas Chinese, Yin noted that although Mandarin was the formal Chinese language in Mainland China which every group could understand, there was also the question of diversity. There was the political legacy of the Civil War after World War II. The over-
seas Chinese consisted of Taiwanese, old overseas Chinese and Cantonese. Over 700,000-800,000 had migrated overseas from Hong Kong and Macao. Overseas Chinese organizations reflected different political tendencies. There were clear differences between old and new overseas Chinese. Vietnamese refugees to the United States were mostly overseas Chinese.

Lee returned to the idea of constructing an East Asian community which she regarded as a good ideal. However, there were different interpretations toward the home state. Citizens in Northern countries (including Japan) saw the whole issue in terms of national security. The State could be a channel to give security. Could the state be a viable channel to provide human security? New problems had been superimposed upon old in the Asian setting mostly as Cold War remnants. Most citizens strengthened their own states to receive security. The sentiment prevailed that globalization was weakening states and minorities were trying to weaken Northern states. We had to be aware of the kind of ideas that circulated to divide citizens from minority communities.

Hanochi reaffirmed the notion that many people were going to fall behind under globalization. The informal sector was going to grow. The relation between the formal and the informal was fluid. In the mist of globalization, the role of informal sector had been changing. Migrants were going back and forth between formal and informal sectors. People may not be able to get into formal sector as globalization was going to make illegal workers an outcast. What would happen to multitudes of these people? How could they have rights as residents, if not citizens? For example, the Filipina are legal for six month, but they became illegal overnight. Immigration laws were uneven, but human rights should be respected. How can illegal aliens be supported in legal battles?

Kim Tae-Myeong mentioned the East Asia Common House Project as one possibility of meeting the new challenges. On the positive side, Koreans in Japan had played an important part in democratization and liberalization and they could yet play a constructive role with regard to the DPRK (North Korea).

Offering an historical overview, Hirano mentioned that in the past there was the notion that the faculty of national university must be Japanese. Migrants had to go home. This thinking had changed as well as the atmosphere in the universities. Within Japanese society, the most monolithic institution was the Diet with very few exceptions. In local assemblies also, the composition was very monolithic. There was a direct correlation between local assemblies and communities. In this regard, the rights of minorities could be improved with better representation.

With regard to the global level, Mushakoji urged that a comprehensive framework was needed. Since the long period of colonialism, diaspora communities had become more complex. An historical perspective was needed. What had been done in the UN? What was the role of religion in the diaspora? In the global context, identity and cultural issues were paramount.

Lal believed that a global comprehensive research rested squarely upon comparative work. All kinds of shared experiences regarding issues of gender, stateless children, and attitudes of host countries were relevant. The rationale for comparative research was based on the need to share experience, to get knowledge, but also to distil experience which could contribute to the theoretical
literature on diaspora and enrich the larger discourse. In this regard, Li recommended comparisons between various diaspora groups within the same country.

Kim Tae-Myeong insisted on reexamining the relation between the local and the global by transcending the borders of the nation-state. How NGOs were helping women? How could the voices of illegal workers be heard? Of course, there were limits to what we could do. Overseas Koreans did not function very well as a liaison. The liberation of minorities as a part of society was therefore important. But there were also limits to what the nation-state could do. We needed to also think of democratization.

Surichai reiterated the salience of how diaspora communities became scapegoats, as noted by Li. How could one enable society with a self-limiting sense of control? Often it was too late. Surichai also appreciated the freshness of youth spirit. It was crucial to incorporate the new generation into the discussion. We could learn a lot, he stressed. But there was also the need for transnational learning with a new sense of confidence.

Morris-Suzuki suggested that another way of approaching the link between the global and the national was by thinking of a particular community. What did the nation state mean for that community? How do agents of the state interact with the community and how do community voices get heard? What do UN treaties mean?

These provocative questions led to the conclusion of a very stimulating and intellectually rewarding symposium. Mushakoji expressed his gratitude to all the participants and the interpreters for their important contributions.
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

With Special Emphasis on the Diaspora

SELECTED PAPERS

Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership (CAPP)
Osaka University of Economics and Law
Tokyo
2004
Today more and more people cross national boundaries and spend at least part of their lives outside the bounds of the state of which they are citizens. According to the CIA (which takes a keen interest in the subject) today some 140 million people live outside the countries of their birth, and more than 50 countries of the world have populations in which migrants constitute over 15% of the population. This represents a striking recent expansion in cross-border mobility: at the start of the 1990s, the number of people living outside the countries of their birth was thought to be about 80 million, just over half the current level.

While cross-border flows of people expand, however, governments become increasingly concerned at the economic, social and security implications of migration, and border control is becoming a key topic of political controversy in many parts of the world. In this context, the study of Diasporas seems more important than ever. The Center for Asia Pacific Partnership's new international initiative in the field is a most welcome development which promises to play a key role in the promotion of diaspora research in our region.

In future research, four issues seem likely to become particularly important. The first is the connection between questions of cultural identity (on the one hand) and the political and economic dimensions of migration (on the other). Second, the dynamics of Diasporas need to be explored in a long-term historical framework. Third, it is particularly necessary to pay close attention to the profound inequalities of power and status which characterize cross-border movement. Interestingly, the word "diaspora" itself directs attention to these inequalities. We generally use the word "diaspora" to refer to those in relatively powerless political positions: people whose cross-border movement is impelled by invasion, war, poverty or social disruption. It seems appropriate, then, that diaspora research should, as Mary Robinson has suggested, focus particularly on the more vulnerable groups amongst the world's migrants. Fourthly, diaspora research is important not only for academic reasons, but also because it can make practical contributions to the urgent task of creating new international legal frameworks and institutions to protect the rights of these vulnerable groups.

Though there have, of course, been large-scale movements of people in earlier phases of history, the nineteenth century rise of corporate capitalism and the creation of global empires was accompanied by particularly significant cross-border and intercontinental migrations. Up to the end of the nineteenth century, however, few international borders were heavily guarded, and travelers rarely carried passports, let alone visas, work permits or residence permits.

From the late nineteenth century onward, new measures such as conscription laws, nation-
al education systems and (in some countries) the first steps towards the creation of social welfare policies made states far more deeply involved than ever before in the lives of citizens. Nation-building made it increasingly important, from the state's perspective, to draw clear dividing lines between "citizens" and "foreigners". These developments, occurring simultaneously with very large scale exoduses of migrants from countries such as China and Russia, evoked a wave of "panics" surrounding immigrants, and provoked the introduction of restrictive migration laws in several countries.

A further transformation took place at the time of the First World War. As historian John Torpey has argued, the outbreak of the global conflict in 1914 evoked new fears of the cross border movement of "subversives" or "enemy agents", and led in one country after another to the introduction of laws requiring entrants to be in possession of a valid passport. Like Britain's Aliens Restriction Act of 1914, these were often intended as emergency measures to last only while "a state of war exists". However, once they were in force, many of the measures remained. (One suspects that the "emergency" border controls introduced as part of the contemporary "global war on terror" are likely to acquire a similar permanence.)

Just as the First World War led to the widespread establishment of systems of passport control, so the events surrounding the Second World War precipitated further transformations in the global migration control system. Political turmoil in Europe and elsewhere from the late 1930s onward generated huge "displacements" of populations, as people were involuntarily driven across frontiers by war and by the genocidal policies of the Nazi government and its allies. In response to these issues, international institutions for the recognition of refugees began to develop, culminating in the signing of the 1951 Geneva Convention.

Postwar recovery also generated another and quite different cross-border flow of population. As global economic growth gathered pace in the 1950s, many of the world's wealthier countries experienced labour shortages which they sought to fill by expanding migrant labour programs. Australia, for example, developed energetic policies to encourage the inflow of permanent migrants, not just from the traditional sources nations - Britain and Ireland - but also from Southern and Eastern Europe. At the same time, West Germany initiated the Gastarbeiter system, aimed at bringing migrant workers into the country on a short term basis. These Gastarbeiter programs (later emulated by other countries) were developed through a series of bilateral agreements signed from 1955 onwards with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia.

The parallel development of new refugee and migrant labour policies led to creation of increasingly complex systems under which migrants were sifted into a hierarchy of different categories with varying civic and social rights: foreign permanent residents, refugees, business migrants, Gastarbeiter, those on student visas etc. In the age of decolonization, the crude racial categories which had characterized prewar migration policy were increasingly discredited. However, the hierarchical sorting of migrants by postwar border-control regimes has aptly been described by Etienne Balibar as "differential racism". In other words, the category into which a particular migrant is placed was determined by migration officials on the basis of a whole range of personal characteris-
tics including nationality, class, education, age etc. Preconceived racial stereotypes inherited from the colonial era, however, remain important factors shaping official perceptions of the category in which each migrant should belong.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the accelerating globalization of the economy since the end of the 1980s have been accompanied by major changes in cross-border movement and in migration controls. As many commentators have pointed out, shifts in the structure of the global economy and the aging of the population in many of the richer countries of the world have not only encouraged cross-border migration, but also led to radical changes in the direction and nature of migration. One of the most important transformations (noted by scholars like Saskia Sassen in the US and Iyotani Toshio in Japan) has been a "feminization" of the migrant workforce. The globalization not only of production but also of reproduction, in other words, has been accompanied by increased migration of women workers in areas such as domestic labour, nursing and age care.

Just as the democratization of the nation state was a major (and still incomplete) political project of the twentieth century, a major project for the twenty-first century is the democratization of the frontier. This means first of all reaffirming the fact that migrants, though lacking the status of citizenship in the countries where they live, work or seek asylum, still have human rights which must be protected under international and domestic law.

Beyond this, however, it also means seeking new forms of international collaboration on issues concerning migrant labour, border controls and the recognition of refugees. At present, we are witnessing a rapid erosion of UN based systems for the protection of human rights, accompanied by an expansion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between governments intent on tightening border controls and keeping out unwanted border crossers. NGOs and others concerned with this trend might, I would suggest, seek to initiate a trend towards a different sort of international cooperation, one particularly appropriate to the countries of the Asia Pacific region.

This alternative model of cooperation would bring migrant "sending" and "receiving" countries together, not in an effort to build more strongly protected borders, but in an effort to ensure that the cross-border flows of people, which will inevitably form an important part of 21st century life, occur in a way that causes as little human suffering as possible. A key feature of such regional forums of "sending" and "receiving" countries would be the inclusion, not just of national government representatives, but also of the local governments of the main migrant sending and receiving regions, and of NGOs involved in migration issues. Most importantly, such forums would also include representatives of the relevant migrant communities themselves. In this way, it might finally begin to be possible to give members of the regions diasporas themselves a greater say in the shaping of the migration and border-control policies which directly so affect their lives.
Study on Huanqiao-Huaren in PRC: Achievement and Challenge

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During the 20th century, the issue of Huaqiao-Huaren, overseas Chinese or Chinese diaspora, has four times attracted international interests, at the turn of the 19th century, during and after the World War I, after the World War II till the 1950s-1960s and since the late 1970s. The study of Huaqiao-Huaren in China has passed three periods: pioneering (1950-1966), stagnation (1966-1976) and revival (1977-) since the founding of the PRC. This paper will give a general survey of the Huaqiao-Huaren study in China during the past half-century and raise some related issues.

Pioneer Work, Stagnation and Revival

Institutions and Journals

In 1956, the Institute for Southeast Studies was founded in Xiamen University, followed by a section of Southeast Asian History of Zhongshan University in 1959 and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Jinan University in 1960, all involved in the half-secret study of Huaqiao-Huaren. Professors Zhu Jieqin, Chen Bisheng and Yao Nan tried their best and did a lot of pioneering works. Projects such as "Qiaoxiang in Jinjiang" and "Huaqiao Investment in Modern China" started in Xiamen University. With the opening-up in the late 1970s, institutes of Huaqiao-Huaren studies mushroomed. Besides the above-mentioned, Institute of Overseas Chinese Studies in Jinan University and the Center for Overseas Chinese Studies in Peking University were set up.

Several journals appeared from the 1980s, such as Overseas Chinese History Studies, Southeast Asian Affairs and Overseas Chinese History of Bagui (now named Journal of Overseas Chinese of Bagui). Published by the China Institute for Overseas Chinese History Studies, an institute under the leadership of China Society of Overseas Chinese History set up in 1981, Overseas Chinese History Studies started the following year. Since 1988, the year of its formal publication, the quarterly has published more than 50 issues and about 400 articles, concentrated on theories, different issues, case studies, or translation of important articles.

Data Collection and Reference

Data collection on Qiaoxiang (home town of overseas Chinese), Huaqiao investment and the indentured labour started as early as the 1950s, also the collection of historical data, preparation of index, publication of reference materials and compilation of biographies. Lin Qinzhi and Zhuang Weiji’s Selected Data on Overseas Chinese Investment on Business in Modern China is the most prominent one. It has three volumes, Fujian, Guangdong and Shanghai, including field notes, published data, company archives and documentary materials. Another project is on the indentured
labour, conducted by Chen Hansheng. *The Collection of Historical Materials of Chinese Labours Overseas* was published in the 1980s, with 10 volumes (11 books) covering five continents. The materials comprise government archives (China, Great Britain, U.S.A., etc.), employment notices, contracts, contemporary reports, research reports and reminiscences, studies on the subject by Chinese and foreign scholars.


**Academic Exchange and Achievement**

For the past 50 years, Chinese scholars have been trying their best to introduce to China important works on *Huaqiao-Huaren*, including works by George William Skinner, Peter Kwong, Lim Thien Joe, Betty Lee Sung, Jack Chen, Wang Gunwu, Li Guoqing, Yu Chu Kun, Yen Ching Hwang, Leo Suryadinata, Diane Mei Lin Mark & Ginger Chih, Edgar Wickberg, W. J. Cator, Chin Fatt Yong, François Debré, Watt Stuart, Leonard Blussé, Frank Pieke, I-Yao Shen, Lucie Cheng, etc.

Various international conferences or symposia have been held in China either by Chinese scholars or co-hosted by Chinese and their international partners. Chinese scholars have become active in international academia. The old generation is continuing to merge with the world community. The new generation has begun to show their capability. Zhuang Guotu’s translations of the history of Sino-Dutch relationship and *Huaqiao-Huaren* went to the Netherlands as a gift to the Queen. Li Minghuan’s *“We Need Two Worlds”: Chinese Immigrant Associations in a Western Society* (Amsterdam, 1999) and Wu Xiao An’s *Chinese Business in the Making of a Malay State, 1882-1941, Kedah and Panang* (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) have been welcomed by the international community. Li Anshan’s *A History of Chinese Overseas in Africa* (Beijing, 2000) caught the international attention after its publication.

There have been quite a number of studies on different topics, such as Huaqiao and the 1911 Revolution, *Huaqiao* and the Anti-Japanese War, their role in Chinese revolution and construction, Chinese indentured labours, Chinese policies regarding *Huaqiao*. Professor Zhu Jieqin once pointed out that the history of the *Huaqiao* in the Southeast Asia could only be viewed as a whole. Many studies have followed this line. However, some works also deal with individual countries or continents. More works have come out recently.

In summary, for the past more than 50 years, the study of *Huaqiao-Huaren* in mainland
China has undergone a process from half secret to opening-up, from general to specific, from introduction to systematic research.

**Different Situation and New Challenge**

**Changed Object**

Now the situation is changing. First, the object of our study is changing. Wang Gunwu categorized the Chinese overseas as four groups in 1984: *Hua Shang, Hua Gong, Hua Qiao and Hua Yi*. His classification is absolutely right historically. However, *Huaqiao-Huaren* today are much more complex than 20 years ago and include different groups. The increase of the Chinese diaspora is more rapid, the source regions wider, the students and high skilled substantial, and the irregular migrants are growing. In 1978-2001, the Chinese students abroad are 460,000. About 100,000 returned to China. From 1978 to 1999, the return rate of Chinese students varied in different countries. The Chinese students abroad are a fluid group; they either settle down in host countries and become new immigrants, or keep their choice open. As new immigrants, they are quickly adapted to the host society with knowledge and skill. It is not uncommon that some gave up the favorite condition and return to China to open their business.

*Huashang* and *Huayi* are more or less the same as Wang described, but the number of *Huaqiao* is increasing understandably. Another difference is that the three groups now co-exit and have their own role and arena. The last group *Huagong* is unique in both legal status and life condition. Wang once said that the type of *Huagong* had become history and would never revive. This statement might be true in the early 1980s. Out of our expectation, this group has revived in various forms and the number is growing rapidly. The noticeable issue is that most of them do not possess legal status and susceptible to all kinds of horrible conditions.

In general, with more and more Chinese migrants abroad, the component of Chinese diaspora becomes increasingly complex, the educated and the uneducated, students and peasants, senior cadres and commoners, rich and poor.

**Different Impact**

Second, the impact is increasing. Economically, *Huaqiao-Huaren* did cause international attention in history, now it differs in extent, quantity and quality. With the opening-up policy, the Chinese overseas were the first to invest in China, introducing international standards in production, logistics, business and management. At the same time, they became active in cultural exchange between China and their host countries. Their role in the economic growth in both China and Southeast Asia has left the academia dazzling. The present Chinese diaspora also differs from the past in that they cover almost all walks of life in host countries, spreading from underground service to high-tech business, from shadow economies to computer industry. Some of them even quickly became millionaires in the host countries. Chen Hong, born in Xi-an, China, went to the U.S. for his Ph.D. in 1985, established his own company in 1994, which appeared in the board of NASDAQ in
1999. He became the first successful electronic businessman from the mainland China.xxx Many highly skilled Chinese found their jobs in other countries. Although causing an alarm of "brain drain" in China, they have brought about "international transfer of technology, capital, knowledge, information," promoting "international trade relations and academic and cultural exchanges" and increasing "the social welfare of both sending and receiving countries.”xxx

Politically, it is more complicated. The Chinese diaspora is also connected with transnational issues. The Chinese are not only the Han; they are a people of 56 ethnic groups.xxxi Therefore, the Huaqiao-Huaren are not only the Han Huaqiao-Huaren, but also ethnic minority Huaqiao-Huaren, who are closely related to the transnational issues. Besides cross border trade, cultural exchange, inter-marriage, there are negative activities: crime, smuggling, terrorism, etc, that resulted in political attention. The ethnic minorities Huaqiao-Huaren have a close linkage with so-called "cross-border ethnic groups." The two groups have common as well as different features.xxxii In the international anti-terrorist activities, sources disclose that some terrorists are members of Chinese ethnic minorities involved in the so-called "Eastern Turkistan Republic", some of them are Chinese overseas in the neighboring countries.

Dual Nationality

Recent years, some Canadian Chinese began to ask for Chinese nationality, thus dual nationality. China dropped dual nationality in 1955 for the reason we know. Now, there appears an opposite opinion from some Chinese overseas. The reasons given by the new Chinese Canadians are triple. The first is closely linked with human rights. They argue that nationality is a citizen's primary right. To obtain foreign country's citizenship is not a crime. A person is entitled to choose whether to keep his or her born-country's nationality after he or she obtains the host country's citizenship. But according to Chinese law of nationality, once you obtain another country's citizenship, you give up Chinese nationality automatically. This is a punishment by depriving of the primary right without any ground. xxxiii But the rationale behind this is the globalization of the world economy. China is now considered one of the important industrial engines in Asia, offering various opportunities. The Chinese Canadians (or other countries' Chinese) realize this good chance and want to get benefits from it while making their own contribution to the country of their ancestors. No wonder that in a poll by two civil organizations in Canada, 92 per cent of the Chinese investigated agreed that the Chinese government should adopt the policy of dual nationality. However, the Chinese diaspora in Southeastern Asian countries may not be happy with this strategy.xxxiv

Suggestions for Diaspora Program

1) To establish a workable network of labor market in order to provide information for both sending and receiving countries, thus make the labor migration a win-win situation.
2) To improve the change of information on both labor shortage and labor available, thus make the arrangement more government oriented and legally protected.
3) To facilitate the exchange in information, research and culture for both sending and receiving countries, in order to improve understanding between different cultures.

i Huanqiao means the overseas Chinese who maintain their Chinese citizenship; Huaren means the Chinese overseas who have obtained nationality of the country where they have settled. Sometimes Huaren is used to indicate all the Chinese. In Taiwan, Huaqiao refers to all the overseas Chinese.


iii Chen Ta, Chinese Migrations, With Special Reference to Labor Conditions, Washington, 1923; P. G. Campbell, Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire, London, 1923; H. F. MacNair, The Chinese Abroad, Their Position and Protection, A Study in International Law and Relations, Shanghai, 1924.


vi Some distinguished scholars such as Liu Shimu, Li Changfu, etc. also wrote some influential works on the subject during the Republic period. For more detail, see Li Anshan. "A survey on studies on overseas Chinese in Republican China," Modern Chinese History Studies (Institute of Modern Chinese History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), No.4, 2002.


viii The former was designated by the Ministry of Education in 2000 as the base for the study of Huaqiao-Huaren and has since done a great deal of work; the latter has published 21 monographs on the subject since its founding in 1999.


xi Articles written by Zhou Nanjing, Liang Yingming, Qiu Liben, Huang Kunzhang and Li Guoliang have appeared in foreign newspapers and journals. Kong Yuanzhi’s works were published in both Malay and Indonesian. Cai Renlong’s collection of essays on the Southeast Asia was translated into Japanese and received a warm welcome.


xiii There are several collections of papers on the subject. For the monograph, see Ren Guixiang, Sun Yat-sen and Huaqiao, Heilongjiang People’s Publication Company, 1998.
There are several studies, but the earliest is Zhen Ruiyan's *Huaqiao and the Anti Japanese War*, Sichun University Press, 1988; the most comprehensive study is Huang Xiaojian et al, *Overseas Chinese and the Anti Japanese War*, Beijing Publication Company, 1995.


In 1977-1999, the rate is 14.1 per cent in U.S. In Japan, about one third of the Chinese students are reported to return home. The rate is much higher in Europe, 47.6 percent in France, 46.8 per cent in the United Kingdom, and 37.8 per cent in Germany. Frank Laczko, "Introduction"; Xiang Biao, "Emigration from China: A Sending Country Perspective"; Guochu Zhang, "Migration of Highly Skilled Chinese to Europe: Trends and Perspective", in Frank Laczko, ed., *Understanding Migration between China and Europe, International Migation*, pp.1-19, 21-48, 71-97.


Now scholars prefer to use "irregular migrants" or "undocumented migrants" to describe them.

The recent Morecambe tragedy is only the tip of the iceberg. For a detailed case study, see Wang Chunguang, *The Wenzhouese in Paris*, Nanchang, 2000.


In Europe for example, see Zhang Gouchu, "Migration of Highly Skilled Chinese to Europe: Trends and Perspective," Frank Laczko, ed., *Understanding Migration between China and Europe*, International Migration, pp.73-95.

According to the statistics of the fifth census (2000) in China, the Han accounts for 1,159,400,000, 91.59% of the total population, the ethnic minorities have a population of 106,430,000, 8.41% of the total population. Xinhua Network, "Major data of the fifth census", *Communique*, No.1, March 28,2001.

There are altogether more than 30 cross-border ethnic groups in China. For a more detailed study, see Li Anshan, "Ethnic minorities Huaqiao-Huaren: A preliminary study," *Overseas Chinese History Study*, 2003, No.3., pp.1-18.

www.newstarweekly.com. April 19, 2002. During her visit in Canada, October 31-November 3, Chen Yujie, the Director of the Office of the Chinese Overseas Affairs of the State Council, met with representatives Yuan Zhiqiang and Lu Binxiong from the Chinese community in Toronto, who presented this idea regarding the issue. They also argue that many countries recognize the dual nationality, China should follow their example. Moreover, Chinese overseas by nature are Chinese. Whenever there is need, they offer their contribution to China. They always care about China. The development of China needs various support, about 50 million Chinese overseas should be considered an important factor, since they are rich in economic strength, cultural heritage, scientific and technological resources, etc. and are familiar with other world and the international regulations. So China should make the best use of this human resource.

Zhou Nanjing, "Historical studies of the overseas Chinese and the policy of the overseas Chinese affairs: the case of the dual nationality of the overseas Chinese", *Qian Dao Ribao (Harian Nusantara, Indonesia)*, December 13, 2003. In this article, Professor Zhou is strongly opposed to the idea of dual nationality and thinks that it would bring great trouble to the Chinese diaspora in Southeastern Asian countries.
People In-Between: Reflections from the Indian Indentured Diaspora

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There is a small Indian community in Canberra where I live. It is a replica of Indian communities found in many western countries. It has its temples, mosques, churches; its spice and grocery shops and video outlets, restaurants and takeaway joints. It has its voluntary organisations pursuing a variety of social and cultural objectives. Occasional classes are held to re-acquaint children with the culture of their parents or grandparents. Festivals, such as Diwali and Dasherra, Eid and Prophet Mohammed's birthday are celebrated with appropriate aplomb. Cultural evenings, of songs and music, form a regular part of the community's social calendar. Ancient prejudices and modern greed are alive and well, causing fissures and frictions which enliven the social life of its members.

No migrant community is complete without a newsletter, and the Canberra Indians have several, both the electronic as well as the conventional variety, disseminating news about cultural events, soliciting contributions for this cause or that, announcing news of death, birth and marriages. Some offer longer reflections. Here is an excerpt, which provides the text for my paper. 'Like an overflowing container, Indians have spilled all over the world,' says the writer. 'This spilling,' he continues with becoming modesty, 'has been by and large to the benefit of the world. He goes on:

We Indians are found in every corner of the world. One in every five human beings on this plant is an Indian. From Australia to Alaska and Britain to Bahrain, we are proudly carrying the flag of Indian culture and civilisation along with idlis, dosas and chicken curry. They say that when Hillary and Tenzing reached the peak of Mt Everest, they were served hot parathas and cold lassi at Bhappe da Dhaba. Hillary was so enthralled by these that he climbed Mt Everest twice. It is rumoured that pathfinder on Mars found the thousand year relics of Patel the Motel among the rocks. You can find a Fiji Indian running an Indian grocery shop on the North Pole selling spices, rice, atta and dhal, along with copies of Hindi movies boldly labelled 'Pirated.

It is true that Indians are found nearly everywhere in the world. In 1980, ancient history now, the Calcutta newspaper, The Statesman, claimed that there were, in fact, only five countries where Indians had 'not yet chosen to stay. These were Cape Verde Island, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, North Korea, and Romania! This is impressive statistics about a people long regarded as landlubbers, bound to home and hearth by caste strictures forbidding the crossing of the dreaded kala pani, dark, pollution-producing sea. But despite its wide spread, the Indian diaspora is not nearly as large as other Diasporas. In 1990, 8.6 million Indians were living outside the subcontinent, roughly one percent of the population living at home. By contrast, 11 million Jews lived outside Israel, compared to 3.5 million within it, while 22 million Chinese lived outside China compared to one billion at home.
The claim about the popularity of Indian cuisine is also (partly) true. Even where Indian people themselves might not be welcomed, their food is. In Suva, Fiji, you will not find many mainstream indigenous Fijian restaurants, even though Fijians now constitute more than half the population. You will, however, find Indian and Chinese restaurants in all the major urban centres. In Trinidad and Guyana, Indian 'busup-shut' and 'dhall-puris' are the standard fare in urban areas. In Paramaribo, Surinam, the most popular eating place in town is 'Roopram's Rotishop.' So Indian food, especially of the non-vegetarian variety, is well on its way to becoming a regular fare in most countries with Indian populations. In this respect, in the friendly competition of the culinary stakes, the Indian and Chinese communities are rivals. May this rivalry long continue.

But other assertions in the passage quoted above are more problematic and would bear closer scrutiny. I want to preface what follows by noting some of the conceptual difficulties involved in using such an encompassing term as 'Indian' to describe a literal and symbolic community of people who share a common ancestral culture. A Patel or a Punjabi or a peasant from Fiji, are not all peas in the same pod. I want to suggest a more complex, socially, occupationally and genealogically differentiated category. I conceive of social and cultural identity as 'multiply inflected and continuously reproduced,' to use the words of Aisha Khan, who goes on to argue that diaspora studies generally 'reflect the recognition that stability in points of origin, finality of destinations, and coherence of identities are notions that have all been questioned and reassessed in recent scholarship'. This leads me to the second point about the nature and meaning of the relationship that diasporic Indians have with India, that is, whether all overseas Indians 'are proudly carrying the flag of Indian culture and civilisation,' or whether the relationship admits to a more complex reading.

The Indian diaspora, like most other movements and displacement of people, is the product of many causes and many crossings over an extended period of time. Historians differ over the precise timing and nature of the different phases of Indian migration, but for my purposes, three will do. The first phase occurs in the pre-European age, involving long distance trading voyages across the Indian Ocean to the east coast of Africa and, closer to home, Southeast Asia... Impelled by missionary zeal or the imperatives of commerce and trade, voluntary and individualistic in nature, the impact of the early excursions survive now in cultural and historical relics and in the archives of deep time.

The second phase of systematic organized labour migration was the result of European commercial and colonial expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries. The third phase, a product of imperial relationships and the opportunities for migration, education and settlement which it offered, is by and large a phenomenon of the 20th century. The British Commonwealth, particularly the United Kingdom, was the main destination of the Indian elite. The United States and Canada and to a lesser extent Australia and New Zealand followed later, and then in much smaller (but now increasing) numbers. The emigrants were well-to-do or well connected, and migrated freely and voluntarily. The contact with the motherland was maintained and nourished through arranged marriages and regular visits. These, especially the more recent migrants, are the true 'non-resident Indians.'
Another kind of Indian 'diaspora' has begun to emerge recently whose precise character and orientation is difficult to ascertain but which is likely to become an important part of the larger diasporic mosaic this century. This is the diaspora of the 'twice banished,' descendants of Indian settlers in the plantation colonies in the West Indies, Fiji, Mauritius, Africa, and parts of Southeast Asia. Although ancestrally Indian, they are products of many influences, western and others peculiar to the region of residence. (In the case of Fiji, for instance, Indian, Oceanic and Western, in the Caribbean, Indian, Black and Western). Forced by political turbulence and repression at home - Idi Amin in Uganda, Sitiveni Rabuka in Fiji, Forbes Burnham in Guyana - or because of a search of better prospects, the descendants of the pioneer Indian settlers in the tropical colonies now make home in Canada, the United States, Australasia and Europe. They acknowledge their Indian roots and can identify with the broad contours of Indian culture, but they are also acutely aware of their separate non-Indianness as well. Questions of 'culture,' 'homeland,' 'territoriality,' 'nation' so intimately tied to the diasporic identity, always problematic even at the best of times, acquire a particular niche in their psyche.

I do not want to dwell on the trials and tribulations of this group, of which I myself am a part, but of their founding ancestors who left India during the second phase of migration from the subcontinent, a direct product of European colonial and commercial expansion in the 19th century. It began with the large scale migration of Indian indentured labour to the 'King Sugar' colonies of Natal, Mauritius, Guyana, Trinidad, Surinam, Fiji and, under slightly different system, to countries in Southeast Asia. Begun in 1834 to meet the shortage of labour following the abolition of slavery in the British Empire, indentured emigration transported nearly 1.3 million Indian people to the distant colonies until all emigration ceased in 1916.

Indenture was a grand but ultimately flawed labour experiment. But it was a unique system, different from the various patterns of Chinese labour migration to Southeast Asia. The system was government regulated and supervised, for the emigrants were British subjects departing for employment under a five year contract. That contract stipulated the terms and conditions of employment in the colonies, remuneration for the labour of the emigrants, state responsibility for provision of medical and housing facilities, rations for a specified period of time. The immigrants would work for five and half days a week on plantation and manufacturing work, for which adult males would be receive 12 pennies and women nine, and they would receive rations for six months on a scale prescribed by the government. Not surprisingly, these promises were seldom fulfilled, leading to grave abuses in the system, but at least on paper - and in fact more than on paper - the colonial governments were held accountable by the government of India - for the performance or non-performance of the contracts.

One important feature of Indian indentured migration was the provision of a free return passage to all emigrants who had completed ten years of industrial residence in the colonies; they could return at their own expense after five. Colonial governments and planters everywhere protested and pleaded with India to revoke the provision. After having incurred huge expenses, they want-
ed the Indians to remain to provide a settled pool of cheap labour for the labour-intensive sugar economy. The Government of India refused to oblige, for to have done so would have been an act of deception. Many emigrants returned. Up to 1870, 21 per cent had returned. From Fiji nearly 24,000 of the 60,000 migrants went back. But the majority stayed on, encouraged by the availability of new opportunities, and inertia. In the course of time, sojourners became settlers.

The rights and interests of these settlers were protected in legislation. First, the government of India insisted that its indentured subjects be allowed to enjoy the same rights and privileges as other subjects resident in the colonies. It was a requirement repeated over time. All the colonies were required to submit annual reports to both the Government of India and to the India Office in London. When exceptional abuses came to light, India intervened with the threat of cancelling emigration. The threat was effective. Official enquiries were instituted, which brought some amelioration. By the beginning of the 20th century, Indian public opinion began to take interest in the affairs of the indentured Indians. Their reports and comments, coinciding with a resurgence of Indian nationalism, galvanized Indian public opinion which eventually ended the indenture system. In the colonies, an extensive machinery supervised indentured labour, consisting of resident inspectors of immigrants, medical officers and others. At the apex of the system was the Agent General of Immigration, a colonial official who represented the concern of the immigrants in the Legislative Council. Not all officials were effective or sympathetic, but neither were they all callous and colluding with the planters.

Another feature unique to indenture was the fixed ratio of men to women in the emigrating population. The ratio evolved gradually. Before the 1860s, the situation varied, but after the 1870s, the government of India insisted that 40 women accompany every 100 men on each shipment. The colonies complained about the extra cost of paying for (women) labourers who might more likely become a burden than an asset, and recruiters complained of difficulties in recruiting them. Once again, though, India was adamant, and in most cases, the ratio was met, and not necessarily through coercion of kidnapping either. In the late 19th century, women from depressed rural areas of eastern Uttar Pradesh were on the move in search of employment, and it was from this uprooted mass that the migrants came. The government's stipulation ameliorated what would have been a major social problem, but disparity in the sex ratio, while it lasted, caused uncertainty and instability in Indian social and married life. Nonetheless, the presence of women on the plantations helped the community retain a semblance of its cultural and social identity.

There is another feature of indentured emigration worth noting. The people who migrated were essentially non-literate labourers and petty cultivators, essentially representing a fair cross-section of rural India. The Patels and the Punjabis, the traders and the artisans, came much later or, in the case of East Africa, went either as temporary workers or as fortune-seeking free migrants. The impression that the quotation gives, and which many visitors have, of Indians as wealthy traders and entrepreneurs is misleading. In fact, long after indenture ended, the bulk of the descendants of the girmityyas remained on the farm, as cultivators of rice, sugar, cotton, bananas and other commercial
crops, as employees of plantation companies and as general casual labourers. Their visibility in the commercial and professional sector came much later, accompanied unsurprisingly by envy and suspicion of those whose dominance their efforts challenged.

Like the Indians, the Chinese have a long, almost unbroken, record of migration to neighbouring countries as sojourners in search of better opportunities. This migration, like its Indian counterpart, is divided into several phases. The first, from the seventh to the sixteenth centuries, the intra-Asian phase, commercial in nature and often officially sponsored, was confined to the neighbouring region in Southeast Asia - Formosa, the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. The second phase, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, was also intra-Asian in scope, but stimulated by the entry of European powers in the intra-Asian trade sphere, with increased numbers of merchants, artisans, miners and agricultural workers going to the Philippines, Java, West Borneo, Sumatra, Thailand and the Malay Peninsula.

In the third phase, during the nineteenth century, the Chinese, while expanding within Asia, branched out voluntarily as individuals to other areas, to such far away as Fiji in the late 19th century, where they set up as retailers and rural shop keepers, often marrying into the indigenous communities. Some left for the Caribbean from the 1890s to the 1940s, and many of the present day Caribbean Chinese are descended from this group. However, the Chinese were vastly outnumbered by Indian indentured migrants.

Both the experience as well as the structure of Chinese and Indian indentured migration differed in significant respects. As already noted, the Indian indenture system was state sponsored and regulated. The Chinese indenture had its own unique characteristics which distinguished it from its Indian counterpart. Lai has identified six differences between Chinese and Indian patterns of indentured migration. There was no provision for a return passage back to China after the end of the five year term, as there was in the case of the Indians. The contracts the Chinese had were less standardized than the contracts of Indian indenture, leading to confusion and misinterpretation. The Chinese contracts provided for a seven and half hour workday, while for Indians in Trinidad it was nine hours and seven hours in Guyana. The Chinese could have repayable loan advances as well as country payments for accompanying family members, whereas the Indians did not. The Indian indentured labourers were given rations for a limited period upon arrival in the colonies, after which they were expected to pay their own expenses, whereas Chinese indentured workers were sometimes allowed rations as well as wages and other benefits, including small garden grounds. Perhaps the most important difference was that Chinese women were not allowed to enter into contracts of indenture. Instead, they entered into contracts of residence which bound them to designated plantations for five years where they lived but where they were not obliged to work. Indian indentured women, on the other hand, were brought to the colonies as indentured workers in their own right and employed on the plantations as such. This complicated family life, imposed additional hardships on women and contributed to the neglect of young children, producing high, heart-rending mortality rates in the late 19th century.
Both the Chinese as well as the indentured Indian communities bore the brunt of the brutalizing routine of the plantation regime. Indeed, the plantation was the site of massive social and cultural transformation for both the communities. Smaller in number and strong in the early phase of indentured emigration to the West Indies, the Chinese were, on the whole, well received by the planters, and commended in official reports for their industry, thrift and law-abiding nature. The British Guinea Commission noted in 1871:

"The Chinese labourer possesses greater intelligence than either the Indian or the Negro, and is much quicker at learning to manage machinery than either of them. He is also very careful and neat in his work in the field or buildings; is much more independent than the Coolie, and is not easily led away by discontented persons; rarely making a frivolous complaint...Possessing a keen sense of justice where his own rights are concerned, he is very capable of strong resentment that appears to him unjust."

This is from the perspective of officials and says little about the inner personal costs of work. In fact, physical abuse of the labourers was common, and the high level of stress and anxiety starkly indexed in high suicide rates, drug addiction, unlawful desertion and unauthorized absence from work, deliberate acts of vandalism against plantation property and in occasional strikes.

The fundamental difference between Chinese and Indian experiences was that in the West Indies by the 1870s, the heyday of the Chinese was over, replaced by indentured Indians who became the backbone of the sugar plantation economy. For this reason, they were more deeply affected by the rigours of the plantation economy. Indeed, in some places, such as Guyana, the Indians continued to depend on the nexus of the plantation economy for their survival well into the middle decades of the 20th century. Even when the Indians were freed from indenture, they continued to do agricultural work, remaining in rural areas as cane and rice growers, field labourers and mill hands. The drift towards the urban areas and into the skilled professions came later, and much more slowly.

In contrast, many Chinese left the confines of the plantations as soon as they were eligible and went into other professions, quicker in some colonies than in others. In Trinidad, many entered the retail trade, while others became domestic servants, hawkers, cocoa and coconut growers, jewellers, saw millers, landlords, rum distillers and smugglers and owners of the hardware business. They did well, some exceptionally so, such as Wong Yan-Sau in British Guiana and John Ho-a-Shoo whose three sons attended the University of Edinburgh in the early 1990s and whose daughter, Asin, became a Fellow of the Royal college of Surgeons before settling in Hong Kong in 1915.

But any hope that this success might encourage the development of a larger Chinese community in the West Indies failed to materialise. On the contrary, the Chinese population continued to decline throughout the latter half of the 19th century. Despite some (half-hearted) attempts, there was no fresh injection of migrants from China once the system of Indian indentured emigration took root. Its success spelled the end of the Chinese experiment. Many Chinese did not marry, nor had no children even when they entered into common law unions. Another reason for the decline was the
mobility of the Chinese who dispersed to other parts of the Caribbean which seemed more commercially lucrative. Some returned to China, perhaps the most notable of them being Eugene Chen, a lawyer, who became Sun Yet-sen's foreign affairs advisor and personal secretary from 1912-1925, and a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. The Indians, on the other hand, were less occupationally mobile and certainly less prone to migration than the Chinese. About a quarter of the indentured Indians and their families and even descendants returned to India.

The Chinese and the Indians also differed in their approach to, and enthusiasm for, integration, into their host societies. The former responded to opportunities for integration more readily than the latter for a number of reasons, including the small size of the community, the great distance from China, the absence of regular cultural contact with the ancestral homeland and the realities in their new homeland. One of these realities was the paucity of Chinese women, and the willingness of Chinese men to form liaisons with local women, thereby lessening the potential for antipathy towards them. So intermarriage was a function of both necessity as well as choice. Overtime, a sizeable and important mixed race Chinese community developed, speaking the local language and often adopting anglicized names for the sake of convenience. Another facilitator of assimilation was the Chinese non-reluctance to convert to Christianity. The 1891 Trinidad census showed that 914 of the 1,006 Chinese had converted the new faith, with the majority belonging to the Church of England, followed, in that order, by Roman Catholicism, Presbyterianism, and the Wesleyan Church. Still, despite these developments, there was no wholesale rejection of things Chinese. As Lai points out:

Local-born Chinese ties to the homeland diminished progressively with the generational factor, even though Chinese ethnicity as a binding within the Chinese community was retained, but varying a great deal with individual families and diluted over time by the process of creolization/Americanization, cultural and racial. However, the China link remained, and indeed never died, side by side with the assimilation and creolization process.

With the indentured Indians in the West Indies and elsewhere, the process of assimilation was much slower and much more measured. Indenture involved both fragmentation as well as reconstitution. Perhaps the great casualty of indentured migration was the caste system whose strict rules of social relationships, pollution and purity and other ritual strictures fell by the wayside on the long voyage to the colonies and, even more forcefully, on the plantations whose daily routine of labour and systems of reward acknowledged individual enterprise and initiative and not divinely sanctioned status. Another factor of importance was the background of the workers, who came from the middle to lower social and economic strata, people of the 'Little Tradition,' in Milton Singer's words, unversed in the higher, sacred texts of Hinduism. The absence of cultural leadership created confusion and hardship. The indifference of the colonial regime and the determination of the planters to keep the Indians in the labour force helped matters little.

For all this, though, there never was a complete breakdown of Indian social and cultural institutions on the plantations. The Indians developed a new culture, drawn from surviving frag-
ments of the past and interweaving them with what they encountered in the colonies. As Leo Despres has written, there was continuity 'not only because the indentures had certain rights, but also because the immigration and labour laws which defined those rights served to confine the new immigrants to ethnic ghettos. As new indentures arrived in one wave after another for almost three-quarters of a century, they were mixed with those who came earlier. This served to reinforce traditional habits and customs and contributed to a continuity of cultural patterning.' The contrast with the Chinese experience was marked.

Women played a critical role in the reconstitution and maintenance of Indian culture. As Jeremy Poynting writes, women were 'the main preservers of Indian domestic culture,' which, he argues, was 'initially the principal means whereby Indians maintained their identity.' We should be careful not to blame the Indian women for the cultural and racial exclusiveness of the Indian society. The women were not instigators of this, but a part of a larger process of reconstitution. An important point to bear in mind is that unlike the Chinese, Indian men were never able to develop a collegial relationship with the local communities they encountered in the colonies. Part of this was due to the large size of their community which did not require interaction with outsiders. Partly also, they sometimes competed for similar jobs, which created friction. Cultural prejudice also played a part. The Indian immigrants in Fiji called the indigenous Fijians 'junglis,' bushmen lacking culture and sophistication while for their part, the Fijians saw little to admire in the 'Kai Idia' beasts of burden. In Guyana, the Blacks saw the Indians as unfortunate victims while they themselves were convinced that they 'enjoyed a superior position to the East Indian'. In Trinidad, Indians 'strenuously objected' to intermarriage with Blacks, and in Jamaica the Indians called them 'kafari' which means an infidel.

Religion also helped to maintain and reinforce Indian cultural identity among overseas Indians. From very early on, the migrants seemed determined to preserve their religion to provide support and solidarity among themselves. In the words of Roy Glassgow, 'the Indian's emphasis upon the values and worth-whileness of his culture was really a mode of expression of his desire to be treated on terms of equality within the Guyanese universe.' In Fiji by the 1890s, the indentured labourers on the plantations were reading all the texts of popular Hinduism circulating in the Indo-Gangetic plains, the most important of all being the Ramayana, whose epic story of Lord Rama's banishment stuck a particular chord with the migrants. Rama was exiled for fourteen years for no fault of his own, but he did return: good eventually triumphed over evil. His story gave the indentured labourers hope that they, too, one day will triumph over their ordeals. Besides reading the religious texts, Indians in all the colonies celebrated Hindu and Muslim festivals such as Diwali, Holi, Eid and Muharram.

Unlike the Chinese, the Indians did not embrace Christianity in large numbers. This was not for lack of trying on the part of the Christian missionaries, such as the Methodists in Fiji and the Presbyterians in the Caribbean. Christianity failed to impress for a number of reasons. The Indian immigrants, even though themselves illiterate, showed pride, often exaggerated pride, in their own culture and traditions, and the community was large enough to support institutions and practices
which contributed to the retention of their culture. Within a few decades of settlement, Indian communities everywhere had their own temples and places of prayer and worship. They also established social and cultural institutions - the Arya Samaj, the Sanatan Dharam Sabhas, the Mandalis - which sustained their culture. There was also the added fact of Christianity being identified in the indentured labourers' mind with the religion of their oppressors, the colonial officials and the planters. And so, for a variety of factors, Christianity remained a minor religion among the Indians.

There was one other difference between the Indian and the Chinese communities. It has already been pointed out that the Chinese were more mobile occupationally as well as geographically. Their pragmatic decision to embrace assimilation improved their chances of success. But the mobility of the Indians was curtailed. In the case of Fiji, this was by law. Governor Sir Arthur Gordon's policies effectively kept the two main races separate and apart. The Fijians lived in the subsistence sector for most of the 20th century, while the Indians lived in scattered settlements in the sugar cane belts of the country. Legislation restricted Fijian mobility and prevented Indians from settling in the vicinity of Fijian villages. Separate schools were established for Fijian, Indian and European children. In politics, too, communal rolls provided for racially segregated representation in the colonial legislature. So the gulf between the different communities that resulted from culture, language and religion, was exacerbated by government policy and practice, with each community leaning on its own cultural and spiritual resources for success.

In time, the Indian communities in the 'King Sugar' colonies increased in size. In Mauritius, Fiji, Guyana and Trinidad, they became the dominant community in the decades following the end of indenture in 1920. Numerical increase and permanent settlement led to the demand for political representation which, in turn, led to the creation of political structures providing for various degrees and forms of political representation - limited franchise, communal representation, and nomination - with the colonial government retaining the ultimate authority. Nonetheless, for all its imperfections, even the limited political representation enabled the representation of Indian concerns at the highest levels of government.

In addition to political representation, the Indian community was able to mobilize its own cultural and economic resources for the purposes of education and social progress, tasks neglected by colonial governments keen to keep the Indians tied to land. Voluntary organisations were formed and cultural institutions established: the Arya Samaj, the Sanatan Dharam, Sangam, the Muslim League. Temples were built, schools established through the keenness of parents eager to escape the vicious cycle of poverty and the degradation of menial labour. These initiatives halted cultural derradication and laid the foundation of social and cultural development, the indifference and importunity of the colonial governments notwithstanding.

The indenture system regulated one kind of Indian labour migration. The other, which dominated in Southeast Asia was, was the Kangani system. Most of the recruits under this system came from South India, and the numbers were large: between 1852 and 1937, 2,595,000 Indian immigrants went to Burma, 1,529,000 to Ceylon and 1,189,000 to Malaya. The kangonis (or
maistries in the case of Burma) were often experienced and trusted employees of the plantation or the estate who were dispatched to recruit labourers in their villages. The kanganis not only recruited the labourers, but at work also acted as intermediaries between the employees and the employers, with concomitant opportunities that this position brought to them. The absence of comprehensive protective legislation and written and legally enforceable contracts enhanced their position. Nalini Ranjan Chakravarti argues that in this respect, the kangan system was worse than its indentured counterpart.

Among the Southeast countries, Malaya was the largest employer of South Indian indentured labour, importing, between 1844 and 1910, some 250,000 labourers. But this indenture differed in form, if not in spirit, from the indenture system discussed above. In the case of Malaya, the recruitment was carried out by speculators and private agents of employers, while licensed agents appointed by government officials carried out recruitment for the sugar colonies. The contract of service for Malaya was for three years, for the sugar colonies five; and it was not always a written, legally enforceable document. Another difference was that while the emigration agents for the sugar colonies bore the cost of transporting the recruits, the cost for Malaya was borne by the workers themselves, paid over time from their wages. And finally, because indentured emigration to the sugar colonies was state regulated, the government of India was in a position to demand the fulfillment of the terms and conditions specified in the Emigration Act, but the informal, non-written nature of the arrangements in Malaya did not permit close scrutiny. India could not, for example, enforce the sex-ratio of men to women that it could for the sugar colonies.

The indentured diaspora has spawned a diaspora of its own, with large numbers of Indo-Caribbeans and Indo-Fijians and other Indian communities now living in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The people are twice removed from India. Most have never been to India. Many, especially in the West Indies, have lost the language, and have adopted western values and adapted to the demands and necessities of living in multicultural societies. A great deal of the imaginative literature produced particularly in the Caribbean deals with the troubled and often tumultuous relationship the people of Indian descent have had with the countries of their birth where they faced years of exclusion from power and discrimination in the public sector. Yet, while seeking to understand their relationship with their current homeland, they also attempt to come to terms with their own ancestral culture. The task is not easy.

This leads directly to the claim in the quotation about overseas Indians 'proudly carrying the flag of Indian culture and civilisation.' This assertion raises further questions. Which Indian culture, which civilization? Which overseas Indians? The indentured labourers took with them Singers 'Little tradition' of Hinduism, that is, essentially folk culture of northern and southern India. The girmitiyas themselves were largely illiterate, from cultivating and labouring classes, young. The culture they resuscitated after the ravages of the long sea voyage and the rigours of the plantations was cobbled together from many fragments, a culture in which the recognised social institutions of Indian society, most especially the caste system, had no place. The plantation regime was a great leveller of
hierarchy and status, rewarding workers for the quality and quantity of their effort and not for their traditional status. The more recent Indian migrants to western countries, the literate professional classes, come generally from the 'Great tradition' of Indian society. The Bhagvada Gita rather than the Ramayana is likely to be their text. The two do not mix easily.

The process of cultural reconstitution took place everywhere, but it's exact depended on a number of conditions. One was the timing of the migration. The earlier migrants, particularly those who left India before the 1870s, faced greater difficulties in retaining their ancestral culture. Another important variable was the distance between India and the colonies where the indentured labourers went. As a general rule, the further away the colony, the less the contact with India and consequently lesser knowledge of the ancestral country. The policy of the colonial power and the role and influence of agents of western influence - Christianity, for example - also played an important role in determining the nature of the 'Indian' society that eventually emerged in the colonies. What was retained and what jettisoned depended on these factors. The exact nature of the reconstituted society depended on the conditions in each colony. Each indentured Indian community developed its own unique relationship with and view of India.

Let me illustrate this by comparing the Fijian experience with that of Trinidad. What most strikes the casual visitor to these two island nations both with substantial Indian communities is the difference in the degree to which one has retained its Indian culture, and the other lost it. In Fiji, a significant proportion of the population reads and understands Hindi. There are 24 hour Hindi radio stations and Hindi newspapers, and Hindi is one of the three official languages recognized by the constitution. Hinduism and Islam are the major religions of the Indian community, with only a small fraction professing Christianity. There is regular contact with India through periodic visit to the island by Indian religious missionaries and artists. In Trinidad few people speak Hindi, although many regret its loss and are now trying to learn the language. English is the primary language of most Indians. The Presbyterian mission was able to convert more Indians to its faith than the Methodist church was able to do in Fiji. Trinidadian Indians follow Hindi music and Bollywood cinema, but without understanding the language.

There are many reasons for the differences between Trinidad and Fiji. Indentured emigration to Fiji began much later, in 1879, by when there was an already well established Indian community in Trinidad. India showed far greater interest in Fiji than it did in other colonies, partly because of reports of greater abuses of Indian labourers on the Colonial Sugar Refining Company plantations. The Christian missions were not able to penetrate the Fijian Indian community to the extent they did the Trinidadian Indian partly because they concentrated their efforts on the indigenous Fijians and partly because of the stiff resistance of the Indians to the overtures of the new faith. The colonial policy towards the Indian community in Fiji forced the Fiji Indians to rely on their own efforts, which encouraged the retention of Indian culture. The emergence of voluntary social and cultural organisations from very early on also contributed towards that end. In Trinidad, the absence of an indigenous community, with its own demands and needs which the colonial government was
obligated to respect - as it had to in Fiji - produced its own effects.

There is, thus, diversity, even among the indentured populations coming from a similar ancestral stock in India and with a shared history of servitude. But the diversity between the descendants of indentured migrants and the 'indigenous' Indians living in the West is greater, producing friction and misunderstanding. The subcontinental Indians, with little experience of the 'Little Tradition' remark patronizingly on the folkloric and rustic nature of many overseas Indian customs and rituals. The put down is offensive and deeply hurtful to the overseas Indians who value these rituals as their cherished badges of cultural identity as 'Indians.' For many subcontinental Indians, the cultural rituals and ceremonies of the descendants of indentured Indians smack of archaic relics of a past which has vanished beyond recall in a modern India. Modern India, they say, has moved on, while the overseas Indians are trapped in a vanishing past.

For their part, the overseas Indians decry what they see as retrograde aspects of Indian culture. For example, most see the caste system as a deeply oppressive and degrading social system with no redeeming features, and thankful that caste has disappeared in overseas Indian communities. Other things cause bemusement as well, among them the Indian practice of arranged marriages, and the elaborate rituals of negotiation that accompany them. The Indian attachment to status, hierarchy, protocol, tradition, superstition - addiction to horoscope and astrology, for instance - sits uneasily with the overseas Indian preference for individualism, egalitarianism, a zest for living here and now, impatience with protocol. The intensity and violence of religious conflict on the Indian subcontinent confounds overseas Indians who have learnt to practice the virtues of religious pluralism.

India's relationship with overseas Indians has gone through several phases over the last century. In the 19th century, there was little public awareness of, or agitation about, the emigration of Indian indentured labourers, beyond the occasional comment about abuses in the recruitment system. It was an age of ignorance and darkness. That changed in the early years of this century, partly because Mahatma Gandhi's struggles in South Africa brought the overseas Indian question on to a broader public stage. From this flowed a number of enquiries, official and non-official, on the conditions on the Fijian plantations. Reports by sympathetic missionaries such as JW Burton and harrowing accounts by indentured labourer Totaram Sanadhya contributed to the end of the indenture system. The Indian interest was partly fuelled by the sense that treatment meted out to the indentured labourers was a reflection of India's lowly position in the international community.

The second phase, of more sustained Indian interest in the life of the overseas Indians, followed the end of indenture in 1920. Once the Indians had decided to settle in the colonies to which their forbears had migrated, the question of the political status of the Indians came to the fore. That is, what kind of arrangements would be appropriate which would retain political power in the hands of the colonial government while providing a semblance of representation to the Indians. India's intervention proved decisive at critical points. In the case of Fiji, for example, it was India's intervention which secured the Indian community political representation which the colonial government was reluctant to grant. India's support for common roll, however, was not successful. Similarly,
Indian pressure on the land question helped, in part, to resolve the perennially thorny land question, forcing the colonial government to enact legislation regularising land leases to Indian tenants. India felt a degree of moral and political obligation to keep a sympathetic eye on Indians overseas.

When India gained its independence, the situation changed from one of active concern about the welfare of overseas Indians to one of passive interest. India understandably became preoccupied with the problems and challenges that independence brought. In foreign policy, India championed the cause of non-alignment and the interests of the Third World, and concerns of overseas Indians were seen and assessed in that light. Overseas Indians: that is how India began to see the people it had previously viewed as Indians overseas. Nehru explicitly asked the overseas Indians to identify closely with the interests and aspirations of the countries of their residence, and cease looking at India as their 'motherland.' This pragmatic and sensible advice underlined a reality the overseas Indians had come to accept themselves. So beyond private advice or legal assistance in constitutional negotiations at the time of independence, India became a silent player.

The third stage came with the independence of the former sugar colonies, a process which began in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. During this phase, the overseas Indian communities began consciously to think about their place, their roles and responsibilities as citizens of new countries. In many cases, they were in the vanguard of the movement for independence though in many places - Guyana, Fiji - they were fated to spend considerable periods of time in the political wilderness. India was represented in these newly emerging nations through high commissions, but otherwise the contact was limited to a few visiting cultural performers. Gradually, the 'overseas' Indians became Indo-Fijians, Indo-Guyanese and Indo-Trinidadian, the shift encapsulating a new, hyphenated identity. Retention or accentuation of Indian culture was interpreted as an index of unassimilability of the people, beyond the recognition of a few festivals as national holidays. Increasing influence of western culture, ideas and institutions also produced its effects.

Nonetheless, the link with India, however tenuous, still persists. The overseas Indians cannot comprehend the intensity of caste or religious conflict on the Indian subcontinent. They lament the absence of civic pride, the degradation of the Indian environment, but they find it difficult to be indifferent to India. VS Naipaul's troubled and tumultuous relationship with India reflects, I think, a fairly common pattern of response. Brinsley Samaroo's observation is equally apt that overseas Indians, no matter where they are or how long they have been away from India, cannot escape the legacy of their Indian heritage. They will have to come to terms with it. The hyphenated nature of their cultural identity will not be easily erased.

I would like to end this paper with some personal thoughts which, I think, reflect wider and widely held concerns. The overseas Indians should acknowledge that they carry in their minds images of India, derived from mythological dramas and fantasy films, or from fragments of culture that survived the crossing, and that these do not necessarily reflect the reality of India. That India has moved on. It is no longer simply the land of Mahatma Gandhi or Jawaharlal Nehru. The classical heritage of music, art, literature and philosophical thought co-exist with the froth of popular,
westernized culture. That the land of their ancestors is scarred with the remains of religious and social conflict and violence beyond their imaginative understanding. Nor should they expect India to waive the magic wand on their behalf in international diplomacy, and expect its intervention to produce a favourable outcome for them on every occasion.

Subcontinental Indians, too, would need to re-define their attitude to the overseas Indians. They are not children of some lesser gods, culturally deficient and deformed, who inhabit the remote, unlovely fringes of Indian culture and civilization. They are a people with a distinct cultural identity which derives from India, but is not confined to it. Their culture is a confluence of many influences. Overseas Indians cherish the Indian part of their heritage, they want to nurture it, nourish it with new inputs, but it can be done within the context of existing realities. They are a people caught in-between.